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Precarious Wife intervenes in the propagation of the binary—of privilege and 
marginalization—inherent in discussions of the institutional identity of wife in the medieval and 
early modern periods by exposing the vulnerability and malleability of the category often 
ignored or minimized in discussions of pre-modern women. Drawing on Judith Butler’s work on 
vulnerability, this dissertation questions the normative trajectory of daughter, wife, widow for 
medieval and early modern women that excludes people with alternate narratives or identities. 
While men’s subjectivity spanned multiple identities based on their class, rank, career, religious 
practices, community, and networks of kinship, women were almost exclusively defined in 
relation to a male authority. The limitation of “wife” as the lens through which we discuss 
medieval and early modern women requires critique. Despite cultural expectations of social 
cache and stability that marriage was presumed to afford, many wives found themselves in 
precarious conditions because of their marital status. By continuing to view wifehood as the 
primary and desirable classification for women, modern scholars risk re-inscribing cultural 
narratives of the idealized good wife while overlooking how women appropriated the narrative 
for their own ends in order to combat the vulnerability, coercion, and violence that they faced 
 v 
due, in part, to the expectations of deference that defined the role of good wife. By attending to 
the instability of marriage and uncovering the permeability of conjugal relationships, this 
dissertation analyzes what happens to women who lose their connection to their central male 
authority: their husbands. In doing so, this project refutes the notion that “wife” was a stable and 
knowable category sufficient to define women by showing that it was partial, at best, and 
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“WHY YOU ARE NOTHING THEN”1 
 
At the end of Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, the Duke attempts to establish 
Mariana’s social status as he asks in succession, “What, are you married? … Are you a maid? … 
A widow, then?” (5.1.177–180). Mariana responds each time in the negative, leaving the Duke to 
declare, “Why you are nothing then” (5.1.183). Though secretly the Duke understands Mariana’s 
complicated position within the world of the play, his public bewilderment at the notion that a 
woman can exist beyond the categories traditionally assigned to her highlights the pervasive 
acceptance of these categories at the time. The repetition of this trajectory—maid, wife, 
widow—implies a natural progression in a woman’s life cycle that underlines the inevitability of 
marriage. However, as Karma Lochrie reminds us, in pre-modern Europe, “the category of the 
natural never implied the average, the widespread, or the ‘norm,’ but rather the ideal, which is 
not the same thing.”2 Amy Froide’s acknowledgement that “the normative people (or put another 
way, the people who mattered) in early modern England were husbands and wives,” is apt if we 
accept the progression from maid to wife as a “natural” one for early modern culture.3 
Nevertheless, the evidence—as repeatedly seen in historical accounts, court cases, pamphlets, 
letters, and plays—suggests that marriage was only one marker of identity for women and often a 
 
1 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, 5.1.183. All textual citations from William 
Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Ed. J. W. Lever, Arden 2nd Series, London: 
Bloomsbury, 1967. 
2 Lochrie, xxii. 
3 Froide, 3. 
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problematic one. While men’s subjectivity spanned multiple identities based on their class, rank, 
career, religious practices, community, and networks of kinship, women were almost exclusively 
defined in relation to a male authority. The limitation of “wife” as the lens through which we 
discuss medieval and early modern women requires critique. 
Precarious Wife intervenes in the propagation of the binary—of privilege and 
marginalization—inherent in discussions of the institutional identity of wife in the medieval and 
early modern periods by exposing the vulnerability and malleability of the category often 
ignored or minimized in discussions of pre-modern women. Despite cultural expectations of 
social cache and stability that marriage was presumed to afford, many wives found themselves in 
precarious conditions because of their marital status. By continuing to view wifehood as the 
primary and desirable classification for women, modern scholars risk re-inscribing narratives of 
the idealized good wife while overlooking how women appropriated the narrative for their own 
ends in order to combat the vulnerability, coercion, and violence that they faced due, in part, to 
the same expectations of deference that defined the role of good wife. 
The qualities of chastity, silence, and obedience are the standard hallmarks of the good 
wife, but the women discussed in these chapters also display heroic endurance—a gendered 
quality in early modern culture—and fulfill the feminine labors of marriage and patrilineal 
succession. The cultural ideal of the good wife implies that women who perform their gendered 
roles according to social expectations will “weave networks of functional accord.”4 In What You 
Will: Gender, Contract, and Shakespearean Social Space, Kathryn Schwarz argues that in terms 
of feminine labor, there is a “gap between decree and execution [that] requires an acquiescence 
 
4 Schwarz, 3. 
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that is deliberate and transactional rather than innate; through the contradictory logic of 
prescribed choice, feminine will becomes the means of social contract.”5 For Schwarz, early 
modern women repeatedly choose to acquiesce to “enforced conformity” in everyday 
interactions. In doing so, they take part in a social contract that allows them to create a “livable 
space” within their marriage and society, more broadly. Feminine deference, then, should 
function to help establish and maintain functional accord in the marital union. In response, as 
Tim Stretton asserts, “husbands enjoyed a monopoly over the management of marital property 
and an obligation to maintain their wives at a level befitting the couples’ social standing and 
material resources.”6 According to this ideal, then, if women fulfill the labors of obedience, 
marriage, and patrilineal succession, men equally are expected to provide them with adequate 
food, shelter, and clothing. This mutually beneficial understanding between husband and wife 
should secure stability within the household, the marriage, and society. However, as the women 
discussed in this project show, even the most devout performance of the good wife role does not 
assure a livable space when men fail to fulfill their part of the contract. 
Consequently, cultural expectations of appropriate conduct that renders women good 
wives are shown to be just that: principles of behavior that are at once socially demanded of 
women but do not guarantee functional accord within the marital union despite the promises of 
such portrayed in conduct literature and some early modern plays. The examples of the good 
wives discussed throughout this dissertation call into question the presumed stability of the 
category of wife within medieval and early modern culture and literature and show that the 
progression from maid to wife to widow touted as a natural and desired course for women—with 
 
5 Ibid. 
6 Stretton, Marital Litigation, 1. 
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wife being the social pinnacle and preferred state—is less linear and stable than previously 
acknowledged. Further, the category of wife, as shown within these historical examples and 
literary texts, is more messy and less structured than suggested by the cultural frame. Rather than 
provide women with social and economic protection, being a wife could expose them to violence 
and coercion. In Marital Litigation in the Court of Requests 1542–1642, Tim Stretton argues that 
“[t]he theoretical restrictions and obligations that marriage imposed on wives and husbands 
throughout most of English history appear relatively clear and unequivocal…What is less 
straightforward, however, is the way individual wives and husbands accepted or resisted these 
restrictions and obligations in daily life.”7 I am interested in those instances when wives were 
forced to maneuver within the confines of societal expectations of proper feminine behavior and 
labor in order to create a space for themselves within and beyond their marital unions. The 
women discussed in this project respond to their situations in a variety of ways. I will show that 
the good wife narrative was appropriated and used—to varying degrees of success—by women 
who desired to remain wives and by those who wished for greater autonomy away from their 
marriages. The representations of the wives examined in this dissertation reveal varied networks 
of support outside of their marriages, lines of authority separate from their husbands, non-
spousal bonds that were privileged by women, and a diversity of feminine self-identifications 
beyond the marital union. 
The critique of marriage that follows draws on the important work being done by a range 
of literary and historical scholars. Ruth Mazo Karras astutely argues in Unmarriages: Women, 
Men, and Sexual Unions in the Middle Ages that in order to resist the teleology of seeing the 




bonds of a given society.8 Karras’s work on the medieval period provides an excellent model for 
thinking about the various relationships that men and women privilege beyond the marital union. 
Her incorporation of many types of sexual unions suggests a greater fluidity with the marital 
identity that is a central concern of my own project. Further, her acknowledgement that any such 
work necessarily “examines a series of moments in medieval history rather than providing a 
chronologically and geographically complete account”9 is crucial because it reminds us that there 
is not one unified history of marriage that is easily traceable. Relationships differ based on 
cultural influences, religious and legal practices, and personal circumstance. Localized analysis, 
particularly of exceptional or minority narratives, can help undermine the cultural norms 
surrounding marriage by showing the variability of experience and its representation.  
Like Karras’ work on relationships that problematize the concept of traditional marriage, 
Cordelia Beattie focuses on unions that make up what she calls the “margins of marriage.” She 
argues that in late medieval England, “marital status can be seen as a performance that had to be 
acted out in order to be visible.”10 Beattie builds on the work of Joan Chandler’s Women Without 
Husbands to show that the “idealisation of the nuclear family”11 has prevented scholars from 
seeing that for many women marriage exists on a continuum. We should consider “cohabiting 
couples, the separated, the divorced, and women with absent husbands” alongside other 
narratives of single-women rather than assume that marital status solidified a woman’s identity 
as a wife.12 Beattie’s insistence on the performative aspects of marriage is important for my own 
 
8 Karras, 4. 
9 Ibid., 5. 
10 Beattie, 327. 
11 Chandler, 2. 
12 Beattie, 328. 
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work because many couples addressed in this project spent a significant amount of time living 
apart from their spouses and fostered identities that challenged the primacy of their institutional 
identities as husbands and wives. In recognizing the need to publicly perform particular gendered 
labors to create and maintain a marriage, we can address how the women in this project employ 
tactics that move them along the continuum toward identities that may subvert their status as 
wives. 
In attending to the myriad of female identities beyond the category of wife, Amy Froide 
focuses not just on single women, but what she terms never married women. Froide makes a 
distinction between life-cycle single women, those who will marry, and lifelong single women, 
those who will not. Froide’s careful scholarship underlines the challenges that these women 
faced from local legislation and societal privileging of marriage as the preferred state for women. 
She argues that 
[w]hile the ideal in a patriarchal society such as early modern England may have 
been for women to dedicate themselves to conjugal and maternal roles, in reality 
not all women could or chose to do so. These women were legal adults, free from 
the control of a male relative, but at the same time they did not enjoy the 
privileges English society afforded wives, mothers, and widows.13  
In examining the roles that never married and unmarried women played within society, Froide 
reveals a wider definition of kinship for early modern women than normally recognized in 
scholarship that remains focused on the nuclear family. Froide explicitly places women without 
 
13 Froide, 7. 
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husbands—including abandoned wives—within the category of the unmarried.14 The precarious 
wives addressed in this project at various points in their lives would be considered unmarried 
based on Froide’s definition. Regardless of whether or not we view the wives within this project 
as married or unmarried, the risk of the loss of social privilege is constant, even for women who 
perform their feminine duties as wives. The coercive nature of that threat underlines the precarity 
of their situations. As such, like Froide’s never married women, the representations of women 
throughout the following chapters confirm the importance of broader networks of support and 
kinship for survival and protection from social, economic, and physical violence. 
Frances Dolan addresses the threat of violence faced by early modern women within 
marriage in two projects: Dangerous Familiars: Representations of Domestic Crime in England 
1550–1700 and Marriage and Violence: The Early Modern Legacy. In the former, Dolan 
incorporates a range of historical and literary documents that report and represent domestic crime 
in the early modern period. Her insightful analysis of the social pressures that shaped these 
narratives help disclose “the contradictions and violence underlying early modern marriage.”15 
Dolan takes her examination of what she sees as an inherent conflict in the marital union further 
in Marriage and Violence, as she argues that our modern concept of marriage is based on a 
history of inequality and violence. Her criticism draws on the religious ideal of uno caro—that 
man and woman become one flesh in marriage—where marriage contains space for only one 
subject and that subject is male. Dolan locates examples of the inequity and coercion derived 
from the cultural ideal of uno caro within the legal practice of coverture whereby a husband 
 
14 Ibid., 9. 
15 Dolan, Dangerous Familiars, 38. 
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subsumes his wife’s legal identity for the duration of their marriage.16 In combining an analysis 
of court records and fictional accounts of domestic abuse in early modern drama, Dolan uncovers 
cultural anxieties about marriage often neglected in discussions of the normative frame. 
This project furthers the conversations of Dolan, Froide, Karras, and Beattie, regarding 
the complexities of marital status for medieval and early modern women as represented in both 
cultural and literary documents. The incorporation of a range of resources and the intentionally 
broad definition of texts employed within this dissertation follows the example laid out in Subha 
Mukherji’s work reading historical law cases alongside early modern drama. I agree with 
Mukherji’s assertion that “[a] comparative enquiry is especially productive since each of these 
groups of texts is particular in its narratorial investments and strategies.”17 But rather than simply 
show the narratorial differences employed by letters, biographies, and dramatic literature, I 
attend to the similarities in rhetorical strategy and fictions employed in writings by and about 
pre-modern women and the representations of women on the early modern stage. As Natalie 
Zemon Davis, in her work on Fiction in the Archives argues, “the crafting of the narrative” 
within historical documents can uncover a great deal about what types of stories were effective 
within a culture and how specific tropes might be utilized and shaped based on the intended 
audience and desired outcome.18 In thinking through the ways that female voices are fashioned, 
we can begin to understand more fully the cultural frames that structured women’s narratives, as 
well as how those frames allowed them opportunities for resistance and autonomy. I heed Ulrike 
Tancke’s warning that women’s “self-writings do not recreate real experience, but only reveal its 
 
16 Dolan, Marriage and Violence, 70–82. 
17 Mukherji, Law, 8. 
18 Davis, 3–4. 
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representation.”19 As such, reading textual representations of women shaped in letters and other 
forms of life writing varies little from those constructed in more traditional categories of 
literature: they are influenced by the conventions of genre, cultural mores, and audience. Despite 
my focus on rhetorical similarities, there is also fruitful analysis to be done in places where 
cultural and literary texts diverge. As discussed in Chapter Four, these moments reveal specific 
disruptions in the idealized narratives of feminine endurance as a means to secure marital accord. 
Kathryn Schwarz’s work on the intentional feminine labor necessary to create a “livable 
space” within the marital union provides a starting point for thinking about the possibility that 
women’s “intentional virtue unsettles the tenets of heterosocial hierarchy.”20 Like Schwarz, I 
draw primarily on representations of women who employ the expectations of femininity for their 
own ends. In doing so they show that “willful acquiescence confounds the process of 
objectification as it answers the demand for compliance.”21 Through their orthodox performance 
of obedience, many of the wives discussed here underline problems with the cultural structures 
that demand their deference without providing adequate assurance that their husbands will fulfill 
their own part of the social contract. Similarly, for women who perform their intentional virtue to 
excess—as seen in Chapter Three—their performance destabilizes the structures it is meant to 
support. This project seeks to show that in appropriating narratives of acceptable feminine 
behavior, these representations do not simply reinscribe patriarchal authority, but foster a space 
for strategies that may help offset the precarity that women can face as wives. 
 
19 Tancke, 8. 
20 Sanchez 1. 
21 Ibid., 6–7. 
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The emphasis on precarity throughout this dissertation draws on the work of Judith Butler 
in Precarious Life and Frames of War. Bulter recognizes that “[l]ives are supported and 
maintained differently, and there are radically different ways in which human physical 
vulnerability is distributed across the globe. Certain lives will be highly protected…Other lives 
will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as ‘grievable.’”22 While 
Butler’s primary concern lies with the vulnerability of subaltern populations, her 
acknowledgement that some lives are rendered more vulnerable than others based on their access 
to social and economic support, the level of protection they receive, and whether or not their 
suffering or death would be deemed grievable is pertinent for thinking about the vulnerability of 
medieval and early modern wives. Admittedly, the category of wife and the social privileges it 
affords may seem incongruous with the populations that concern Butler. However, as this project 
will show, women who were wives were exposed to a range of violence and coercion that often 
made securing or maintaining a livable life a struggle.  
For Butler, and for this dissertation, social recognition is essential in order to combat 
precarious conditions. “A vulnerability must be perceived and recognized in order to come into 
play in an ethical encounter, and there is no guarantee that this will happen.”23 Wives presumed 
to be protected by their station and their husbands, then, risk exposure precisely because of the 
cultural assumption that they are secure in their union and their economic and social status. If 
women are expected to receive the majority of support from their husbands, they also risk the 
loss of support from the same. Many of the women discussed in this project seek redress from 
the vulnerabilities caused by their marital unions. Their petitions for assistance from a range of 
 
22 Butler, J., Precarious Life, 32. 
23 Ibid., 43. 
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kinship networks attest to the need for identification beyond their marriages. For, “when a 
vulnerability is recognized, that recognition has the power to change the meaning and structure 
of the vulnerability itself.”24 Through their reiteration of cultural narratives of the vulnerable 
woman in need of help, these wives reveal a broader social understanding that marriage did not 
always fulfill the patriarchal ideal of stability and functional accord. 
The term “precarious wife” is used in this project in two different, though related, ways: 
first, by acknowledging that wife was an unstable category for women whose legal, economic, 
and social positions were subsumed by and often at the mercy of their husbands, and, second, by 
emphasizing the malleability of the category for women who embraced identities separate from 
their husbands. In the moment from Measure for Measure discussed at the outset of this 
introduction, the Duke’s assumption that women who exist beyond the normative frames are 
“nothing” suggests a stability of classification—if a woman is not a maid, she must be a wife, 
and she remains a wife until her husband dies—that results in the cultural exclusion of women 
with alternate narratives or identities. By attending to the vulnerability of wives and uncovering 
the permeability of conjugal relationships, this project refutes the notion that “wife” was a stable 
and knowable category sufficient to define medieval and early modern women by showing that it 
was partial, at best, and ideologically inscribed, at worst. It builds on the work of literary and 
historical critics who engage with atypical and minority experiences in order to elucidate aspects 
of womanhood. A focus on the ways that women saw themselves, sought identities unrelated to 
their husbands, privileged non-spousal relationships, and formed alternate networks of support, 
illuminates how women created communities and formed subject positions independent from 




amount of time separate from their husbands. In each instance, the conjugal role becomes 
ancillary to personal subjectivity; however, the primary motivations for the separations differ. In 
chapters one and two the husbands initiate the separation, while in chapters three and four the 
wives seek to redefine their relationships. 
In Chapter One, “‘Ye turn me into nothing’: When is a Wife not a Wife?” Katherine of 
Aragon in Henry VIII, or All is True (Shakespeare and Fletcher) and Doris in The Tragedy of 
Mariam (Carey) identify as wives. The kinship ties privileged in their representations are ones 
that connect them to their husbands. In fact, by all accounts Katherine and Doris exemplify the 
early modern ideal of the good wife; however, in spite of their devotion, they suffer 
displacement, injury, and marital instability when their husbands wish to remarry. At first wives, 
these women become “nothing.” This chapter looks at representations of women who, in many 
ways, reverse the performance of those discussed in later chapters. Katherine’s and Doris’s 
inability to remain wives when their husbands deem then insufficient underlines the 
precariousness of their position, and allows an interrogation of the category of wife that serves as 
the basis for status and honor in medieval and early modern culture. 
Maternal roles are explicitly tied to marriage and could solidify a woman’s status as a 
wife; however, they could also instigate suspicion and jealousy. The women in Chapter Two, “‘I 
am their Mother I must not away’: Self Identification Beyond the Marital Union,” are precarious 
wives who privilege relationships outside of their marriages in response to their husbands’ 
destructive behavior. In Dekker, Chettle, and Haughton’s The Pleasant Comodie of Patient 
Grissill and Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale, Grissill and Hermione epitomize the good wife 
figure but struggle with remaining devoted to their marriages when relentless coercion from their 
husbands threatens their children. The diverse networks of support from characters surrounding 
 13 
Grissill and Hermione and the women’s focus on their relationships with their children help de-
center the marital union and reinforce the primacy of maternal subjectivity and alternate 
communities for early modern women. 
Chapter Three, “‘And make my body free to God’: Religious Orthodoxy and Marital 
Identity,” looks at the lives of medieval semi-religious women who negotiate chaste marriages or 
argue for separation from their husbands. Born into a wealthy family, Marie d’Oignies feels an 
early calling to a spiritual life but is compelled to marry. Her husband readily agrees to maintain 
a chaste union, and she turns to female companionship to guard herself against public scrutiny 
over her chaste marriage. In contrast to Marie, Margery Kempe marries, births fourteen children, 
and faces opposition from her husband when she requests a chaste marriage. And unlike Marie, 
Margery is unable or refuses to foster a community of female kinship and religious supporters. 
She performs her devotion with fervor, yet it is her fervor that others label disruptive and 
dangerous. In both instances, these women embody a fidelity to a non-cloistered religious life 
that leaves them socially vulnerable, even as it demonstrates the malleability of marital unions, 
and the possibility for personal, physical, and spiritual autonomy. 
“‘I maye lyve in quyet and be free from his vyalence’: Divorce and the Limits of 
Feminine Endurance” closes the project with a micro-history of the marriage of Elizabeth and 
Anthony Bourne that shows how women may use the cultural expectations of appropriate 
behavior for both men and women in marriage to negotiate for a livable space separate from their 
husbands. In reiterating the economic, physical, emotional, and social violence (“vyalence”) 
wives may endure at the hands of their husbands, Elizabeth Bourne tactically constructs a story 
that depicts her as a reluctant petitioner forced to seek sanctuary in the law after repeated 
attempts to reform Anthony Bourne’s “wicked practises, terrours and tyrannous speeches against 
 14 
mee, my frendes, kinne, and allies.”25 Elizabeth’s knowledge of the law, the cultural mores that 
inform the law, and the hypocrisy of legal remedies available to men in contrast to those denied 
women are echoed in early modern literature through the representation of Salome in Elizabeth 
Cary’s The Tragedy of Mariam. Faced with the inability to bend the law to her needs, Salome 
tries another tactic; she foregoes “precedent” and claims her will is enough to grant the divorce 
she seeks. She insists that her husband “shalt no hour longer call [her] wife” (1.6.417). Bourne 
and Salome demand separations for different reasons; however, in doing so they attest to the 
need for women to create livable lives of their own choosing and construction, even if those lives 
emphasize a more fluid hybrid identity beyond the boundaries of social acceptability. 
 
 




“YE TURN ME INTO NOTHING”: WHEN IS  A WIFE NOT A WIFE?1 
 
I. “I WILL CONFESS MYSELF TO BE THE KING’S TRUE WIFE”2  
 
As far as concerns this business, I have offended neither God nor the King, to 
whom I have always shown obedience as a true wife, and sometimes more so in 
this affair than my conscience approved of.  
—Katharine of Arragon to Charles V, 6 Nov 15313 
 
Political marriages in the medieval and early modern periods often suffered heightened 
pressure from the need to secure alliances between powerful families and the demand for the 
production of a male heir; as such, they were exceedingly precarious. Eleanor of Aquitaine 
annulled her marriage to Louis VII of France despite the fact that the couple was married for 
fifteen years and produced two daughters—who were declared legitimate even though the 
 
1 Shakespeare and Fletcher, Henry VIII (All is True), 3.1.114. All textual citations from 
William Shakespeare and John Fletcher, King Henry VIII (All is True), Ed. Gordon 
McMullan, Arden 3rd Series, London: Thomson Learning, 2000. 
2 Katharine of Arragon to Charles V, 6 Nov 1531.  
3 Katharine of Arragon to Charles V, 6 Nov 1531. In the Letters and Papers, Foreign and 
Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII.Vol. 5., Katherine’s name is listed as “Katharine of 
Arragon,” but for the purposes of this chapter, I have opted to use the spelling Katherine for 
consistency between the historical figure and the character in Shakespeare’s and Fletcher’s 
Henry VIII. Citations for Katherine’s correspondence will maintain “Katharine” as the 
spelling; however, all other references within the chapter will be “Katherine.” 
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couple’s marriage was invalidated. Originally, Pope Eugene III denied the request, but the 
annulment was granted after the birth of their second daughter when Louis conceded to Eleanor’s 
wishes. The grounds were consanguinity in the fourth degree. Shortly after, Eleanor wed Henry, 
Duke of Normandy (future Henry II of England), who was her cousin in the third degree. The 
hypocrisy of leaving one spouse based on degree of relation, while marrying another more 
closely related emphasizes an inconsistency of petitions for divorce and implies that in most 
instances the reasons given were merely excuses to end a marriage. Louis’ son, King Phillip II 
Augustus of France, employed similar tactics with two of his wives, as did Henry VIII in his 
divorce from Katherine of Aragon. In each instance, the rationales given were acceptable based 
on canonical law; however, each divorce also met with resistance from one of the spouses and 
the church authorities. As Karras shows, “If both parties wanted the divorce, the church would 
likely have been willing to grant it, but there was considerable backing for a woman who stood 
her ground.”4 The church’s willingness to support a queen’s right to remain in her marital union 
suggests a cultural understanding that women were at risk of harm should their husbands succeed 
in dissolving the marriage. However, with the exception of Phillip’s first wife, Isabelle, all of the 
women discussed in this chapter failed to remain wives even with the institutional backing of the 
church. Their continued self-identification as obedient and true wives during the divorce 
proceedings and after their husbands succeed in casting them off underlines the inequity of 
gendered identities in the medieval and early modern period. If women were only categorized by 
their relationship to a male authority, then what happened to women who lost their connections 
to that authority? How were they recognized within the larger social structures? The men 
remained kings and remarried. The women suffered the loss of their cultural identity—Katherine 
 
4 Karras, 65. The same is true of the Pope’s support for Louis VII. 
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was publically named Dowager, while Ingeborg of Denmark and Doris in The Tragedy of 
Mariam lacked any title that suggested their former status—and much of the economic and social 
protection they received as wives.5 Their indeterminate status as first wives fell outside of the 
maid/wife/widow progression and, as such, left them at risk for lack of social recognition and 
support. 
Writing to her nephew, Charles V, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Katherine 
sought redress from Henry VIII’s “wicked intention” to annul their marriage. Throughout her 
letter she named herself as a true and obedient wife to the King, decried the treatment she 
received at Henry’s court, and implored Charles to use his sway with Pope Clement VII—a 
prisoner of Charles’ at the time—to deny Henry’s request for an annulment. She began by 
disparaging her current situation, which caused her much distress. She wrote, “[m]y tribulations 
are so great,” and “the surprises which the King gives me, with certain persons of his Council, 
are so mortal, and my treatment is what God knows, that it is enough to shorten ten lives, much 
more mine.”6 Katherine prefaced her plea for assistance by positioning herself as a vulnerable 
woman who feared for her life—from continued mistreatment—and was in need of protection. 
She claimed that Henry and his associates “treat me in such a manner that I do not know what to 
do.” In doing so, she simultaneously assumed that there was a cultural undestanding of how a 
husband should behave towards his wife and names Henry as an unfit husband. While Katherine 
understood that she lacked recourse in this life due to her precarious position within Henry’s 
 
5 Eleanor of Aquitaine was the exception in that she instigated her divorce and successfully 
remarried. Further, inheritance rules of Aquitaine were based on paritable inheritance—
rather than primogeniture—and allowed women to inherit, so Eleanor maintained economic 
and social power separate from her husbands. Philip August offered Ingeborg the 
opportunity to take another husband, but she refused. 
6 Ibid.  
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court, she maintained, “in the next they will know how unreasonably I am afflicted”; for 
Katherine, if she remained steadfast to her vows as Henry’s “true wife,” her suffering would be 
rewarded in heaven.7 In naming God as the witness to her misery, she established herself as a 
devoutly religious woman, a marker of a good wife, who was secure in her innocence and aware 
that the treatment she received at the hands and command of Henry was unjust. In reaffirming 
the sacramental nature of their union and her devotion to both God and her marriage, Katherine 
situated herself within cultural assumptions about the universality of marriage and its status as a 
sacramental institution. In turning to Charles, and by extension the Pope and God, to handle her 
appeal, she conceded that God was the only authority higher than her husband/king who might 
take up her cause and right the wrongs Henry had done to her. 
Katherine’s expectation of religious restitutaion of her titles of wife and queen was 
complicated within England during the time because of Henry’s movement toward the Act of 
Supremacy whereby he declared himself the head of the church. The precariousness of her 
position was amplified because privately, in his capacity as her husband, Henry tormented her, 
while publicly, in his capacity as King, he was able to engage others to do so, as well, and 
finally, spiritually, as the head of the church, he maintained religious authority to deem their 
union invalid. Beyond his private removal of his affections as her husband, as her King, Henry 
limited her access to other networks of support. Katherine argued that Henry’s advisors “deter 
those who would speak the truth” of her right to remain his wife.8 She noted that even her closest 
“council are afraid to speak” and support her publicly and asked that Charles voice his support 
for her cause so that others might do the same: “If your Majesty speak thus, it will animate those 
 
7 Ibid.  
8 Katharine of Arragon to Charles V, 6 Nov 1531. 
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who wish me well, and show them that there is some one who grieves at my troubles.”9 
Katherine astutely understood the importance of public opinion and support for her cause.10 
Because Henry’s status as King granted him the power to discount a life as undeserving of 
protection or recognition, Katherine required someone of Charles’ status to publicly lament her 
situation in order to counteract the effects of the withdrawal of Henry’s support. Katherine’s 
situation emphasizes the need for women to maintain extended networks of kin and allies beyond 
the marital union to help minimize the conditions of precarity within the same. 
In seeking the outside counsel and assistance necessary for her survival, Katherine 
exposed herself to public scorn for appearing to contradict her husband’s wishes. 
Simultaneously, she revealed a further challenge for wives who must appear dutiful, or face 
ridicule and judgment of unruly behavior, even when such deference will cause them harm. 
While her status as Henry’s wife required her obedience to his wishes—in this instance his 
request for an annulment—her acquiescence to his demands were in direct conflict with her 
desire to remain a wife. Despite the conflict, she assured Charles that, “As far as concerns this 
business, I have offended neither God nor the King, to whom I have always shown obedience as 
a true wife.” She had not offended God because she continued to hold her vows with Henry 
sacred, and she did not lie about her “virginity when [she] married the King.”11 Her dedication to 
 
9 Ibid. 
10 Though Katherine’s letter follows the standard convention of women petitioners—as 
discussed further in Chapter Four—in her rhetoric of vulnerability and need of assistance, 
she was not without support at Court. Henry’s sister, Mary Tudor Brandon spoke out against 
Henry’s desire to wed Anne Boleyn, and Mary went so far as to leave London during 
Anne’s coronation, refusing to attend even though her husband was in charge of the 
ceremonies. Further, Mary was not the only aristocratic woman to side with Katherine. See 
Sadlack, 153, and Harris, English Aristocratic Women, 237–238. 
11 Katharine of Arragon to Charles V, 5 April 1531. 
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husband remained intact, even though she confessed that in striving to be dutiful in the face of 
Henry’s attempt to invalidate their union, she went against her own “conscience.” In doing so, 
she pointed to the precarious position of wives who attempt to remain devoted to their husbands 
even when they know it is not in their best interest to acquiesce to the demands of their spouses. 
Katherine’s self-identification as Henry’s obedient “true wife” implied both that deference is a 
crucial aspect of a good wife’s labors—though it went against her own desires—and that any 
other wife Henry might seek after her would be a false wife. 
Henry VIII’s treatment of his wives and the precarious conditions they faced has received 
exhaustive study by literary and historical scholars. It has also inspired fictional renderings in 
early modern plays and contemporary popular culture. However, Henry was not the only king to 
attempt to put aside a wife, or wives. In many ways, Philip II Augustus of France (1165–1223) 
served as a medieval precursor to Henry. Philip married Isabelle of Hainaut in 1180. Four years 
later, he renounced the marriage based on consanguinity, the same argument Henry used to annul 
his marriage to Katherine. Like Katherine, Isabelle sought to maintain her status as Philip’s wife 
and queen, and understood that in order to do so, she required widespread support for her claim. 
Refusing to accept Philip’s declaration, Isabelle took to the streets as Jim Bradbury notes in his 
biography of Philip: 
[Isabelle] felt no guilt over her marital conduct and made public demonstration of 
the fact. She took off her jeweled clothes and emerged from the palace clad only 
in a chemise, barefoot, and carrying a candle. She distributed alms to the poor, to 
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beggars and lepers, entering churches in the city to pray. Those who had received 
her gifts gathered before the palace to demonstrate their support.12 
Through a public performance of penance, Isabelle garnered backing for her marital claim from 
Philip’s subjects. Her display of humility, piety, and generosity—all appropriate and traditional 
traits for a Queen—undermined the King’s attempts to displace her. Isabelle’s performance 
differed from Katherine’s in that Isabelle’s focused on the public qualities associated with a good 
Queen rather than the private deference expected of a good wife. Despite Philip’s offers to 
arrange a new marriage for Isabelle of her choosing, she maintained that her place as his Queen 
and wife was sanctioned by God and, therefore, indissoluble. Her public religious devotion and 
virtue, then, served to protect her from Philip’s desire to take another wife. Unlike the hostility 
and ostracization Katherine experienced from Henry’s councilors, Philip’s advisors urged him to 
restore Isabelle. The couple remained together due to her successful petition and public 
performance. Isabelle fulfilled her labor of patrilineal succession—she provided Philip with a 
son—and died in childbirth a few years later. Isabelle’s ability to keep her position as Philip’s 
wife does not discount the precarity of her situation or the cultural importance of reputation and 
feminine virtue for medieval wives. Rather, it shows that in some instances the appropriation of 
the good wife persona could productively protect women from accusations of marital 
incompatibility and provided them with one avenue of socially sanctioned resistance when the 
wives’ desires were in conflict with the husbands’.  
However, this tactic did not always work, as seen in Philip’s second marriage. In 1193, 
Philip married Princess Ingeborg of Denmark. Instead of the four years it took him to object to 
 
12 Bradbury, 58. 
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his first marriage, Philip attempted to escape his second marriage the day after his wedding, 
again claiming consanguinity. Though Philip married Ingeborg in a public ceremony, he refused 
to let her be crowned queen. He exploited his uncle’s power as Archbishop of Reims “to declare 
the marriage invalid on the grounds that Ingeborg was related to his first wife, which created the 
impediment of affinity.”13 Unaware of Philip’s process against her until after the judgment was 
awarded, Ingeborg was left with little support. Philip placed her in a convent where he further 
limited her access to contact with and help from her family. Ignoring a papal edict from 
Celestine III that declared Philip’s divorce from Ingeborg invalid, Philip wed Agnès de Meran in 
1196. Later, Philip tried to petition Rome, again, for a divorce, this time claiming non-
consummation.  
While non-consummation became a legitimate reason for an annulment in early modern 
England, in the medieval period consummation was not necessary to form a union, only present 
consent.14 Peter Lombard notes in his widely influential Four Books of Sentences (c. 1150) that 
nothing can form a marriage, “except for the aid of the will expressed by words of present 
consent, which makes the marriage between them lawful.”15 Based on the tenets of present 
consent, Ingeborg and Philip’s union was legal and binding without further need to prove 
consummation. However, in the face of Philip’s attempts to validate their divorce, Ingeborg 
 
13 Karras, 59. 
14 See Karras, 53–59, and Beattie, 329. 
15 Lombard, 171. While words of future consent followed by consummation also make a 
marriage, Lombard did not agree with this view and argued that the intent to marry spoken 
in the present consent was the only thing that could create a marriage. He did acknowledge 
that there were impediments to consent, including “error as to person, another as to fortune, 
another as to condition, another as to quality” (174), but none of those reasons were valid in 
the case of Philip and Ingeborg. 
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maintained her claim that she was Philip’s rightful wife and that their marriage was 
consummated.  
Like Katherine, Ingeborg petitioned the new Pope—Innocent III, who would go on to 
make significant reforms regarding the Church’s official stance on marriage at the Fourth 
Lateran Council of 1215—for help in her suit to be reinstated as Philip’s wife. 
My lord and husband Philip, the illustrious king of the Franks, persecutes me, 
since he not only does not treat me as a wife, but seeking to make my youth 
loathsome with the solitude of prison, he does not cease to annoy me with the 
insults and calumnies of his followers, that I should consent to him against the 
laws of marriage and the laws of Christ.16 
Written after Agnès’ death, Ingeborg’s letter attests to Philip’s ongoing denial of her status as his 
wife. Ingeborg saw Philip’s attempt to break their union as an affront to both secular and 
religious order. She was allowed “no person or messenger from the land of my birth.”17 
Effectively remaining separated from her networks of support, she was unable to seek proper 
redress for her wrongs. She continued to name Philip her husband, but also listed the ways he 
failed to fulfill his marital obligations. She claimed emotional, physical, and verbal abuse, as 
well as coercion in his attempts to get her to acquiesce to the divorce. While a husband was 
expected to provide for his wife in a manner befitting her station, Ingeborg noted that her “food 
is often restricted” and that she had “insufficient clothing and it is not such that a queen should 
have.”18 In exposing how Philip denied her the basic provisions a husband should supply for his 
 




wife, she successfully portrayed herself as a wronged and vulnerable woman, deserving of pity, 
and in need of relief. Ingeborg’s petition elicited sympathy from Innocent who continued to deny 
Philip’s requests, but the Pope’s support was not enough to reinstate Ingeborg as Philip’s wife.  
In many ways, the concerns raised in the letters of Ingeborg and Katherine speak to the 
broader problems of precarious wives addressed throughout this dissertation. Katherine’s 
devotion to her husband did little to guarantee the stability of her status as Henry’s wife. 
Ingeborg’s naming of Philip as her husband did not make it so in practice. Both women 
expressed piety toward God, which served as further proof of their status as a good wives 
because they held the vows they made to their husbands and God at their marriages as one in the 
same. In declaring their own religious zeal, they simultaneously impled that Henry and Philip 
were lacking in their own spiritual convictions if they were willing to forgo one union for 
another. Ingeborg and Katherine foreground the need for wives to maintain support and 
community beyond the marital union in order to have adequate assistance when facing 
tribulations within the marriage. Despite the assumption that wives of kings should be afforded 
greater protection due to their economic and social status, Katherine’s case exposes a heightened 
risk because when Henry withdrew his support she lost the protection of both her patriarchal and 
political authorities: she lost the guardianship of her husband and her king. Similarly, when 
Philip discarded Ingeborg the day after their marriage, she struggled for years to secure 
assistance because Philip limited her access to her kin and allies. The removal of the husbands’ 
favor left both women without the help of personal, economic, social, and political networks that 
should offset conditions of precarity. Finally, after twenty-four years of marriage, Katherine’s 
struggle to keep her status as Henry’s wife and Queen—categories she desperately wished to 
maintain as seen materially in her correspondence, where she signed “Katherina Regina” at the 
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top and bottom of every page—provides a prime example 
of the vulnerability faced by women even when they 
successfully perform their feminine duties of chastity, 
devotion, and patrilineal succession. 
 
 
II. “AND AM I THUS REWARDED?”19  
 
Your graces find me here part of a housewife: 
I would be all, against the worst may happen. 
 —Katherine, Henry VIII, 3.1.24–25 
 
The indeterminate and precarious status of first wives who failed to retain their positions 
despite their performance of their feminine duties was not limited to historical women but 
appeared in early modern drama, as well. The rhetoric of devotion and virtue employed by 
Katherine in her letter to Charles V is expanded in the dramatic characterization of Katherine in 
Shakespeare’s and Fletcher’s Henry VIII.20 Doris, Herod’s first wife in Elizabeth Cary’s The 
Tragedy of Mariam, and Winifred, Frank’s first wife in Dekker, Ford, and Rowley’s The Witch 
of Edmonton, echo many of the tropes of desertion voiced in Ingeborg in her letters. Ingeborg, 
Doris, and Winifred express a strong sense of the legal and spiritual wrongs done to them when 
 
19 Shakespeare and Fletcher, Henry VIII, 3.1.133.  
20 While the first half of this chapter delt with the historical Katherine, the second half will 
focus on the dramatic representation of Katherine within the early modern play Henry VIII.  
 
“Katherina Regina” 
BL, COTTON VITELLIUS B/XII,  
FOL.192–197, 1529. 
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their husbands remarry. In attending to the ways that dramatic literature deals with the 
vulnerability of wives whose husbands no longer wish to remain married—or more specifically, 
wish to take second wives21—we see a broader cultural confirmation of the instability of the 
marital union and the problem with socially privileging a category of identity that women had 
little control over maintaining. 
In The Tragedy of Mariam, Doris expresses bewilderment over the dissolution of her 
marriage considering her success in providing Herod a male heir. She points to the security she 
felt upon her son’s birth, “When thou wert born, how little did I fear / Thou shouldst be thrust 
from forth thy father’s door!” (2.3.229–30).22 Lack of a male heir was an ongoing concern for 
Henry VIII and the underlying cause for instability in several of his marriages; however, Doris’ 
production of a son fulfills the demand for patrilineal succession in her union with Herod and, as 
such, should strengthen her status as his wife. Cataloging the ways that she properly performed 
her duties as a wife, Doris questions the validity of Herod’s “hate” that allowed him, under 
Mosaic law, to discard her in favor of Mariam, and the inequity that grants men the power to put 
away their wives and denies women any recourse to maintain their status. 
What did he hate me for: for simple truth?  
For bringing beauteous babes, for love to him?  
For riches, noble birth, or tender youth?  
Or for no stain did Doris’ honour dim? (4.8.591–594).  
 
21 Frank, in The Witch of Edmonton, marries his second wife because of pressure from his 
father, who does not know of Frank’s first marriage. 
22 All textual citations from Elizabeth Cary, The Tragedy of Mariam the Fair Queen of Jewry, 
Eds. Barry Weller and Margaret W. Ferguson, Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1994. 
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Doris connects her own virtue, her social standing from a wealthy noble family, her love and 
obedience toward Herod, and her ability to produce children as evidence that she was a good 
wife. She reiterates that her reputation is unblemished. Herod’s hate in the face of these virtues 
seems unwarranted and cruel. Doris’ confusion when she asks, “Which fault of these made 
Herod Doris’ foe?” implies that spousal compatibility within the world of the play should lie in 
women fulfilling their appropriate gendered performance of virtue (4.8.596). The fact that Herod 
left Doris for Mariam in spite of Doris’ perfect execution of the expectations of wifely duty 
exposes a fault in the cultural expectations of feminine virtue as a means to obtain marital 
accord. 
Katherine, in Henry VIII, similarly objects to her husband’s desire for a divorce and 
demands to know the reason, which she argues cannot be traced to any fault in the performance 
of her duties as Henry’s wife. Katherine asks, “In what have I offended you? What cause / Hath 
my behavior given to your displeasure / That thus you should proceed to put me off” (2.4.17–
19). Like Doris, Katherine presents her fulfillment of feminine devotion as evidence of her right 
to maintain her marital status. She names herself Henry’s “true and humble wife” (2.4.21). In 
describing her devotion to him, she claims that she fit her mood to match his and never 
“contradicted [his] desire” (2.4.24–26); she accepted his counselors, even when she recognized 
they meant her harm (2.4.27–29); and she turned away from her own friends when Henry 
expressed disfavor with them (2.4.29–32). By recognizing her deference to her husband’s 
desires—even when it went against her own interests or safety—Katherine contends she has 
never offered Henry any reason for him to seek an end to their union. She reminds him, “That I 
have been your wife, in this obedience, / Upward of twenty years, and have been blessed / With 
many children by you” (2.4.33–35). Her continued patient devotion over the course of their 
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marriage and her ability to give Henry children serve as further proof that he lacks sound reason 
to remove Katherine as his wife.23 Henry cannot deny her claim as a nonpareil wife and reiterates 
that she possesses the qualities of “sweet gentleness,” “meekness,” and “wife-like government” 
(2.4.138–149). Although he acknowledges her virtue and claims no man has “[a] better wife,” he 
still pursues the annulment (2.4.132). In doing so, he undermines the social contract whereby a 
woman’s obedience, chastity, and production of heirs ought to secure her husband’s 
companionship and care, an ideal that centers on a promise of stability contingent on feminine 
labor. Katherine questions the inequity whereby her fulfillment of her wifely duties in no way 
guarantees that her husband will fulfill his, when she asks, “And am I thus rewarded?” (3.1.133). 
In contrast to the favor and protection she should receive from Henry for her virtuous 
performance, she claims that her husband “hates” her, and that he “’has banished [her from] his 
bed already; / His love, too, long ago” (3.1.120, 121–122). Similarly, Herod’s refusal to 
acknowledge and reward Doris’ positive work as his wife goes against the cultural ideal and can 
be read as deviant. For both couples, the husbands’ actions in divorcing their wives and seeking 
second marriages verify that the ideal of marital stability based on wifely duty is fictive.  
Doris recognizes this incongruity between the model and practice of marriage when she 
notes that there is no recourse or hope for her in terms of regaining Herod’s affection, “For as he 
did my wretched life despise, / So do I know I shall despised die” (2.3.265–266). Her only solace 
is the hope that she may secure her son a place in Herod’s care, “Let him but prove as natural to 
thee, / As cruel to thy miserable mother” (2.3.267–268). With the loss of hope for her own 
 
23 While Mary is the only child of Katherine’s and Henry’s union to survive, they did conceive 
several other children: two daughters (one stillborn and one who died within a week of birth) 
and two sons (both named Henry, Duke of Cornwall, and both who died within two months 
of birth). Katherine’s inability to produce a living male heir is, in part, what spurs his desire 
for an annulment. 
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restoration, Doris focuses her energies on her children. The correlation she sets up between the 
“natural” feelings a father should have toward his children and the “cruel” treatment she has 
received from Herod implies a social binary whereby love or affinity is read as natural and 
cruelty is unnatural. As such, even if Herod were to accept Antiphater as his rightful heir and 
prove a natural father, his actions would not, in fact, recompense the unnatural cruelty with 
which he treats his first and lawful wife. 
The tenants of Mosaic law, which allowed a man to put away his wife and take another, 
complicate a wife’s legal standing to maintain her status and marriage within the world of the 
play. Mariam reminds Doris that according to Moses, “he that being match’d did deadly hate: / 
Might by permission put his wife away, / And take a more belov’d to be his mate” (4.8.588–
590). While the law grants Herod the legal right to remove Doris and marry Mariam, others 
critique his actions within the play, thereby suggesting a gap between lawful action and social 
acceptability. Herod’s brother, Pheoras, names Doris Herod’s “lawful wife;” he notes that it was 
Herod’s “passion” for Mariam that caused the rift in the first marriage (2.1.31–32). In contrasting 
law with passion, Pheoras establishes Doris as an appropriate companion for the king because 
she is lawful and virtuous. Mariam, conversely, prompts Herod to the emotional spontaneity and 
excess as seen in the passion that drove him to cast off his lawful wife in favor of his feelings for 
Mariam. Succumbing to his emotions—which also cause him to order Mariam’s death later in 
the play—in choosing a wife implies that Herod’s decision was a faulty one.24  
 
24 Herod’s susceptibility to acting on his passion reveals a volatility in the character that should 
render him an unfit ruler and husband. Doris implies such a parallel when she calls Herod a 
“false monarch” (2.3.326). 
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The tension between the letter of the law and cultural acceptance of legal action is further 
complicated by the religious implications of marriage vows. Admittedly, Mosaic law is religious 
law, but even within the play—let alone early modern England—there exists an understanding 
that if Herod’s and Doris’ union is no longer recognized in this life, it will be in heaven. Doris 
claims that Mariam’s “soul is black and spotted, full of sin: / You in adult’ry liv’d nine year 
together, / And Heav’n will never let adult’ry in” (4.8.576–578). Doris argues that while an 
earthly court or king may opt to allow a husband to remarry, God recognizes the unity of the first 
marriage and serves as the ultimate judge against a husband who leaves his wife. Katherine 
places her case in the hands of God, as well: the one authority she deems exceeds her husband’s 
power. “Heaven is above all yet: there sits a judge / That no king can corrupt” (3.1.100–101). 
She insinuates that a verdict rendered in Henry’s court must be biased and fraudulent—a fault 
she blames on Henry himself—and that the only lawful and true decree regarding their marriage 
must come from God.25 Doris and Katherine attest to the religious centrality of marriage, and, as 
such, they reason that a secular body is unfit to declare their unions invalid. In maintaining their 
beliefs that God will recognize a man’s first wife as a lawful one, they simultaneously suggest 
that any other wife will be deemed adulterous. 
Katherine and Doris both claim that the spiritual bond of marriage—seen as eternal and 
proof of the indissoluability of their unions—is primary and should secure marital stability on 
earth as it will in heaven; however, the ideal does not hold up when public scrutiny denies the 
validity of the union. In this way, marriage is a societal commitment that must be continually 
 
25 Doris’ and Katherine’s understanding that God is the only authority that can trump the 
decision of a husband/king is similar to Hermione, in The Winter’s Tale, insisting that the 
heavens will right the wrongs done to her by Leontes (2.1.104). For further discussion, see 
Chapter Two. 
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performed by both spouses and culturally recognized for it to be binding. The necessity for a 
public avowal of a marriage—even when a religious commitment has been made—is seen 
explicitly in Dekker, Ford, and Rowley’s The Witch of Edmonton. The play also exposes the 
conflict between personal and public unions, revealing that neither guarantees stability for 
women. Like Doris and Katherine, Winifred names herself as Frank’s “first only wife, his lawful 
wife” (4.2.178).26 She claims that their union is permanent and she will not “Unfile the sacred 
oath set on record / In heaven’s book” (1.1.202–203). In this way, Winifred situates the marriage 
as both lawful on earth and in the eyes of God; she implies that the union of husband and wife 
works to bring men and women into appropriate bonds and behavior sanctioned by society and 
the church. Though Winifred and Frank are wed by private contract after she becomes pregnant, 
they both claim their “bridal oath” is valid (1.1.62). Winifred confesses that she “did not bring 
him / The dower of virginity,” as Katherine swears she did with Henry—Winifred was 
previously Sir Arthur’s mistress. However, she names him her “kind husband” and claims their 
union will make her a “repentant wife” (1.1.187, 193). Winifred’s insinuation that through 
marriage she will become a good woman speaks to broader cultural beliefs that women who are 
not under the control of a patriarchal authority are at greater risk for deviant behavior and loss of 
control. In assuming that her marriage will bring social acceptability and stability she represents 
the ideals of married life; however, Frank marrying Susan at his father’s behest undercuts 
Winifred’s desire for such a union. For Katherine, Doris, and Winifred, the expectation of 
stability in marriage fails when their husbands take second wives. When Frank marries Susan to 
appease his father, Winifred questions how he could, “Dance at the wedding of a second wife?” 
 
26 All textual citations from Thomas Dekker, John Ford, and William Rowley, The Witch of 
Edmonton, Ed. Arthur F. Kinney, New Mermaids, New York: W.W. Norton, 1998. 
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when he had so recently married her (4.2.89). In contrast to Henry’s acceptance of Anne Boleyn 
as his wife in Henry VIII, Frank concedes that his marriage to Susan is false. He calls Susan “a 
whore” and “No wife of mine. The word admits no second” (3.3.27, 32). Despite his public 
marriage with Susan, Frank admits that his marriage constitutes bigamy—explicitly made a 
criminal offense in England in 1604—and is unlawful.27 In marrying two women, he renders 
them both precarious wives. Susan is tricked into a union that is publicly sanctioned, but her 
husband refuses to accept her. Consequently, she is exposed to verbal and physical cruelty, and 
eventually death at the hands of the man who society dictates should protect her. Winifred is not 
publicly acknowledged as a wife and, therefore, lacks the institutional and social support she 
requires. 
Pubic recognition of the marital category is vital if women are to maintain their status as 
wives as seen in the representations of Winifred and Katherine. Without access to her friends and 
networks of support, Katherine decries, “Alas, I am a woman friendless, hopeless” (3.1.80). The 
isolation from her “friends” who “live not here” renders her unable to combat the coercion she 
faces at the hands of Henry, and exposes the extreme precarity for wives of kings who lack 
personal or political redress when their husbands deem them no longer sufficient (3.1.87, 89). 
Further, in declaring that “No friends, no hope, no kindred weep for me,” Katherine notes that 
there is no one to grieve her loss of status, to recognize and combat her vulnerability, to help her 
maintain a livable life. For Katherine, a livable life includes remaining Henry’s wife. In this way, 
Katherine’s situation recalls the plight suffered by Ingeborg of Denmark: both women are 
sequestered, defenseless, and both cling to a fast desire to maintain their status as wives and 
queens. 
 
27 Ingram, 178–179. Amussen, 57. 
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The limited resistance available to Katherine exists, in part, because of her representation 
as a good wife, which requires her obedience to proper codes of conduct. Accordingly, her 
ability to entreat the court on her own behalf is limited because if her speech or disagreement 
with the king and his advisors is seen as being in excess, she risks negating her virtuous 
performance. Her defense must be balanced with shows of deference. Katherine positions herself 
as a vulnerable woman in need of protection: “Sir, I desire you do me right and justice, / And to 
bestow your pity on me, for / I am a most poor woman and a stranger” (2.4.11–13). Her petition 
is less successful than the wives in Chapter Four because the political authority from whom 
Katherine desires compassion and assistance is her husband, who is also the private authority 
that wrongs her.28 Even when addressing Wolsey and Campeius later in the play, she struggles to 
balance her own need to safeguard her status as Henry’s wife with their judgments of appropriate 
feminine behavior. She concedes that by cultural standards, a woman should not represent 
herself in such a suit, but still she asks, “let me speak myself, / Since virtue finds no friends” 
(3.1.125–126). Although she reiterates her status as an obedient wife to Henry, claiming, “with 
all my full affections / [I] Still met the King, loved him next heaven, obeyed him” (3.1.128–130), 
she refuses to acquiesce to the annulment, insisting: 
I dare not make myself so guilty  
To give up willingly that noble title  
Your master wed me to. Nothing but death  
Shall e’er divorce my dignities. (3.1.139–142) 
 
28 While Katherine’s situation differs from the wives discussed in Chapter Four, her limited 
redress caused by the fact that her husband is also her ruler closely relates to the difficulties 
faced by Grissill and Hermione in Chapter Two. 
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Katherine situates her innocence and guilt in terms of her marital status. In order to remain a 
good wife, she cannot agree to the divorce. If she did, she would concede that her union with 
Henry was invalid, in part, because her marriage with Arthur had been consummated, which she 
insists it had not. Her repudiation of Henry’s attempts to sever their union become a way for her 
to maintain her innocence and reputation because in complying with Henry’s wishes, she would 
reduce herself to an adulterous woman and render her daughter illegitimate. She is guilty of 
insubordination toward her husband if she refuses Henry, but she is guilty of sin if she does not. 
For Katherine, the latter trumps the former, unsurprisingly, as she repeatedly declares that her 
love and devotion toward her husband is only second to her love for God. Consequently, in 
Katherine’s view, no earthly body can force her to willingly besmirch her name or give up the 
dignities—the quality and rank—of being Henry’s wife and queen.  
Katherine’s argument is sound and continues her orthodox performance of piety and 
chastity, but it also erases her claim that “all the fellowship I hold now with [Henry] / Is only my 
obedience” (3.1.121–122). In denying Henry, she removes the one aspect of wifely performance 
that she has managed to uphold. Her speech and refusal, for the Cardinals, becomes a sign that 
she is an obstinate woman, as Campeius declares when he informs Katherine, “You wrong your 
virtues” (3.1.168). In reprimanding her for her refusal to accept the King’s demands, Wolsey 
underlines the precarious position women face when expectations of obedience are in direct 
conflict with their need to maintain a livable life. Wolsey warns, “consider what you do, / How 
you may hurt yourself, ay, utterly” (3.1.159–160). He reminds her that kings respond to 
obedience, “So much they love it, but to stubborn spirits / They swell and grow as terrible as 
storms” (3.1.153–164). Henry will be kind and generous to Katherine if she agrees, but will be 
cruel if she does not. In essence, though Wolsey is situating Katherine as a subject and not as a 
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wife, he echoes the cultural expectations that feminine obedience will be rewarded with love and 
care in marriage. However, Katherine’s performance has failed to guarantee such support from 
her husband up to this point. Based on Wolsey’s threats, Katherine is undone by her defense, but 
she is also undone without it. If Katherine refuses Henry, she risks her own reputation and the 
wrath of her King. If she acquiesces to Henry, she loses her husband, her status as his wife, and 
with it all of the accompanying support and recognition.  
For Katherine, the category of wife is central to her self-representation; without it she 
sees no way to identify herself personally or socially. In response to Wolsey’s and Campeius’ 
attempt to persuade Katherine to accept Henry’s counsel in the annulment proceedings, she 
underlines the desperation she experiences in striving to preserve her status. “Your graces find 
me here part of a housewife: / I would be all, against the worst may happen” (3.1.24–25). In 
naming herself “part” but not entirely a wife, she concedes that her place as Henry’s wife is in 
jeopardy. Simultaneously, she voices a desire to remain and act a proper housewife—Henry’s 
private wife in contrast to his public queen—even if she loses everything else (i.e., the title of 
queen). The issue of divorce moves from concerns about her reputation and the successful 
fulfillment of her feminine duties to one of survival. She asserts that the Cardinals’ discussion of 
the end of her marriage is “so near mine honor— / More near my life” (3.1.71–72). The 
assumption that her marital status has a direct correlation with her ability to maintain any 
existence is confirmed when she tells Wolsey, “Ye turn me into nothing,” because of his part in 
helping the King secure an annulment (3.1.114). If she is no longer a wife, she is not only 
vulnerable but is rendered—in her mind—a non-person. The phrase recalls the Duke’s insistence 
in Measure for Measure that Mariana is “nothing then,” if she exists beyond the normative 
gendered categories of maid, wife, or widow (5.1.183). Similarly, for Katherine, the social 
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recognition of the traditional trajectory for early modern women leaves little space for those who 
do not fit within the categories. Katherine’s precarious position exposes the instability of the 
category of wife; and, consequently, underlines a problem with concentrating a woman’s worth, 
honor, and identification on a single relationship—her marriage—when she lacks the ability to 





“I AM THEIR MOTHER I MUST NOT AWAY”: 
SELF IDENTIFICATION BEYOND THE MARITAL UNION1 
 
I. “[G]RIEVABILITY IS A PRESUPPOSITION FOR THE LIFE THAT MATTERS”2 
 
On April 30, 1536 in an attempt to ingratiate herself with an increasingly distant Henry, 
Anne Boleyn presented the King with the infant Elizabeth. Alexander Ales reported the event to 
Queen Elizabeth in a letter dated 1559: 
Never shall I forget the sorrow which I felt when I saw the most serene queen, 
your most religious mother, carrying you, still a little baby, in her arms and 
entreating the most serene king your father, in Greenwich Palace, from the open 
window of which he was looking into the courtyard, when she brought you to 
him.  
I do not perfectly understand what had been going on, but the faces and gestures 
of the speakers plainly showed that the king was angry, although he could conceal 
 
1 Dekker, Chettle, and Haughton, 4.1.93. All textual citations from Thomas Dekker, Henry 
Chettle, and William Haughton, The Pleasant Comodie of Patient Grisill, Ed. Fredson 
Bowers, The Dramatic Works of Thomas Dekker, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1953. 
2  Ales, 527. 
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his anger wonderfully well. Yet from the protracted conference…it was most 
obvious to everyone that some deep and difficult question was being discussed.3 
In this episode, occurring two days before Anne’s arrest and imprisonment in the Tower of 
London, Elizabeth serves as a living reminder of Anne’s multifaceted bond with the king: she is 
his wife and the mother of his child. Anne, as Henry’s wife, has successfully provided Henry 
with a child, though she fails to produce a son. Henry’s demand for a male heir as requisite work 
for a wife to be considered legitimate is seen in his treatment of Katherine of Aragon discussed 
in the previous chapter. Further, Jane Seymour’s ability to produce a living male heir solidifies 
her status as Henry’s true wife, as seen in her state funeral and his choice to be buried beside her. 
Despite her failure to produce a male child, through her presentation of Elizabeth Anne seeks to 
elicit an affective response and she does, though it is not the one she desires. In Ales’s 
recollection of the event for the newly crowned Queen Elizabeth—one where he is clearly 
attempting to curry favor with the new Queen by portraying her mother in a sympathetic light—
Anne’s attempt to reconnect with her husband through her daughter miscarries. Rather than draw 
out Henry’s pity and love, Ales claims the moment spurs Henry’s rage even though, according to 
Ales, the King’s ability to dissemble when provoked is well known. The familial tableau of Anne 
and Elizabeth that Ales describes fails to call back Henry’s devotion to his wife, and serves as an 
example that while motherhood can solidify a woman’s status as a good wife, it also may 
instigate suspicion. 4  Anne’s public performance of her maternal and marital identities 
emphasizes her understanding of the precariousness of her position: as she faces accusations of 
 
3 Ibid. 
4 This tableau calls to mind Paulina presenting Perdita to Leontes in The Winter’s Tale, which 
will be discussed later in this chapter. For a discussion of the early modern female body, 
representations of pregnancy, and suspicion, see Ephraim and Gowing. 
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adultery and treason, she attempts to remind Henry that Elizabeth is the proof of their chaste 
union. Ales similarly seeks to recuperate Anne’s reputation by portraying her as a chaste wife 
who has fulfilled her obligations by providing the King with a child who would eventually 
become Queen. Within Ales’s narrative, Anne fulfills the idealized feminine labors of “chastity, 
marriage, and patrilineal succession,” but they are not enough.5 
As a wife of the King, Anne’s identity and status are inextricably bound to both her 
husband and her ruler. Her social and political position should “minimize conditions of 
precarity”; however, as the King’s wife, her access to networks of support remains subject to his 
will.6 The suspicion of Anne’s adultery comes with an assumption of guilt, particularly when the 
king supports the accusations. Adultery implies a person capable of moral depravity; in this way 
the judgment is included in the definition. When Anne’s chastity is questioned, so too is her 
successful fulfillment of the feminine responsibility to further patrilineal succession through the 
production of an heir. Anne resists the label of adulterer by clinging to her daughter, a literal 
reminder that Anne has performed her duty and is a faithful wife to Henry: Elizabeth is living 
proof of Anne’s labor as a wife, of her chastity and devotion to her husband. Henry’s rejection of 
Anne’s attempt to publicly claim her position as wife and mother, as evidenced by his anger and 
her subsequent imprisonment, leaves her vulnerable and ineligible for social recognition and 
protection. The loss of Henry’s favor exposes Anne to injury and death. In fact, it results in her 
execution, and, consequently, what Eric Ives calls her status as “a non-person.”7  
 
5 Schwarz, 3. As stated, Anne’s chastity is in question in April 1536 when she approaches 
Henry, but it is her chastity that Ales attempts to reaffirm in his letter to Elizabeth. 
6 Butler, Performativity, ii. 
7 Ives, 365. 
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Anne serves as an example of the importance of commemoration. How others represent 
and attest to a life, or not, helps to shape individual and cultural identity. In this vein, a queen 
executed for adultery and treason cannot have been a good wife. In the cultural refusal to speak 
of Anne in the years after her death, she is discounted as a subject, her life unworthy of 
recognition and her death unworthy of mourning. Once Elizabeth ascends to the throne, however, 
Anne’s status as a virtuous mother—and by extension a good wife—must be revitalized in order 
to substantiate Elizabeth’s legitimacy. In writing to Elizabeth, Alexander Ales provides the 
empathetic response—the “sorrow” he felt watching Anne present Elizabeth to Henry—that 
Anne sought, but was denied from her husband. Steadfast in its defense of Elizabeth’s royal 
mother, Ales’s report of the confrontation at Greenwich, Anne’s arrest, and her beheading works 
to legitimize Elizabeth through a recuperation of Anne’s reputation. Throughout the letter, Ales 
imbues his representation of Anne with the culturally prized feminine qualities of modesty, 
religious devotion, and patience, which he cites as proof of her innocence. He effectively 
replaces one descriptive judgment with another: a devout modest woman cannot be an incestuous 
adulteress. He claims that even at her execution, Anne never displayed any “token of impatience, 
or grief, or cowardice,” but that rather her “constancy, patience, and faith towards God” moved 
spectators to declare “her innocence and chastity.”8 Based on this narrative, Anne’s ability to 
face death with grace creates a transitive effect whereby witnesses who thought her guilty were 
moved to declare her innocence. The public audience that verifies her virtue—and in doing so 
names her death grievable—becomes a localized network of support that outlives Anne’s 
marriage and life. In exposing Henry’s anger over seeing Anne with Elizabeth and affirming 
Anne’s innocence, Ales recognizes Anne as a mother unjustly accused, and as such re-writes her 
 
8 Ales, 528–529. 
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death as a tragedy. Through a representation of Anne as patient and constant Griselda figure—
rather than an adulteress—enduring violence at the hands of her capricious husband, Ales 
solidifies Elizabeth’s legitimacy by testifying to Anne’s virtue, underlines the importance of 
community in the creation and maintenance of reputation, and provides an example of precarious 
conditions faced by wives in early modern England. 
As Judith Butler acknowledges in Frames of War, “[l]ives are by definition precarious: 
they can be expunged at will or by accident; their persistence is in no sense guaranteed.”9 In this 
way, Anne Boleyn’s life is no different than any other: all lives are precarious. Precariousness 
also implies that we live “socially,” that the conditions that sustain or inhibit our access to a 
livable life are “in some sense in the hands of the other.”10 But bound up in this idea of living 
socially is the implication that a life is valued; its loss would be felt. “Thus, grievability is a 
presupposition for the life that matters.”11 In Butler’s terms, then, the cultural refusal to discuss 
Anne in the years after her death renders her a non-person. The lack of public mourning implies 
that her death does not matter, that is not grievable, and, therefore, her life is not valued as a life.  
For modern society, Butler states that “[p]olitical orders, including economic and social 
institutions, are designed to address those very needs without which risk or mortality is 
heightened.”12 Although Butler is speaking of modern nation states, the concept of precarity—
the social conditions by which some people are at greater risk for injury and death—is useful for 
thinking about early modern women. “Precarity designates that politically induced condition in 
which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support and 
 
9  Butler, Frames, 25. 
10  Ibid., 14. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Ibid., 25. 
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become differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death.”13 The implication is that as social 
beings people participate in networks that help minimize their precariousness, but some people 
lack the support of these networks. These networks attest to the right to a livable life. In 
providing support—support that if withheld might result in injury—they verify that a life is 
valuable and its loss would be grievable. Butler’s discussion centers on the vulnerability of 
subaltern populations, those who face precarious conditions due to their social or economic lack. 
It may seem incongruous, therefore, to suggest that wives like Anne Boleyn, those linked 
explicitly to centers of power in terms of patriarchal and political authority, may suffer from 
conditions of precarity. However, as a wife of a King, Anne’s vulnerability derives from her 
exceptionally high social status. If women are expected to receive the majority of support from 
their husbands, they also risk the loss of support from the same. For Anne, this risk is amplified 
because Henry is both her husband (patriarchal authority) and her king (political authority). 
When Henry withdraws his support, Anne lacks access to personal, economic, social, and 
political networks that should offset conditions of precarity. In this way, it is Anne’s social status 
as the wife of a king, her marital and political identity, places her at greater risk of injury. 
Early modern conduct literature, like Juan Luis Vives’s A Very Fruitful and Pleasant 
Book Called the Instruction of a Christian Woman, suggests that when a woman marries, her 
husband becomes her sole avenue for support. “[B]oth father and mother, kinfolks, and all her 
friends left, she shall reckon to find all these in only her husband.”14 The ideals voiced in 
conduct literature extends the the laws of coverture whereby a husband’s legal identity covers his 
wife’s—in marriage her status changes from feme sole to feme covert—into all aspects of daily 
 
13  Ibid. 
14 Vives, 112. 
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life as the model for masculine/feminine relationships. Legally, for an early modern wife much 
of her access to a livable life rests in the hands of her husband, but with this power comes 
obligation: a husband is expected to provide for his wife at a level befitting their social status. 
Many court cases attest to the cultural understanding that a husband should provide for his wife’s 
care. In one example, Dame Elizabeth Stafford v. Sir Humfrey Stafford (1562), the plaintiff notes 
that the “defendant usyde her during the tyme of the spowsells betwyxt them lyke his deerly 
beloved wyef in meate, drynke and apparrall,”15 suggesting that at the very least, keeping a wife 
properly fed and clothed is part of a husband’s duty.16 Even popular ballads emphasize the 
expectation of mutual affection and proper care in terms of food and housing, “A good Wife she 
is the comfort of a Man, / If a Man be carefull to comfort her again; / … / And those that are 
Married and has been long wed, / To make much of there Wives both at Board & at Bed.”17 Tim 
Stretton reminds us that “[t]he resulting dilution of a married woman’s independence and rights 
[by coverture] was supposedly for her benefit, intended to remove from the marital union any 
potential for acrimony or disagreements over property interests, obligations, privileges, and other 
entitlements.”18 But in limiting support—economic, social, and legal—exclusively to the marital 
union, coverture, the social institution that was presumed to provide wives with protection, left 
 
15  Stretton, Marital Litigation, 44. The reasons for the marital litigation discussed in Stretton’s 
work vary and the accusations involved may or may not be true. However, the cases are 
useful in that there is enough repetition in descriptions of how a spouse should behave, or 
how they once behaved, to make some generalizations about cultural expectations of 
appropriate marital conduct. 
16  Further evidence of the obligation of a husband to clothe his wife is seen in Ingeborg of 
Denmark’s complaint to Pope Innocent III (discussed in the previous chapter) that Philip 
Augustus, in refusing to acknowledge her as his wife, did not maintain her in a manner 
appropriate to her station: “I have insufficient clothing and it is not such that a queen should 
have” (as qtd in Karras 65). 
17  The Batchelour’s GUIDE. 
18  Stretton, Marital Litigaton, 2. 
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them vulnerable to violence and coercion.19 The vulnerability of wives, even within exceptional 
cases such as Anne Boleyn, suggests instability with the category that is often overlooked in 
cultural narratives of marriage, particularly if we consider Ales’s representation of Anne as a 
patient Griselda figure. 
Throughout much of medieval and early modern Europe and England, the patient 
Griselda figure functioned as the epitome of the good wife: chaste, silent, and obedient.20 From 
medieval iterations like Boccaccio’s Decameron; Petrarch’s Letters; Christine de Pizan’s The 
Book of the City of Ladies; The Goodman of Paris; and Chaucer’s The Clerk’s Tale;21 through 
Renaissance versions such as John Phillip’s Comedy of Patient and Meek Grissill; Dekker, 
Chettle, and Haughton’s The Pleasant Comodie of Patient Grissill; “A Most Pleasant Ballad of 
Patient Grissell;” The Ancient True and Admirable History of Patient Grisel; and Thomas 
Deloney’s Garland of Good Will, Griselda’s obedience and constancy in the face of continual 
testing by her husband is alternately framed as religious allegory, political allegory, irony, or an 
impossible example that women should nevertheless endeavor to emulate. The History of Patient 
Grisel (c. 1603) and William Forrest’s The History of Grisild the Second: a Narrative, in Verse, 
of the Divorce of Queen Katharine of Arragon (c. 1558) provide specific examples of the 
 
19  Here I am drawing on cultural narratives of marriage based on conduct literature, the law, 
and religious teachings like the “An Homily of the State of Matrimony” from The Second 
Tome of Homilies (1563), which bases much of its teachings on Peter and Paul. For 
example, “[the husband] out to be the leader and author of love in cherishing and increasing 
concord, which shall take place if he will use measurableness and not tyranny” (16). 
Scholars’ views on medieval and early modern marriage vary greatly. 
20  Throughout this chapter I engage with multiple iterations of the Griselda tale that variously 
name the characters. I maintain the character names as they exist in each version; however, 
when referring to the figures more broadly—rather than specific characters—I will use the 
terms Griselda and Guatier. 
21  For further discussion on the Griselda narrative in medieval culture, see Butler, Language, 
52–53; McKinley, 90–110. 
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popularity of the Griselda narrative as political and personal allegory as well as its 
simultaneous—and seemingly conflicting—notions of affirming the qualities of a good wife 
while exposing the precariousness of the category and the real threat of male cruelty. 
The plethora of literary appropriations of the tale over the course of three hundred years 
attest to its malleability, but also to its acceptance as a cultural touchstone. By the Renaissance, 
Griselda had become a culturally loaded figure that was synonymous with patience and with the 
added inflections of prudence and heroic suffering.22 Modern scholars often struggle with the 
female stereotypes presented in the tale, despite the variety of framing devices that provide space 
for critique of the narrative and, specifically, of Gautier’s behavior. In The Goodman of Paris, 
for example, the narrator’s critique of Walter’s behavior comes in his apology, where is asks that 
his young wife “excuse me if the story telleth of cruelty too great (to my mind) and above 
reason.”23 He further confesses that he has no desire to ask of such obedience from his wife 
because he is “not worthy thereof” nor is he “not so foolish.” Petrarch says that Griselda’s 
obedience to her husband is a model for human piety towards God in the face of tribulations.24 In 
her work Erotic Subjects, Melissa Sanchez speaks directly to the notion that devotion in the face 
of cruelty is the sign of love based on the model of religious devotion: “the hagiographic and 
Petrarchan traditions both see suffering, not joy, as evidence of true love: if we love someone 
even though it hurts us, our affections must be both selfless and sincere.”25 Further, in Petrarch’s 
 
22 Gildenhuys, 12. The heroic suffering of Griselda is one of feminine steadfastness. For 
further discussion see Rose, Gender and Heroism in Early Modern English Literature. 
23 The Goodman of Paris, 92. 
24  Petrarch, 669. This view is repeated in The Goodman of Paris, 91–92.  
25  Sanchez, 5. 
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reporting of a man “being overcome by sudden weeping”26 while reading the tale, Petrarch 
suggests that Griselda’s suffering—much like Christ’s—can and should prompt an affective 
response. 
Griselda is often presumed to be a flat character who is infuriating in her passivity. 
Beyond the frustration voiced by modern scholars, Griselda’s passivity could be a problem for 
early modern audiences. As Pamela Allen Brown has noted in Better a Shrew Than a Sheep: 
Women, Drama, and the Culture of Jest in Early Modern England, Griselda figures were not 
always praised for their commitment to obedience, nor did their representations always elicit 
sympathy.27 In Dekker, Chettle, and Haughton’s The Pleasant Comodie of Patient Grissill, for 
example, Gwenthyan calls Grissill a “ninny pobbie fool” and “baselies [sic] minded” (3.2.202, 
5.2.25) and Julia claims that “Grissils patience” in the face of Gwalter’s abuses is one reason that 
Julia refuses to marry (4.3.217–218). But whether eliciting pity or disgust, Griselda’s suffering 
prompts a response. Consequently, the shifts in the repetition of the tale, its use as political 
allegory, and the affective response prompted by the character’s willful acquiescence all afford 
the opportunity for complicating the feminine ideals of patience, obedience, and endurance set 
forth in the tale. In doing so, the narrative also calls into question the actions of Guatier.  
The women discussed in this chapter—Grissill from Dekker, Chettle, and Haughton’s 
The Pleasant Comodie of Patient Grissill and Hermione from Shakespeare’s The Winter’s 
Tale—are good wives. In Kathryn Schwarz’s terms, they “willfully do what they should [to] 
further the projects of chastity, marriage, and patrilineal succession.”28 But, as Schwarz argues, 
 
26  Petrarch, 669. 
27  Brown, P., 178–217. 
28  Schwarz, 3. 
 47 
“[t]hrough opportunistic agency, reclaimed autonomy, and strategic orthodoxy, such subjects 
challenge a monolithic patriarchal order, even when that construct delineates the space within 
which they contest their inscription.”29 Schwarz’s argument is useful in thinking about how the 
explicitly feminine labor performed by good wives within marriage simultaneously allows for a 
critique of the union. As Griselda and Hermione maintain an orthodox commitment to chastity 
and patrilineal succession, they expose a fault in the patriarchal system that demands this labor 
from them while offering no guarantee of support and stability from the fulfillment of their labor. 
Their performance of the good wife paradigm forces an examination of the cultural structures 
that result in conditions of precarity for wives and the behavior of husbands who fail to fulfill 
their obligations of support and protection when their wives “willfully do what they should.”30 
Earlier iterations limit Griselda’s response to Guatier’s trials, in part because of Guatier’s 
demands that she never contradict him in “either in word, or deed, in sign or thought.”31 
Conversely, Dekker and company and Shakespeare grant their heroines the opportunity to speak 
their minds and grieve the losses they suffer at the hands of Gwalter and Leontes, respectively. In 
some ways Grissill’s status is lower than earlier Griseldas; Grissill functions and is treated as a 
servant throughout much of the play. However, her steadfast commitment to her family and her 
former life, her defense of others who share her economic station, and her ability to recognize the 
limited space and autonomy that she may claim within her marriage, also render her more 
complex than the stereotypical good wife in Medieval prose, or on the Renaissance stage. 
 
29  Schwarz, 11. 
30  Schwarz, 3. 
31 The Goodman of Paris, 79. Griselda’s acceptance of Walter’s condition for the marriage in 
this particular edition repeats his stipulation with an emphasis on total obedience in thought 
and deed. She states, “never will I wittingly do or think anything against thy will, and never 
will I deny anything that thou mayst do against me” (79). 
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This chapter focuses explicitly on dramatic representations of wives of lords and 
therefore takes into consideration the threat of personal and political violence derived from the 
same source. Through marriage to their rulers, wives’ marital identity and political identity are 
inextricably bound. Fulfillment of the seemingly private feminine labors of chastity, devotion, 
and patrilineal succession are heightened by their significance for both the patriarchal and 
political structures. The wife of a king or marquis does not just produce an heir for her husband, 
but for her country, or march, respectively. Accordingly, the risk of coercion and violence is 
heightened as their access to redress is limited, as seen in the case of Anne Boleyn. In The 
Pleasant Comodie of Patient Grissill, Grissill’s situation is complicated through her doubly 
precarious state: she is a poor wife to the Marquesse, her ruler. The term poor wife intentionally 
is at once descriptive and judgment based. Grissill is a wife, but prior to being the wife of 
Gwalter, she was a poor woman. While Gwalter gilds her with fine attire, her underlying 
economic status remains a point of contention for Gwalter’s courtiers and serves as an excuse for 
Gwalter to continually test and mistreat her. The radically disproportionate distribution of wealth 
and power within the story—and arguably within medieval and early modern culture—assures 
that Grissill is always and repeatedly placed in a social condition that exposes her to greater 
violence. While her status as a Lord’s wife should afford her a higher level of social, economic, 
and political stability than her unmarried status as the daughter of a peasant, throughout the play 
Gwalter reminds Grissill of her subaltern position within his household and the meager 
conditions from which she came. Further, he threatens retribution against his wife and her kin 
despite her orthodox performance of her marital duties. The category of wife in this instance 
places Grissill in a constant state of coercive precaution because she is subordinate to Gwalter in 
all things—in private, public, bodily, and legal senses: he is her husband and her lord.  
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Despite the disparity in their economic backgrounds, Grissill and Hermione suffer injury 
due to their vulnerable positions as wives of lords. Both women are married to men of power 
who actively wooed their wives and profess to love them. Although Grissill and Hermione are 
devoted to their lords and do nothing to provoke the wrath of their husbands, Leontes and 
Gwalter act in irrational and tyrannical ways that reveal the conditions of precarity within the 
marital union. For Hermione and Grissill the tyranny of Leontes and Gwalter is not metaphorical. 
Laureo claims that Gwalter’s “tyranny / Exceedes the most inhumaine” in forcing Grissill and 
her family from court (4.2.6–7). Paulina correctly questions whether the lords fear Leontes’ 
“tyrannous passion more, alas, / Than the queen’s life? A gracious, innocent soul, / More free 
than he is jealous” (2.3.27–29).32 In suggesting that the King acts tyrannically in his accusations 
against Hermione, who is innocent of any wrongdoing, Paulina underlines the threat of a ruler 
governed by his passions. Consequently, it is their status as wives and Queen/Marquise that 
place Hermione and Grissill in heightened states of vulnerability because the jealousy and 
passion that causes their spouses to act in tyrannical ways is sanctioned and authorized by their 
political authority. 
Grissill and Hermione embody the good wife figure but struggle to perform the expected 
feminine devotion to their husbands when relentless cruelty from their spouses threatens their 
children. The identity of mother—a necessary component for the good wife role and proof of her 
intentional virtue—thus destabilizes marital accord in these plays. In response to their husbands’ 
destructive behavior, the women privilege relationships beyond their marital unions. Gwalter and 
Leontes’s actions are met with multifaceted opposition by various characters in the text, 
 
32 All textual citations from William Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale, Ed. John Pitcher, Arden 
3rd Series, London: Methuem Drama, 2010. 
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revealing diverse networks of support and kinship for Grissill and Hermione. While the husbands 
publicly shame their wives, other characters in the play, including people close to Gwalter and 
Leontes, defend the honor and worth of these women. Grissill’s main support comes from her 
family. Julia, Gwalter’s outspoken sister who self-identifies as a single-woman, reprimands her 
brother and expresses outrage over his treatment of Grissill. Similarly, Leontes’s lords defend 
Hermione’s honor, but her most ardent apologist is Paulina. The alliances that these women 
choose and those that mobilize around Grissill and Hermione—like those that appear in earlier 
iterations of the tale—occur in part because of the arbitrary violence perpetrated by Gwalter and 
Leontes and the affective response initiated by the suffering and steadfastness of the wives. The 
varied trajectories of the two women reveal the diverse tactics used to negotiate for a livable 
space within their individual structures of coercive domination. In much the same way that 
Ales’s letter to Elizabeth offers an alternate narrative of the life and marriage of Anne Boleyn, 
these representations present a minority view of the functional accord that should be granted to 
good women within marriage. The other voices in the these plays name the losses suffered by 
Grissill and Hermione as grievable, help shape the individual and cultural identites of these 
characters within the world of the play and for the Renaissance audience, and underline the 





II. “YOU SHALL FINDE LOUE FOR YOUR OBEDIENCE” 33  
 
You shall finde loue for your obedience, faithe for your truthe, care and study to 
keepe you, for your redy good will to obey.  
—John Aylmer, An harborovve for faithfull and trevve subiectes agaynst the 
late blowne blaste, concerninge the gouernme[n]t of vvemen, 159934 
 
 Chastity and devotion are central tenets of the good wife persona and cultural 
expectations of feminine labor beyond the category of wife, as well. In representations of 
medieval and early modern women—such as Isabella in Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure or 
the semi-religious wives discussed in the following chapter—an orthodox commitment to 
chastity becomes one of the markers of identity that women profess to embrace, often at the 
expense of patrilineal succession. Chastity is fundamental to how Grissill and Hermione see and 
define themselves, as a maid in her father’s house and a wife and mother, respectively. For 
Hermione, it is Leontes’s questioning of her chastity that instigates the rupture in their 
relationship. Hermione’s anger over his accusations implies that her status as a virtuous wife and 
mother is critical to her identity. Grissill’s chastity is, in part, what draws Gwalter to her, in 
much the same way that Angelo and the Duke are drawn to Isabella. However, Gwalter removes 
Grissill’s base garments—an outward sign that her virtue derives from her humble beginnings—
and clothes her in fine attire. Further, he continually tests her devotion to him by placing her in 
increasingly coercive and cruel circumstances. In both instances, Gwalter’s behavior implies that 
 
33 Aylmer, Sig. R2.  
34 Ibid.  
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Grissill’s chastity is not enough to render her a virtuous wife. For both women, the violence and 
injury they suffer at the hands of their husbands demonstrates that their status as a good wives is 
some ways beyond their control; it is contingent on the view and report of another. 
For Grissill, her commitment to her life as a chaste daughter is evident in her opening 
exchange with her father. When we first meet Grissill, her father, Janicola, lectures her on 
honesty and sin. He claims that due to her poor station, her “honest name” is her only dowry 
(1.2.48–50).35 The young, virtuous, and regrettably poor girl whose spiritual superiority and 
outward beauty make amends for a chasm in class is a common trope in early modern drama. 
Typically, the young gallant visits his beloved in disguise and eventually reveals himself to her; 
they encounter resistance from their parents for their class disparity; and the play concludes with 
the revelation that the heroine is a long lost noble and therefore a worthy spouse for her gentle 
suitor.36 Gwalter visits Grissill in disguise, he reveals himself to her, and she endures reprimands 
from her father, but for Grissill there is no grand reveal. She is not noble and her only dowry, as 
her father states, is her chastity, without which she would be rendered worthless and unfit for a 
husband. It is for this reason that Janicola warns his daughter against the advances of the 
Marquesse, who, we learn, has courted Grissill for some time. Specifically, Janicola cautions, 
“[B]eware my Grissill / [Gwalter] can prepare his way with gifts of golde, / Vpon his breath, 
winged Promotion flies” (1.2.57–58). While Gwalter offers expensive tokens and may raise her 
status at his whim, Janicola suggests that these favors, like the beautiful clothing Gwalter will no 
 
35  All textual citations from Thomas Dekker, Henry Chettle, and William Haughton. The 
Pleasant Comodie of Patient Grissill, ed. Fredson Bowers, The Dramatic Works of Thomas 
Dekker, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953. 
36  In The Winter’s Tale, Shakespeare seems to break the Griselda conventions—the long 
suffering wife and the poor virtuous maiden—into two with Hermione embodying the 
former and Perdita the latter. 
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doubt bestow, will only serve to cover the sin beneath—presumably the sin of sex with Gwalter. 
With his favor, these outward shows of status may disappear as arbitrarily and as quickly as they 
arrived, leaving only her transgressions: sins that also guarantee her inability to marry (or re-
marry) because she will lack the one advantage she can bring to a marriage, her virginity. Grissill 
marries Gwalter, legalizing their union and removing the threat of sin discussed by Grissill and 
her father. However, when Grissill’s new clothes and her place as Gwalter’s wife are taken away, 
she is sent home and left worse off than before for the lack of her virginity. Gwalter maintains 
the right to remarry, even though his proposed second marriage is a ruse, while Grissill remains 
unmarried in the house of her father. 
Despite her goodness, Grissill’s brief union with the Marquesse effectively renders her 
unfit for marriage, just as her father prophesizes. Janicola’s wise advice foreshadows Gwalter’s 
actions and lodges the first dissent against the union between Gwalter and Grissill. Grissill 
admits that Gwalter has visited them but defends his acts as honorable:  
Although the Marquesse sometimes visit vs,  
Yet all his words and deedes are like his birth,  
Steept in true honor: but admit they were not, 
Before my soule looke black with speckled sinne, 
My hands shal make me pale deathes vnderling. (1.2.68–72) 
She denies that she has encouraged or accepted his advances, and argues that if his intentions 
“were not” honorable, she would kill herself before sinning. The phrase “but admit they were 
not” can be read in a few ways: 1) Grissill concedes that if Gwalter’s actions were not honorable, 
she would kill herself before sinning; 2) Grissill acknowledges that Gwalter’s actions were not 
always honorable; or 3) Grissill claims that she did not accept his advances, whether they were 
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honorable or not. Based on the context—her defense of Gwalter followed by her threat of 
suicide—I do not think it is unreasonable to read a combination of the first and last 
interpretations. Further proof that Gwalter’s actions were not always honorable are seen in 
Babulo’s reminder that he once struck Gwalter “for offering to haue a licke at [Grissill’s] lips” 
when Gwalter came to see her (1.2.328). While she is aware of the vulnerability of her position 
as a poor single woman, her willingness to risk eternal damnation rather than lose her chastity or 
reputation suggests that for Grissill her identity is bound up with her virtue and her status as 
Janicola’s daughter.37 Her opposition rapidly follows that of her father’s, as she denies any 
possibility of a sexual union, or otherwise, with the Marquesse. This consensus between father 
and daughter faces the complication of political coercion when Gwalter arrives—with his 
entourage—and requests the hand of Grissill. 
Request is the wrong word. Gwalter approaches Grissill’s family under the guise of 
requesting her hand in marriage, but as their Lord, the coercive power of his demand negates any 
real possibility of refusal. Despite this, he publicly stipulates that “by heauen / Vnlesse your free 
consent alowe my choice, … Ile not call her mine.” (1.2.248–250 emphasis mine).38 Gwalter 
 
37  Grissill’s adamant aversion to sin and her desire to remain in her father’s house recall 
medieval semi-religious women who opted for relationships with God over those of men; 
here we can read Janicola as a father/God figure. Similarly, Grissill’s desire to remain 
chaste—and her proclamation that death would be better than sinning—prefigures Isabella 
in Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure. 
38  Gwalter, as a ruler, places Grissill alongside other types of acquired property, conquered 
kingdoms. “Vnlesse your free consent alowe my choice, / To win ten kingdomes Ile not call 
her mine” (1.2.249–250). But here he situates Janicola’s consent (and Grissill’s brother 
Laureo’s) as equal to, or even more worthy, than those kingdoms. The line foreshadows 
other instances of weighing the worth of sexual relationships against the possibility of 
power. In Othello, for instance, Desdemona claims she would not make Othello a cuckold 
for the entire world, while Emilia admits that sex, and the shame that would accompany it, is 
a small price to pay to give her husband power over everything (4.3.59–78). See Rose’s The 
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insists that Grissill’s father and Laureo, Grissill’s brother, approve of the union or the marriage 
will not take place (1.2.251). In her work on early modern friendship, Laurie Shannon notes that 
“Equality between agreeing parties suggests a balance of wills, and only that parity can ensure 
that a contract has been freely entered.”39 Shannon’s claim is reflected in William Gouge’s 
treatise on marriage, Of Domesticall Duties (1622): 
[F]or if a man of great wealth be married to poore woman, he will thinke to make 
her as his maid-seruant, and expect that she should carrie her selfe towards him so 
as beseemeth not a yoake-fellow, and bedfellow: so as such an one may rather be 
said to be brought vnto bondage, then marriage.40 
Gouge delineates a difference in between a husband’s relationship with his wife and that with his 
servants by suggesting an expectation of intimacy in a wife’s countenance toward her husband. 
Bedfellow specifically addresses this intimacy, but even yoke-fellow, according to the OED, 
implies a “fellow-worker” or “associate,” and within the early modern period, the term was also 
used to refer to a spouse.41 In either instance, the relationship implied is a partnership, not one of 
servitude.42 Based on Gouge’s assessment of the lack of acquiescence in a marriage between 
people from different social classes, Gwalter’s condition that Janicola and Laureo agree to the 
match is irrelevant because the disparity of their estates invalidates any autonomy implied by the 
 
Expense of Spirit on the metaphors of conquest in depictions of early modern marriage, 
particularly, 121–122. 
39  Shannon, 39. 
40  Gouge, 189–190. 
41  See “yoke-fellow, n.” OED Online, Oxford UP, March 2014. Web. 11 May 2014.  
42  Though Gouge disagrees with the sentiment, he acknowledges that some people “thinke 
there is no differene betweixt a wife and seruant but in familiarity: and that wiues were 
made to be seruants to their husbands, because subiection, feare and obedience are required 
of them.” (358). 
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request for their blessing. Proof of the emptiness of Gwalter’s stipulation can be seen in the fact 
that Laureo withholds consent while Grissill begs Gwalter, “Humble not your high state to my 
lowe birth, / Who am not worthy to be held your slaue, / Much less your wife” (1.2.240–242). 
She denies the possibility of being his wife, and even states that her status dictates that being his 
slave would be too high of an honor for her. Her lines warn of the dangers of marriage between 
people of unequal estates and foreshadow both Gwalter’s treatment of her and provide a literary 
example of the warnings elucidated by Gouge in his treatise. Though neither Janicola nor Grissill 
reject Gwalter’s proposal, neither accepts his offer; she is “brought vnto bondage” rather “then 
marriag.”  
Gwalter’s authority, and by extension his claim to Grissill, is accepted because he is 
Janicola’s ruler, not because Janicola approves of the match. Janicola submits, “What to my Lord 
seemes best to me seemes so” (1.2.260). In a similar fashion Grissill capitulates, “As her olde 
Father yeeldes to your dread will, / So she her fathers pleasure must fulfill” (1.2.265–266). While 
both men represent patriarchal figures for Grissill, there is a difference between the private 
power of the father, Janicola’s “pleasure,” and the public power of the lord, Gwalter’s “dread 
will.” In early modern England, the word dread suggested something or someone “[f]eared 
greatly” or “held in awe.”43 Derived from the Middle English verb dread, the word often carried 
the connotation of the mortal fear and reverence associated with a ruler or God.44 The absolute 
power stipulated by Gwalter’s “dread will,” then, indicates a demand for a patriarchal fidelity 
akin to religious devotion, one that necessitates the subject acquiesce or risk physical or spiritual 
 
43  “dread, adj.2.”OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2014. 
44  “dread, v.”OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2014. For religious connotations of 
dread, see Thomasii, Dictionarium linguae Latinae et Anglicanae (1587), Lexicons of Early 
Modern English, http://leme.library.utoronto.ca. 
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violence. Grissill points out the coercive nature of Gwalter’s proposal as she reiterates that her 
father agrees to the union because Gwalter’s station demands they obey and revere his desire (his 
dread will), and that she, likewise, owes the same veneration to her father and his decision.45 
Grissill as a virtuous daughter obeys her father’s acquiescence to Gwalter, but Grissill’s 
opposition to the marriage and to becoming a wife is made clear when she claims that if the 
choice had been left up to her—which clearly it has not—“she had rather, / Be the poore 
Daughter still of her poore Father” (1.2.268–269). Given the option between marrying Gwalter 
and remaining a poor virgin in the house of her father Grissill would choose the latter. Grissill 
indicates her devotion to her chaste life at the outset of the play when she declares, “If to die free 
from shame be nere to die, / Then Ile be crowned with immortallitie” (1.2.51–52). The categories 
she identifies with and wishes to maintain are those of daughter and maid.46 Despite Grissill’s 
patent declaration that she desires to remain a chaste maid, Gwalter mistakenly believes that her 
only fear lies in the discrepancy of their estates.  
 Grissill’s commentary on her economic status as an obstacle to the union is a common 
feature in earlier versions of the narrative leading all the way back to Boccaccio. It also reflects 
the practice of early medieval European laws that made marriage between disparate estates 
impossible. In her work on the spectrum of non-marital medieval pair bonds, Ruth Mazo Karras 
asserts, “because the status of a union depended on the relative social status of the parties, a 
 
45  Admittedly, coercion and consent are complicated in early modern power dynamics. For 
further discussion on consent and status, see Shannon; for issues of consent in the forming 
of medieval pair bonds, see Karras; and for the importance of willful acquiescence as a 
means to question heterosocial hierarchy, see Schwarz. 
46  While sitting outside working in Act One, scene two, Grissill she asks her father’s 
permission, “might it please your age,” if she could work inside so as to avoid enticing the 
gaze of men. This show of deference to her father, even in small decisions, also emphasizes 
her commitment to chastity. 
 58 
woman of lower social status was likely to be considered a concubine or prostitute rather than a 
wife.”47 Janicola’s servant Babulo, the fool figure in the play, reiterates the impracticality of the 
marriage between Grissill and the Marquesse when he proclaims himself “a fitter husband” for 
Grissill. Despite Gwalter’s assurances of raising Grissill’s fortunes, Babulo insists that gilding 
her with finery will not suffice, that “beggers are fit for beggers, gentlefolkes for gentlefolkes” 
(1.2.317). Babulo recognizes the cultural restraints that prevent permeability between social 
classes. 
The Grissill of the village, the one who is the daughter of poor Janicola, lives literally and 
figuratively on the borders of Gwalter’s society. Gwalter and Grissill understand that her lack of 
monetary worth lies in direct conflict with her inner worth. Grissill acknowledges that her 
goodness is a product of her chastity and of her humble birth; however, Gwalter’s response to 
this conflict suggests that according to the cultural ideals of the play it is impossible for Grissill 
to be at once, poor, virtuous, and the Marquesse’s wife. In order to rectify the issue of Grissill’s 
low birth, Gwalter intends to have her outward appearance match her inner virtue, but his choice 
of words is both problematic and telling of the impossibility of the transformation he desires. He 
states that he will “gild [her] pouertie, and make it shine” (1.2.270), but his words imply that his 
actions will only serve to impose a superficial layer of worth, a thin layer at best; he cannot 
change the metal/mettle underneath. Gwalter’s declaration of his desire to disguise her low birth 
with expensive garments harkens back to Janicula’s earlier warning to Grissill that “in a painted 
coat goes sin” (1.2.35). For Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass: 
 
47  Karras, 7. 
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[The o]pposing of clothes and the person was always in tension with the social 
practices through which the body politic was composed: the varied acts of 
investiture. For it was investiture, the putting on of clothes, that quite literally 
constituted a person as a monarch or a freeman of a guild or a household servant. 
Investiture was, in other words, the means by which a person was given a form, a 
shape, a social function.48  
The Marquesse demands that as an outward symbol of her worth—and her change in status from 
poor virgin to Marquesse’s wife—that she remove her base garments and be dressed in “robes of 
honour” before he takes her to his home (1.2.270, 273). Through this public action of removing 
her clothing and insisting she don the finery he has brought for her—an act performed in the 
previous Medieval iterations—Gwalter gilds her with new clothes and assumes that the facade of 
wealth will suffice to allow her to transverse the distance between poor virgin and Marquesse’s 
wife.49 The act of dressing Grissill like a queen makes her a queen; the material allows Gwalter 
to “shape” Grissill “both physically and socially.”50 
The clothing serves as a reminder of the performative aspects of marriage and how 
readily the category and status of wife can be bestowed or taken away. As is common in early 
modern drama, it is the fool of the play, Babulo, who explicitly warns of the precariousness of 
Grissill’s union with Gwalter. Babulo claims [Gwalter] will most certainly “giue her the belles, 
 
48  Jones and Stallybrass, 2. 
49  While Gwalter assumes that the title of wife and the new clothing will be enough to render 
Grissill an appropriate mate, neither he nor Grissill accept her new status in practice: 
Gwalter continues to treat Griselda as someone of lower birth and she reiterates her 
underlying status in her insistence that the clothes she wears are merely “liuerie” (2.2.68). 
50  Ibid. 
 60 
[and] let her flye” (1.2.323).51 In using a falconry metaphor to describe the dressing of Grissill, 
Babulo implies that the finery with which Gwalter’s clothes her is like a falconer placing bells on 
his falcon: it marks Grissill as his, but he may use her or let her go as he pleases, knowing that he 
will always be able to find—and by extension control—her. Through his metaphor, Babulo 
exposes the instability that Grissill faces in her marriage to Gwalter. Babulo cautions—as 
Janicola did previously—that once Gwalter has sex with Grissill, his interest will wane and he 
will “let her flye.” In many ways, Babulo’s warning rings true: after she fulfills her feminine 
labor of patrilineal succession, he sends her home and then calls her back. She is reinstated at the 
end of the play; however, Gwalter’s actions prior to the final scene foreground the inequity 
between husbands and wives if a woman cannot maintain her status even when she fulfills her 
gendered obligations. 
Despite abundant criticism over the marriage and the Marquesse’s own stipulations for 
the union not being met, Gwalter exclaims, “Grissill is my Bride” (1.2.282). His acquiring of 
Grissill reads more as a King impressing a person into his service rather than a man asking for 
the hand of the woman he loves. In Discourses of Service in Shakespeare’s England, David Evett 
points to biblical passages that helped inform ideologies of service. He notes that, “the 
injunctions to servants in those texts are closely preceded by the injunctions to wives. Both 
injunctions specify nurture by the superior and obedience by the inferior as the raw material of 
familial mutuality, and they have the effect of putting women and servants at the same level, in 
the same group.”52 The correlation between the service a woman owes her husband and that a 
 
51  For a discussion on whether or not children born to lower class women could legally inherit, 
see Karras, 36. 
52  Evett, 160. 
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servant owes his master provides a basis for Gwalter’s treatment of Grissill and his linking of her 
and his servant Furio within the play. As a poor virtuous maid, Grissill embodies the overlap in 
these injunctions. Her early objection that she is “not worthy to be held [his] slaue, / Much less 
[his] wife” is the only instance in the text where Grissill uses the word wife (1.2.241–242). Even 
after they are married, she never refers to herself as his spouse, but only as Gwalter’s handmaid 
or servant. In Evett’s terms, familial mutuality fails because despite Grissill’s obedience, 
Gwalter, as the superior, fails in his duty to nurture those below him. 
Gwalter’s desire for a wife/servant recalls Theophrastus’s argument against marriage as 
quoted in Jerome’s Against Jovinian: 
Men marry, indeed, so as to get a manager for the house, to solace weariness, to 
banish solitude; but a faithful slave is a far better manager, more submissive to the 
master, more observant of his ways, than a wife who thinks she proves herself a 
mistress if she acts in opposition to her husband.53 
In contrast to the privileging of servant over wife within Theophrastus’s argument, Gwalter 
wants it both ways: he desires the comfort of a wife but the obedience of a servant.54 As Gouge 
warns, Gwalter wants a “maid-seruant” but his desire is in conflict with the intimacy he should 
desire from a “bedfellow.”55 His initial courting of Grissill, his declaration of his feelings, and 
the moments when he admits that he is moved by her response to his testing all imply a desire for 
 
53  McCarthy, 42. 
54  The first time that we see Gwalter after his marriage is in Act Two, scene two. Gwalter 
informs Furio that Grissill is pregnant, that he loves her, but that he has a burning desire to 
try her patience (2.2.12–13, 17–18, 2–21). 
55  Gouge, 190. 
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a certain intimacy in their relationship.56 Gwalter confesses to Furio, “So dearly loue I Grissill, 
that my life / Shall end, when doth ende to be my wife” (2.2.17–18), but directly after he admits 
that his “bosome burnt vp with desires, / To trie my Grissills patience” (2.2.20–21). Within these 
few lines, Gwalter reveals the emotional volatility that Grissill must endure as a wife. He loves 
her and believes he will die without her, but in giving in to his desires, he also seeks to test and 
control her. As such the intimacy that should foster stability within the marital union actually 
endangers it. Frances Dolan underlines the cultural importance of intimacy in marriage in her 
work on murder pamphlets and ballads. She notes that in “[d]etailing husbands’ violent refusals 
to act as protectors, partners, or lovers, these texts present the murders of wives as abuses not 
only of authority but of intimacy.”57 While Gwalter’s violence does not extend to murder, his 
refusal to act as Grissill’s protector or partner does intimate an abuse of authority and intimacy. 
Further, the impulse to test Grissill’s devotion and patience—an impulse not new for Gwalter but 
seen previously in his testing of Furio (2.2.3–4)—speaks to Gwalter’s need for absolute control, 
which boarders on tyranny. To marry these two ideals and answer the problem put forth by 
Theophrastus, Gwalter sets out to mold a wife as submissive and devoted as a servant. However, 
Gwalter is not a newlywed husband meeting with resistance from a shrew who must be punished, 
tricked, and beaten down until she succumbs to right rule and sway—a standard comic set-up in 
Renaissance drama and one that Gwalter points to as a justification for his actions at the end of 
the play.58 Rather than a shrew, Grissill is the model of the servant/wife that Gwalter seeks.  
 
56  See 4.1.69–70, 4.1.82, for examples of Gwalter’s acknowledgement of Grissill’s suffering 
by his actions. 
57  Dolan, Dangerous Familiars, 99. 
58  Gwalter claims “ile haue my will and tame her pride, / ... / Ile bridle her” (4.3.237–239). 
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Gwalter’s belief that a servant may prove perfectly obedient and submissive is a faulty 
one. Even in the case of Furio, who has been tested and proven true, we see a servant who 
registers objections to Gwalter’s actions within his asides. Furio’s private dissent—made public 
by the audience who bears witness to them—supports Babulo’s earlier comment that a ruler 
lacks the right to control the speech of his subjects (1.2.294). But if we return back to the 
religious allegory of earlier iterations of the tale, what Gwalter desires is complete obedience in 
the form of religious devotion. For Schwarz, this “Obedience requires an unattainable correlation 
between imperative and enactment, a complete absence of frictions, ambivalence or effort. By 
contrast, secular norms frame a contractual space in which obedience can be serviceable and 
consent can be sufficient.”59 Grissill embodies the patient good wife from the outset of their 
marriage, offering serviceable obedience. Through her orthodox performance of subservience, 
one that exceeds the standards of secular norms as viewed and reported by other characters in the 
play, Gwalter’s actions come across not as the prudent decisions of a husband or ruler, but as 
tyrannical and coercive. In doing so, the play calls into question the cultural conventions that 
demand such obedience. 
The conflation of Grissill’s personas—wife and servant—appears in her assertion that the 
rich gowns that Gwalter gilds her with are nothing more than a symbol that she belongs to his 
house: 
Poore Grissill is not proud of these attires, 
They are to me but as your liuerie  
And from your humble seruant when you please,  
 
59  Schwarz, 27. 
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You may take all this outside which ineeded  
Is none of Grissills, her best wealth is neede. (2.2.67–72) 
Grissill’s comment comes as a retort against Gwalter’s accusations that her new clothes have left 
her haughty, but her words also serve a double purpose. She disagrees with his assessment that 
she has become arrogant—i.e., the garments have not made her proud, or superior, as he 
suggests. Simultaneously, she reiterates the vulnerability of her position: the clothes are merely a 
marker of her status as a member of his household; both the attire and her position are easily 
taken away. She recognizes that her worth and true identity are not merely personified by an 
outward display of clothing, but lie in her inner virtue. In contrast to her apparent lack of 
attachment Gwalter’s fine array, she embraces the humility and humble beginnings from whence 
she came, asserting that her “best wealth is neede” (2.2.72). Unlike the clothes and status that 
may be conferred or removed, Grissill names her lack as her best virtue. In this way, despite her 
precarious status as a Marquesse’s wife, she maintains a fidelity to her original identity: “the 
poore Daughter … of her poore Father.” In a similar vein, she professes that her old dress is 
more practical and possibly better because it offers greater warmth (2.2.74–76). Grissill’s 
defense of her upbringing as the foundation of her virtue, her declaration that the clothes she 
dons are merely the Marquesse’s “liuerie,” and her refusal to name herself as Gwalter’s spouse, 
all emphasize her understanding of the instability of wife as the constitutive marker of her 
identity. 
In continually presenting herself as a handmaid—with the connotations of religious 
devotion—Grissill’s submission toward Gwalter and her acceptance of his demands and insults 
renders his trials of her all the more cruel and absurd. Grissill’s servitude is stressed in Act Two, 
scene two, when Gwalter insists that she stoop to tie the shoes of his groom, Furio, orders that 
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she fetch wine, and offers her services to his courtiers. He states “Tis but her office: what she 
does to mee, / She shall performe to any of you three” (2.2.137–138). The sexual undertones in 
Gwalter’s offer to his noblemen are unmistakable, particularly when he orders Grissill to treat his 
noblemen as himself: “And as you bowe to me, so bend to them” (2.2.142). Grissill is pregnant 
during this scene, a physical reminder that one of her marital duties includes sex with Gwalter. If 
Grissill’s office—the category she embraces—is one of service, she protects herself from the 
sexual implications of Gwalter’s offer. Grissill’s willingness to embrace servitude becomes a 
performative tactic because in acting as Gwalter’s servant she avoids the baser category of 
whore. Her virtuous enactment of the handmaid/Marian figure—a connection made more overt 
by her physical pregnancy—helps safeguard her reputation as she attempts to fulfill her duties of 
chastity and patrilineal succession. 
 In the face of Gwalter’s abuses, Grissill performs of the role of handmaid, one that aligns 
her with the figure of Mary as a symbol of chaste devotion. As a queen descended from a line of 
Kings, Hermione cannot employ the same self-deprecating device. Much as Grissill draws her 
virtue from her humble birth, Hermione draws hers from her high-born status. At the outset of 
The Winter’s Tale, Hermione has already fulfilled her feminine labors of marriage, chastity, and 
patrilineal succession. The young prince Mamillius is well and Hermione is visibly pregnant with 
another child. Despite her virtuous performance, the occasion of Hermione’s physical pregnancy 
coinciding with Polixenes’s visit becomes a point of unease for her husband. William Gouge 
warns against the very behavior Leonte’s displays when notes that some men, “through iealous 
suspicion…vpbraid [their wives] with lightnesse, and to say that the childe is none of theirs.”60 
For Gouge, “To lay this to a wiues charge vniustly, is at any time a most shamefull and odious 
 
60  Gouge, 401. 
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reproach: but in the time of childbirth whether iust or vniust, a thing too too spightfull”61 
Without provocation, Leontes accuses Hermione of adultery, treason, and conspiracy. As 
Leontes’s wife, she cannot escape his open accusations. In fact, it is Leontes’s public slander of 
his wife that breaks the bond between them and initiates the series of events that lead Hermione 
to fake her death and remove herself from court. In doing so, Hermione fulfills Gouge’s final 
warning that a husband’s accusations may drive a wife to “vow neuer to know their husbands 
again.”62 She warns Leontes that when he learns he is wrong, he will regret his actions in calling 
her “an adultress,” “a traitor,” and “a bed-swerver” (2.1.88, 89, 92). 
 How will this grieve you 
When you shall come to clearer knowledge, that 
You thus have published me? Gentle my lord, 
You scarce can right me throughly then to say 
You did mistake. (2.1.96–100)  
She informs him—in legal terms—that because his slander was public (“published”) a 
confession of error would be insufficient to balance out the injury. Leontes cannot take back the 
damage he has done to her honor or, by extension, their relationship. Hermione claims she “must 
be patient” and wait until the “heavens” right the wrongs done to her (2.1.104).63 Her application 
of legal terms and supplication to the Gods for justice, indicate a break with her marital identity 
where a private act of repentance by her husband may have been enough to remedy a private act 
 
61  Ibid., 402. 
62  Ibid. 
63  Hermione’s willingness to endure until miraculous intervention eases her suffering aligns 
her with the Catholic models of piety. For more discussion on the difference between 
Catholic and Protest modes of suffering, see Sanchez, 16–19.  
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of slander. However, Leontes’ indictment of Hermione is public and sanctioned by his authority 
as king. Hermione, therefore, faces the allegations not as a wife, but as a subject and submits her 
case to the Gods—the only authorities higher than the king. 
Hermione moves away from defining herself as Leontes’s wife toward a performance of 
her role as a subject and mother as she leaves Leontes physically and emotionally. Hermione’s 
parting remark to him, “Adieu, my lord: / I never wish’d to see you sorry; now / I trust I shall” 
suggests her previous love for him and her personal stake in his happiness (2.1.122–124). She 
also acknowledges that she knows that Leontes is wrong and is clear that the truth will prevail, 
but no longer is emotionally invested in his impending remorse. Further proof of her marital 
break is found in her requests for attendants, which she explicitly makes to her king: “Who is’t 
that goes with me? Beseech your highness / My women may be with me, for you see / My plight 
requires it” (1.2.116–118). Without waiting for Leontes to approve, she demands, “My women, 
come, you have leave” (2.1.124). She insists on the company of her women to protect herself and 
her unborn child (2.1.116–124). In Act Three, scene two, the trial scene, her identification with 
the role of mother is further emphasized when she claims that she defends herself because her 
reputation reflects directly on her children: “For honour, / ’Tis a deriavtive from me to mine, / 
And only that I stand for” (3.2.42–44). Foregoing any effort to restore marital accord, Hermione 




III.  “MY SOULE KNIT TO YOUR SOULES, KNOWES YOU ARE MINE”64 
 
Can a mother forget the child of her womb? … Therefore let no man blame a 
mother … since every man knows that the love of a mother to her children is 
hardly contained within the bounds of reason.  
—Dorothy Leigh, The Mother’s Blessing, 161665 
 
 Early modern views on the relationship between a mother and child vary.66 Some 
religious and legal tracts emphasize that the fathers maintain sole custody and responsibility for 
children engendered from a marriage. Donna Long concedes that, “[f]or the early modern 
mother, possession would seem a foreign concept, given the patrilineal privilege.”67 Religious 
arguments tend to focus on the idea that procreation is an obligation to God and, therefore, 
children belong to God. “The premise that a child belonged first to God, then to its biological 
father, and, upon his death, potentially to the Crown, displaced the mother from the living 
child.”68 However, in practice—even in legal practice—the rules and expectations are more 
malleable.69  
 
64 Dekker, Chettle, and Haughton, 5.3.196–197. 
65 Leigh, 293. 
66 See Long’s overview of views from Stone and Macfarlane, in particular, 187–188. 
67 Long, 188. 
68 Ibid, 193. 
69 For example, in the case of Elizabeth Bourne, discussed in Chapter Four, she successfully 
petitions the Privy Council for the right to have a say in her youngest daughter’s marriage 
despite the fact that her husband has already negotiated a match. The council sides with 
Elizabeth, demands that halt to the intended union, and requests that the guardian appointed 
by her husband Anthony return Elizabeth’s daughter for fear that Mary Bourne will be 
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The cultural expectations of a father’s right to a child and the mother’s inability to “forget 
the child of her womb” come into conflict to such an extent that it causes both mothers to 
separate, at least for a time, from their husbands.70 Grissill and Hermione spend extended time 
away from court and return at the end of the narrative to be reunited with her children. Hermione 
chooses her exile; Grissill does not. But in each instance I will show that these wives privilege 
their status as mothers in their moments of reconciliation. In response to their husbands’ 
behavior, the wives create “[c]ovenants of allegiance, affiliation, fidelity and reciprocity”;71 they 
create alternate livable spaces through diverse networks of support from characters surrounding 
them. Rather than exemplifying Vives’s decree that women “shall reckon to find all [family and 
friends] in only her husband,”72 the livable space for these characters is not necessarily one 
shared only or primarily with their husbands. In these texts, other characters attest to the virtue of 
Grissill and Hermione and comment on the injustice of their treatment. The various reactions of 
these networks define the husbands’ actions as unreasonable while acknowledging the 
grievability of Grissill’s and Hermione’s distress. Further, Hermione’s willingness to leave 
Leontes and remain with Paulina on the premise that Hermione may be reunited with her 
daughter destabilizes the edict that a wife’s first duty should be to her husband. Similarly, 
Grissill’s inability to maintain her devotion to her husband when he demands she relegate herself 
to the status of nurse to her children, her defense of those who share her station, including Furio 
 
contracted in marriage for which the mother disapproves. In demanding the release of her 
daughter the Council writes, “takeing care that noe suspected persons have accesse unto her, 
and that she be not contracted to anie; onely her mother maie repaire unto her when and as 
often as shall stand with her pleasure and good lyking” (PC 2/15 f. 341). See also SP 12/203 
f.68, PC 2/15 f. 131, and PC 2/15 f. 179. 
70 Leigh, 293. 
71 Schwarz, 3. 
72  Vives, 112. 
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and her family, and her increasing critique of Gwalter’s behavior, serve to unhinge this Griselda 
narrative from its referential frame. 
Faced with a weak position within Gwalter’s household and his abject humiliation of her 
within Act Two, scene two, Grissill performs an outward show of patient devotion even as she 
expresses dissent and disapproval. In this way Grissill’s tactics differ from Hermione’s. Grissill’s 
asides, her exchanges with Furio, and her commentary to her family, all provide her with the 
opportunity to make the audience aware of her struggle to endure Gwalter’s abuses and her grief 
over losing her children. In doing so, this iteration of the tale explicitly questions the inequity 
that grants Gwalter power at the expense of Grissill’s suffering. Earlier prose narratives suggest 
that while Griselda maintains a stoic exterior, she must be suffering inside. Medieval versions 
frequently observe that Guatier knows that Griselda loves her children and is pained by the 
thought that he has had them killed. The shift towards allowing Griselda a verbal and affective 
response may attest to the fact that by the early modern period the possibility of a woman 
passively accepting the murder of would render Grissill an unnatural mother.73 Regardless, the 
instructions and critiques that Grissill weaves into her submission create a space for growth in 
the Griselda narrative that implies a mutual right to instruction within marriage. On her knees in 
an attempt to defend Furio from Gwalter’s threat of death, Grissill appears the picture of 
subordination; however, she also exalts the virtues of compassion and claims that the world 
reveres a merciful king (2.2.110–111). Her words read as a lesson for the Marquesse, suggesting 
that Gwalter himself is deficient in the qualities, such as mercy, of a good Lord. Hermione 
performs a similar slight against Leontes’s rule when she wishes that her father, the Emperor of 
 
73 See Luckyj, “Disciplining the Mother” 113, for biblical evidence that states a false mother is 
one who would let harm come to her child. 
 71 
Russia, was alive to see her trial because he would look on her misery “with eyes / Of pity, not 
revenge” (3.2.122–123). By identifying herself as a daughter of a merciful king, Hermione 
reiterates her status as a princess separate from her marriage to Leontes and implies that she has 
seen examples of how to rule (her father/pity) and how not to rule (her husband/vengeance). 
Through their discourse, the women offer instruction to their husbands on how to be better 
rulers; in each instance the focus is on mercy and non-violence. Grissill’s critique of Gwalter’s 
tyrannical rule subsequently exposes her own unjust torment at the hands of her husband when 
she asks of Gwalter, “Forgiue [Furio’s] fault though youle not pardon mee” (2.2.112). In asking 
for forgiveness for Furio and acknowledging that she has no hope of the same clemency at the 
hands of Gwalter, Grissill through her own virtuous performance indirectly points out a flaw in 
Gwalter: his lack of parity and compassion when dealing with his subjects, his household, and 
his wife. 
Gwalter’s testing finds the limit of Grissill’s patient disposition when the Marquesse 
expresses disdain with her family. Grissill appears ready to suffer humiliation and threats of 
violence to her own person, but she struggles to refrain from defending those that she loves. 
When Gwalter scorns her brother and father, Grissill promptly urges that Gwalter “cast them 
downe, / And send poore Grissill poorely home again” (2.2.120–121). Maintaining a show of 
fidelity, Grissill uses the opportunity of his critique of her family to leave Gwalter. These lines 
could be read as evidence of her desire to please the Marquesse, even at the cost of her family; 
however, Gwalter voices contempt only for her family and yet Grissill proposes that they all be 
sent home, including her. Similarly, after Gwalter offers her up to his courtiers, as discussed 
previously, she gives her husband a backhanded compliment about his ability to tolerate the 
obvious flattery of his noblemen (2.2.146–147). Gwalter chastises her for her impropriety and 
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tells her to leave (2.2.148–149). She responds in the affirmative and offers to stay away, “if you 
please, nere more beholde the day” (2.2.150). Her comment may be read as an attempt to please 
Gwalter by removing herself from him for the day. She also may be suggesting that she will kill 
herself if he so desires and never see daylight, again. While the second reading may be extreme, 
in her opening scene Grissill claimed that she would kill herself before sinning (1.2.71–72). 
Whether we read her offer as one of absence or suicide, when taken with her previous comment 
we must at least entertain the idea that Grissill wishes to leave Gwalter’s company completely. 
Within the span of forty lines Grissill suggests that she leave Gwalter twice: she first requests to 
be sent home, and when that does not work she offers a permanent solution in suicide. Cleverly, 
both of these are done under the pretense of pleasing him. Her desire to return home comes up, 
again, when the Marquesse banishes her father, brother, and Babulo from court in Act Three, 
scene three. Before the arrival of Furio, Gwalter, and his attendants, Grissill displays grief at the 
loss of her family and blames herself for their despair. In comforting them and reaffirming their 
alliance, she insists that they will “finde content” at home (3.1.47); content that she herself is 
denied within Gwalter’s court. 
The contention Grissill faces between negotiating a livable space as Gwalter’s wife and 
her desire to protect and maintain a strong sense of kinship with her family encounters further 
complication after she gives birth to twins. With her children comes the category of mother, a 
title that Gwalter tries to remove, but Grissill fights to maintain. The Marquesse repeatedly 
reminds her that she is “but [a] nurse to them, they are not [hers]” (4.1.149), and though she 
admits her lack of a claim, “I know my gratious Lord they are not mine” (4.1.50), she becomes 
progressively outspoken in her dissent and freely expresses her grief. In direct opposition to 
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Gwalter’s mandate that she leave the children, she asserts to an equally frustrated Furio,74 “I am 
their Mother I must not away” (4.1.93). She calls them “[her] babes,” confesses that her “heart 
akes” for them. As Dorothy Leigh corroborates in The Mother’s Blessing (1616), Grissill cannot 
forget the children of her womb; the identity of mother turns out to be one that Gwalter cannot as 
readily manipulate.  
The History of Grisild the Second: a Narrative, in Verse, of the Divorce of Queen 
Katharine of Arragon, written by William Forest, provides another example of the centrality of 
the mother/child relationship in an appropriation of the Griselda narrative. Forest writes that after 
the death of their son, Walter’s (here a stand-in for Henry VIII) “harte (nodoutes) it went ful nye; 
/ But, touching the Mother specyalle, / Neauer was theare woman (I think nolesse) / That for her 
childe myget shewe more heauyness.”75 While both parents suffer at the loss of the child, 
Grisilde (the Katharine figure) bemoans that “I was a mother, and nowe am none.”76 The 
importance of the child in defining female identity suggests a stronger correlation in the 
mother/child relationship and its possibility for at once fulfilling the purpose of marriage and 
shifting the wife’s primary relationship from her spouse to the child. After Grisilde and Walter 
divorce and she is sent from court, Forest notes, “Yeat worste thyne of all, which did her most 
 
74  Furio’s asides reveal his own anguish at discharging Gwalter’s orders. Furio asserts, “I shall 
drowne my heart, with my teares that fall inward” (4.1.140), and when he is forced to take 
away Grissill’s children, he comments that it would be better if he “were rid of [his] office” 
(4.2.168). In this way, Furio, like Grissill, struggles with devotion to Gwalter and lodges 
private—made public through the presence of the audience—dissent against the trails of the 
Marquesse. 
75  Forest, 39. 
76  Ibid., 41. Forest also notes the difference in class between the standard Griselda and 
Katharine. As such, he sees her suffering as more extreme because, “she a noble woman of 
byrthe and delycatly brought upp, therefore the more harder adversytee tendure, thother 
farre base[r] brought upp in pneurye and hardenes, brought tot he same state agayne she 
myght the easyer suffre ytt” (20–21). 
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hurte, / Her deareste Doughter from her was holden short.”77 The separation of Grisilde and her 
Doughter (Mary), then, becomes a greater trial for Grisilde than the split between her and her 
husband.78 The threat of the loss of her children causes a similar distress for Dekker’s Grissill 
and prompts Gwalter’s decision to send Grissill and her children home. When mother and twins 
are banished after she refuses to part from them, she claims that they will “laugh and liue 
content” away from Court and by extension away from Gwalter (4.1.100, 113, 136, 183). When 
she returns home, she repeats the sentiment and tells her father that Gwalter “Hath banist me 
from care to quietness” (4.2.39). Her declarations that she will live a content quiet life as a poor 
mother makes clear that her time as a wife has been anything but happy. 
Grissill’s failed attempts at functional accord in Gwalter’s court align her with other 
mothers—on stage and in early modern England—who attempt to use the proof of their feminine 
labor, their children, to solidify the bond with their husbands. Like Katherine’s references to 
Mary as proof of the legitimacy of her marriage to Henry, or Anne’s presenting Elizabeth to 
Henry discussed at the outset of the chapter, Grissill returns to Gwalter after he declares her 
banishment and entreats him, “Oh see my Lord, / Sweet prettie fooles they both smil’d at that 
word / … / Can you thus part from them?” (4.1.194–198). The act appears as one of desperation 
on the part of the woman to preserve her family and her standing as a wife. Simultaneously, it 
 
77  Ibid., 85. 
78  Forest writes his Griselda narrative for Queen Mary, and as such, this political appropriation 
of the tale works to memorialize Katharine, in much the same way that Ales venerates Anne 
Boleyn for Elizabeth. In both instances, and in The Commodye of Pacient and Meeke 
Grissill (c. 1560)—believed by Ursula Potter to have been written for Queen Elizabeth 
about Anne and Henry—the Griselda figures are exalted as devoted and exceptional 
mothers, even in the face of their husbands’ cruelty. It is interesting to note that the Griselda 
tale is one that is malleable enough to emphasize the mother/child relationship, despite the 
tradition of focusing on the relationship between Griselda and Guatier. 
 75 
indicates a fault in early modern gender mores that demand children as part of a good wife’s 
labor, but leave wives with little redress or maintenance when the fulfillment of their labors fails 
to secure their status.  
According to Ursula Potter, Anne Boleyn’s entreaty to Henry VIII at Greenwich may 
have inspired a scene in John Phillip’s The Commodye of Pacient and Meeke Grissill (c. 1560) in 
which the Nurse presents Guatier’s daughter to him in hopes of softening his resolve to murder 
the child.79 For Potter, this appropriation of the Griselda tale situates Anne Boleyn as a chaste, 
virtuous, and devoted wife and mother. This version also highlights the importance of the 
mother/daughter relationship through the addition of a mother for Grissill, another departure 
from the majority of the medieval editions.80 Notably, the play was written for the newly 
crowned Queen Elizabeth. Phillip’s interpretation seeks to establish the virtuousness of Anne and 
consequently the legitimacy of the new Queen. In this way, Phillip’s use of the Griselda narrative 
is similar to Forest’s The History of Grisild the Second, written for Queen Mary. In both 
instances political appropriations of the tale work to memorialize the mothers, in much the same 
way that Ales venerates Anne Boleyn for Elizabeth. The Griselda figures are exalted as devoted 
and exceptional caretakers, even in the face of their husbands’ cruelty. The Griselda tale is 
malleable enough to emphasize the mother/child relationship, despite the tradition of focusing on 
the relationship between Griselda and Guatier. Philip’s and Forest’s appropriation of the Griselda 
 
79  Potter 22–23. After the son is born, the nurse has a long quarrel with Diligence, the 
supposed murderer, about wanting to protect the child (1381–1427). When her appeal fails, 
the nurse calls the marquis a “cruel father” and leaves for court to comfort Grissill and “cry 
out” against the Marquis (1427, 1448–1451). 
80  The exception to this is found in a fourteenth century Italian edition of the tale in Giovanni 
Sercambi’s Novelle (c. 1369). While Phillip gives Grissill both a mother and a father, 
Sercambi replaces the father with a mother. For more on Sercambi’s version see Potter, 25m 
and Severs Literary Relationships, 21. 
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story to substantiate and witness the injuries of Anne and Katherine, respectively, foregrounds 
the flexibility of the story as a political and cultural allegory. Moreover, the repetitions of the tale 
throughout the medieval and early modern periods indicates its cultural acceptance as a story that 
not only epitomizes and reaffirms the qualities of a good wife, but simultaneously exposes the 
precarious nature of the category by showing that even the most obedient and patient wife—
Griselda—is at risk of coercion, emotional violence, public humiliation, and displacement at the 
hands of her husband. 
In a departure from the scene described by Ales and from previous iterations of the 
Griselda narrative, Phillip splits the wife figure: Grissill reaffirms her devotion to her husband—
though only after she bemoans the loss of her daughter—and the Nurse forcefully and 
loquaciously defends the babe while simultaneously providing the majority of the commentary 
and criticism leveled at Guatier (1097–1107, 1122–1131, 1150–1161, 1173–1174, 1401–1413, 
1418–1425, 1428–1451). The splitting of the mother figure in two, a patient wife and a nagging 
defensive nurse, calls to mind Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale.81 Though both Hermione and 
Paulina are high-born, Hermione functions as a type of Griselda and Paulina—a steadfast and 
vocal defender of Hermione—a nurse figure who brings the infant Perdita before Leontes. Like 
Anne facing an angry Henry, Grissill entreating Gwalter, or the Nurse confronting Guatier, 
Paulina stands up to Leontes; she counters his verbal attacks with her own in order to protect 
Hermione and Perdita. The presence of Paulina and the Nurse emphasize the importance of 
bonds beyond the relationship between husband and wife. Both Paulina and the Nurse create a 
 
81  See Baldwin. 
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space for a critical female voice within their respective texts.82 The critical female voice allows 
Hermione and Grissill to remain more reserved and measured in their critique of their husbands, 
thereby maintaining their performance of the good wife persona. Further, the multifaceted praise 
for the women and criticism of the husbands confirms the social facet of reputations within the 
texts and the early modern period: Hermione’s and Grissill’s status as good wives are confirmed 
and defended by the community that surrounds them, even when the same is under threat from 
their husbands. In doing so, these representations verify the need for social networks for women 
when the institutional ones fail to provide the necessary support to sustain a livable life. 
In The Pleasant Comodie of Patient Grissill, the critical female voice is Julia, the 
Marquesse’s sister. While Grissill offers veiled objections to Gwalter’s actions, Julia makes her 
objections to Gwalter, and to marriage, in general, more explicit. She asks “would you wish me 
to loue? when loue is so full of hate? how vnlouely is loue? how bitter? how full of blemishes?” 
(4.3.205–206). Historians like Lawrence Stone, who characterizes early modern marriage as 
“brutal and often hostile,” echo Julia’s pessimistic view of relationships.83 Admittedly, Julia’s 
adamant commitment to her single life and her refusal to accept the affections of any of her 
suitors comes across in the play as a standard romantic comedy trope. Julia, the comic unmarried 
maid of the play, bemoans the evils of men and the troubles that women endure in marriage. She 
even chastises women for the trouble that they bring upon themselves in marriage: “I alwaies 
wish that a woman may neuer meete better bargaines, when sheele thrust her sweet libertie into 
the hands of a man” (4.3.210–211). Julia notes that her “brother insults our Grissill” and that 
 
82  Phillips also gives Grissill a group of ladies in waiting, like Hermione, who witness her 
suffering. In earlier prose iterations, including Boccaccio’s, there are women of the court 
who express sorrow over Guatier’s treatment of Griselda. 
83  Stone, The Family, 117. 
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“poore Grissill is martred by her Lord” (4.3.207, 209). She asks that her brother “Vex not poore 
Grissill more” and insists that he does her wrong (4.3.236, 239). In the subplot, Julia’s 
quarrelsome behavior and commitment to a single life pairs well with Gwenthyan, a Welsh 
widow, who also fulfills standard comic conventions as she rails against her new husband. In 
presenting these three archetypes—opinionated single woman, patient wife, shrewish re-married 
widow—the play animates established ideas about women, but does so in a way that re-writes 
their standard representations. Gwenthyan reveals that her behavior is a response, in part, to 
Gwalter’s treatment of Grissill: she “pridles” Sir Owen so that he may not do the same to her. 
Her final declaration that “tis not fid that poore womens should be kept always vnder” proposes 
that some women rebel as a proactive defense against gendered structures of subordination 
(5.2.290–291). In regards to Julia, this play differs from contemporary texts like Taming of the 
Shrew or Much Ado About Nothing—Julia’s commentary and character most closely resemble 
that of Beatrice—in that Julia’s refusal to take a husband does not change at the end of the play; 
she is steadfast in her outspoken defense of single-women and her empathy toward women in 
difficult marriages. In this light, Julia and Gwenthyan offer alternative perspectives on marriage 
and critique expectations that women remain compliant within their unions. 
The presence of the critical female voice as represented by Julia and Gwenthyan allows 
Grissill to continue her gendered performance of wifely obedience, but in the latter half of the 
text the rectitude of her character is complicated by the revelation that she dissembles. Grissill’s 
ability to counterfeit when needed intimates that the outward show of chaste obedience trumps 
the expectation that the deference is genuine.84 She notes this change in herself when her father 
 
84  Furio also notes the conflict between his need to perform an observable deference and his 
own private dissent against Gwalter’s demands. 
 79 
asks about her banishment. Grissill crafts a tale for her father of how the Marquesse suffered at 
their departure—though the audience, and Grissill, both know that she is lying. In fact, at the end 
of her report, she states, “And by my truth (if I haue any truth), / I came from Court more quiet 
and content, / By many a thousand part then when I went” (4.2.56–58). Grissill’s brief aside, “(if 
I haue any truth),” reveals the extent of her fabrication, and her ability to feign a response to fit 
the occasion. She also confesses that if anything is truth, it is not Gwalter’s remorse over seeing 
his family leave, but rather these last lines that she speaks. She comes from court “more quiet” 
than when she left home, in part, because she returns home without the “thousand part” of 
Gwalter’s entourage. In claiming, again, that she is more content in her return to her father’s 
house, she reminds the audience that she left under duress.  
While Grissill’s peace in returning to her father’s house with her children is short-lived, 
the time with her family reinforces her desire for her former life, the reality that her comfort and 
virtue are bound up in her humble beginnings, and her privileging of the kinship ties between her 
father, brother, Babulo, and her children. In Act Four, scene two, Furio arives at Janicola’s house 
to take away Grissill’s children. The skills she has learned to counter the coercive actions of 
Gwalter and protect her family become apparent when Furio interrupts her return to her quiet 
life. Gwalter, who is also present but in disguise, states that the “Marquesse is a tyrant and does 
wrong” to take away her babes (4.2.169). Grissill appears to defend Gwalter by stating that “I 
would not for the world that hee should heare thee” (4.2.170); however, she does not disagree 
with Gwalter’s statement, she only states that she would not want Gwalter to hear that he is a 
tyrant. Her comment may be more for the protection of the disguised man who voices his dissent 
in the presence of Furio than a disagreement with the man’s view of Gwalter. Directly after, 
Grissill claims that Gwalter is not “A tyrant, no he’s mercy euen her selfe” (4.2.171). Her 
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comment seems out of place, even absurd, considering that she chastises Gwalter for his lack of 
mercy, as discussed above. At the end of the same speech she confesses that her responses are 
feigned. She reveals that “God can tell, / My heart saies my tongue lyes” (4.2.180–191). Her lie 
may be in regards to her comment that Furio “lookes gently” and will not hurt her children. It 
may also be read as a confession: God knows the truth of her heart; he knows her defense of 
Gwalter is a lie. Throughout this scene, Gwalter is present but in disguise. We know from the 
beginning that Gwalter initially wooed Grissill in disguise, and that Grissill, her father, and 
Babulo all knew that it was the Marquesse in spite of his attempts to conceal his identity. With 
this in mind, it is possible that Grissill recognizes Gwalter as the disguised stranger and makes 
shows of devotion in order to appease him. She knows from previous experience that resisting 
him and his desire to cause her pain is futile.  
Grissill acknowledges the problems of active resistance and suggests that sometimes 
silence is the only option when language fails to instigate change. Her silence—a key 
characteristic of the good wife figure—can be read less as submission and more as an 
understanding of the limits of protest and the need for functional accord particularly because her 
husband is also her ruler. In a discussion with her brother in Act Five, scene one, Laureo, angry 
over Gwalter’s mistreatment of Grissill’s family, protests, “Shall I in silence buy all our 
wrongs?” Grissill responds, “Yes, when your words cannot get remedy” (5.1.91–92). Her 
willingness to turn to silence when words fall short allows us a space to read her silence not as a 
simple acquiescence to Gwalter’s rule but also as a form of resistance.85 Much like her feigning, 
the silence provides a virtuous veil that shields her and her family from the vulnerability and 
harm they might otherwise endure at the hands of Gwalter. In sharing her tactics with her 
 
85  For further discussion of the role of silence as opposition, see Luckyj. 
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brother, Grissill emphasizes the necessity of such strategies to preserve a livable space and 
verifies her devotion to her family and their wellbeing. 
 Hermione’s privileging of her kinship with Perdita (and Paulina) is more overt than 
Grissill’s association with her family and occurs as a rupture with Hermione’s former sense of 
self. When Hermione lists the blessings in her life in Act Three, scene two, she includes the 
“favour” of Leontes, her son, and her newborn daughter (94, 96–97, 98–99). Subsequently, she 
bemoans the loss of all three and asks Leontes, “Tell me what blessings I have here alive, / That I 
should fear to die?” (3.2.107–108). For Hermione, then, a life where she is no longer an honored 
wife and mother is not a livable one. Though she initially names her daughter in her list of 
blessings, her identity as she describes it in this scene derives from the men in her life, “For 
behold me, / A fellow of the royal bed, which owe / A moiety of the throne, a great king’s 
daughter, / The mother to a hopeful prince” (3.2.37–40). She is the wife of Leontes and thereby a 
queen; she is the daughter of the Emperor of Russia and a princess by birth; and she is the 
mother of Mamillius, the future king of Sicilia. With the loss of Leontes’s love, the death of her 
father,86 and the death of her son, Hermione is left without the signifiers of her identity. Her only 
hope lies in the oracle’s prophecy that her daughter may be found. While Grissill is sent home, 
Hermione chooses to leave the court.87 In faking her own death and ensconcing herself at 
Paulina’s until the return of Perdita, Hermione refuses Leontes’s remorse and penance and with 
 
86 Hermione mentions during her trial that she wishes her father “were alive” (3.2.120). 
87 I acknowledge that my reading of Hermione’s disappearance and restoration at the end of 
the play is one that is divisive. While I accept that frequent readings and performances of the 
text focus on Paulina’s insistence that we must “Awake our faith” in order for Hermione/the 
statue to come to life, I think it is a mistake—and one that diminishes Hermione’s agency—
to discount the clues that Hermione has been hiding at Paulina’s in the intervening years. 
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them his love and kinship.88 By her own admission, she only returns to public life when her 
daughter is found (5.1.120–128). 
 Without hope of her children’s survival, Grissill’s concern revolves around protecting her 
family, and it is her family that levels much of the critique against the Marquesse’s final trial of 
Grissill. The diverse alliances Grissill forms throughout the text provide ample critique of the 
structures that allow Gwalter to continue with his seemingly arbitrary testing of his wife, and by 
extension her family. Though the trials continue, several characters readily voice objections; 
even Gwalter comments on the fact that he is moved by Grissill’s suffering (4.1.69–70, 4.1.200). 
When Gwalter declares that it is time for him to take a second wife, he demands that Grissill act 
as a servant to his new bride and ready his house for the wedding.89 While earlier iterations of 
 
88 Hermione’s removal from state and personal affairs and her belief in the power of the Gods 
to right the injustices against her align her with medieval semi-religious women like those in 
beguines who formed communities of devout women. Hermione places her fate in the hands 
of the Gods/planets several times and gives the Oracle credit for Perdita’s preservation 
(2.1.105–107; 3.2.115–116; 5.3.121–128). Hermione’s absence from court for sixteen years 
appears similar to the anchoresses who lived in seclusion. The anchoresses were often from 
well off families who were able to afford to pay for their keeping and were frequently 
tended to by close female family or friends. 
89  In both The Pleasant Commodie and The Winter’s Tale the fathers imply, if briefly, a 
physical desire for their daughters. Admittedly, Gwalter’s elaborate plot that to take a 
second wife, who happens to be his daughter, is a ruse to further test his wife and to reveal 
that both of his children are alive and well. Despite the fact that he never intends to marry 
Gratiana, his daughter, the set-up is both uncomfortable for the incestuous implications and 
the age disparity. Even Grissill cautions the Marquesse to “consider of her tender yeares” as 
she urges him not to treat Gratiana as harshly he has treated Grissill (5.2.148). In this 
manner, Grissill continues to defend those who face a similar fate of being dominated by 
Gwalter while simultaneously building further networks of alliance. In The Winter’s Tale the 
situation is arguably more uncomfortable because Leontes does not know that Perdita is his 
daughter. Florizel asks Leontes to intercede with Polixenes on behalf of Florizel and Perdita, 
claiming that “At your request, / My father will grant previous things as trifles” (5.1.220–
221). Leontes responds that if he were to ask Polixines for anything, he would “beg your 
precious mistress, / Which he counts but a trifle” (5.1.222–223). The exchange is quick, but 
Leontes clearly states his sexual interest in Perdita. Paulina immediately reminds Leontes of 
Hermione and chastises that his “eye hath too much youth in it” (5.1.224). While we are 
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the tale have ladies of the court who express sorrow over seeing Grissill’s mistreatment, in 
Dekker’s version the majority of the critique stems from Laureo, Janicola, and Julia. Laureo’s 
commentary here, as it has throughout the play, demonstrates the importance of the kinship 
between Grissill and her family. In Amy Froide’s work on the importance of kinship bonds for 
early modern singlewomen—an arguably apt category for Grissill who spends a majority of her 
life in her father’s house, away from Gwalter—she argues that, “siblings were equally, if not 
more, important” than parents.90 Relationships between brothers and sisters often involved 
“material assistance;” however, like Laureo with Grissill, they could also be protective.91 In his 
defense of his sister, Laureo goes so far as to proclaim that Gwalter should take a new wife 
quietly rather than “proclaime this iniurie / And vexe Grissill with such laweless wrong” (5.1.64–
65).92 Laureo’s insistence that Gwalter’s second marriage is illegal because the Marquesse is still 
married to Grissill calls to mind the complaints of Katherine of Aragon’s supporters who 
declared Henry’s marriage to Anne invalid based on the same grounds.  
Whereas earlier in the play Grissill would step in with quiet objections to protect her kin 
and others from Gwalter’s attacks, at the end of the play the protests against Gwalter’s behavior 
grow more adamant and consequently suffer greater reprimands from the Marquesse. When 
 
meant to read Leontes attraction for Perdita as foreshadowing of their familial bond and a 
reminder of his continued attraction for Hermione, the moment is awkward and recalls the 
discomfort of the Marquesse planning a false marriage to his own daughter. It is also worth 
noting that in Pandosto, Shakespeare’s source for The Winter’s Tale, Pandosto persists in his 
pursuit of his daughter, calling her to his chamber in secret, and entreating her to acquiesce 
to his love. When she denies him, he threatens her with death. 
90  Froide, 52. See, also, Sara Butler’s The Language of Abuse for further examples of brothers 
protecting their sisters from marital violence in late medieval England, particularly 189–194. 
91  Ibid., 60–61. 
92  Laureo continues his protest in the Marquesse’s presence. Laureo insists that Gwalter does 
“gross wrongs” and “cursed acts” (5.2.64, 68). Also, Grissill’s brother threatens to continue 
his proclamations against Gwalter wherever he goes. 
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threatened with the imprisonment for his refusal to behave, Laureo declares, “Lodge me in 
dungeons, I will still exclaime, / On Gwalters cursed acts and hated name” (5.2.67–68). Refusing 
Grissill’s advice of silence, Lauero learns the cost of defiance. Janicola’s acknowledgement that 
he “indureth wrong”—after he has spent much of the play acquiescing to the Marquesse’s 
demands and treatment—points to the excessiveness of Gwalter’s injuries to Janicola’s family, 
and the limits of endurance for even the most devout subject (5.2.102). Janicola’s final 
confession that Gwalter’s trials are too much should not be undervalued. While he has supported 
his daughter throughout, he has consistently placed his lord’s needs and desires first. In 
acknowledging Grissill’s suffering, Janicola joins the community that witnesses the precarity of 
her situation and, as such, names her life grievable. 
As her defenders meet with resistance, Grissill readies the Marquesse’s second wife with 
care and outwardly with perfect patience and joy, but there is disruptiveness in her compliance. 
When he inquires if Grissill willingly gives the young maid to Gwalter in spite of any envy she 
may feel, Grissill replies, “I do my deare Lord, and as willingly / As I deliuered vp my maiden 
youth” (5.2.75–76). It seems that Gwalter has succeeded in taming Grissill, but we must think 
back to both her initial thoughts of suicide over transgressing with Gwalter and her proclamation 
that she would rather stay at her father’s house than become the Marquesse’s wife. It may be true 
that Grissill offers the second wife’s innocence as willingly as she did her own, but that does not 
mean that Grissill was happy about Gwalter’s first marriage, or is happy about his second. 
Gwalter mistakes Grissill’s intent here as he did with her initial objection to their union at the 
beginning of the play; Gwalter assumes that he has molded the most patient and obedient woman 
ever. As her reward, Grissill is reinstated as Gwalter’s wife and she is reunited with her lost 
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children. This moment of reconciliation reads as arbitrary as the trials that Gwalter instigates 
earlier in the text.  
The emotional trauma suffered due to Gwalter’s actions and, consequently, the 
precariousness of Grissill’s position, is palpable in her response to the reunion with her children. 
If we had any doubts about Grissill’s emotions regarding Gwalter, her last lines remove them, 
“Ioy feare, loue hate, hope doubts incompasse me. / Are these my children I supposed slain?” 
(5.3.193–194). Her joy from the reunion with her children, along with her love for them is 
apparent. She may only cling to hope that Gwalter’s torments are at an end, but her fear and 
doubts are understandable considering the years of coercion, threat, and emotional violence she 
has suffered at the hands of her husband. That leaves us with hate. The only person she can direct 
her hate toward is the Marquesse. Gwalter’s behavior produces a struggle whereby Grissill’s 
inner suffering spills over into her attempt to maintain shows of deference. The inequality in 
authority and lack of mutual accord within the marriage of Gwalter and Grissill that results in 
Grissill’s public confession of fear and hate calls to mind William Gouge’s warning that, 
“Contrary also…is the sterne, rough, and cruel carriage of husbands, who by violence and 
tyranny goe about to maintaine their authority. Force may indeed cause feare, but a slauish feare, 
such a feare as breedeth more hatred then loue, more inward contempt, then outward respect.”93  
Despite Grissill’s attempts to appease Gwalter throughout the play, her last lines are not 
to him but to her children: “Blessing distill on you like morning deaw, / My soule knit to your 
soules, knowes you are mine” (5.3.196–197). Her love and focus are directed toward her 
 
93  Gouge, 355. 
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children; she claims them readily and in more concrete terms than she hinted at before. 
Hermione’s only lines in the last scene of the play echo those spoken by Grissill,  
 You gods, look down, 
And from your sacred vials pour your graces  
Upon my daughter’s head! Tell me, mine own,  
Where has thou been preserved? (5.3.121–124).  
Both mothers bless their children and claim them for their own in separate terms from their 
relationships with their husbands. Gwalter responds to Grissell that, “They are [yours], and I am 
thine” (5.3.198). He attempts to situate himself into a marriage and a family that he has spent 
years destroying. Rather than reconciliation, he is met with silence, a silence that I would like to 
suggest is rife with resentment and resignation that her “words cannot get remedy” (5.1.92). 
Grissill does not speak for the remaining 110 lines of the play.  
Similarly, though Hermione embraces Leontes when she first descends from her place as 
a statue, she does not speak to her husband but only addresses her daughter. “Knowing by 
Paulina that the Oracle / Gave hope thou wast in being, have preserved / Myself to see the issue” 
(5.3.127–128). Hermione admits she kept herself in hope of being reunited with her daughter, but 
says nothing of Leontes or of her choice to live away from the king during the intervening years; 
her focus is on her daughter. Hermoine uses the word “preserved” to describe her and Perdita’s 
time away from court, suggesting that both mother and daughter were protected and safe away 
from court, away from Leontes. Hermione’s self-identification in these final moments, as it has 
been for her previous years of solitude, is as a mother. 
 While others in The Pleasant Comodie fall in line to praise Gwalter’s judgment, as 
expected at the end of a comedy, Julia voices her dissent: 
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besides our selues there are a number heere, that haue behelde Grissills patience 
[and Gwalter’s] tryals…amongst this company I trust there are some mayden 
batchelers, and virgin maydens, those that liue in that freedome and loue it, those 
that know the war of mariage and hate it. (5.2.275–283)  
Julia moves her objections to Gwalter’s actions from the world of the play to the world of the 
early modern England. Her comment that “besides our selues there are a number heere” expands 
her protest—and by extension the protest of both Grissill and Hermione—to include those in the 
audience who Julia assumes also object to Gwalter’s “tryals” of his wife. In including the 
audience in her speech, Julia connects Grissill’s patience and suffering at the hands of Gwalter to 
the spectators who have witnessed Grissill endure Gwalter’s abuses. Grissill’s hate—an emotion 
she conceals as she endures Gwalters abuses, but finally articulates in the moment of reunion 
with her children (5.3.193)—surfaces in Julia’s declaration that for many, marriage is war. Those 
who know this war—Grissill, the audience, and by extension husbands and wives in early 
modern England—hate it. Julia’s final protest against Gwalter and marriage, in general, occurs in 
stark contrast to Grissill’s silence. However, Julia’s observations articulate the emotions behind 
Grissill’s silence: Grissill may be silent and obedient, she may be silently protesting, or she may 
be tired of lying and opts to focus on her role as a mother reunited with her lost children after 
years of pain and separation. Sir Owen nods to the last of these when in the final words of the 
play he notes that Grissill’s silence is because she “is weary” (5.2.297). In asking for the 
audience’s applause, Sir Owen includes calling on “awl that haue crabbed husbands and cannot 
mend them, as Grissill had” (5.2.). The implication in Sir Owen’s critique of Gwalter’s refusal to 
“mend” his ways suggests that despite the purported comic resolution of the play, the 
Marquesse’s behavior has been unacceptable and requires correction. Sir Owen provides further 
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proof of this assessment with his comment that rather than Gwalter taming Grissill, that Grissill’s 
patience “pridled” (bridled) the Marquesse. In the final moments, then, Sir Owen and Julia 
extend the play’s critique of marriage, and explicitly Gwalter’s actions, to the audience by 
acknowledging their shared experience: Grissill’s grief and the precarious position she occupies 
as a wife are not limited to representations on the stage. In doing so, the text implies that the 
arbitrary violence and coercion Grissill sustains at the hands of her husband is not unfamiliar to 




“AND MAKE MY BODY FREE TO GOD”: 
RELIGIOUS ORTHODOXY AND MARITAL IDENTITY1 
 
I.  “[U]NEQUIVOCAL AND PERFECT FREEDOM”2  
 
[T]he two great religious and secular states to which almost all persons of the 
female sex commit themselves should display unequivocal and perfect freedom as 
their most natural character.  
—Gabrielle Suchon, Treatise on Ethics and Politics, Divided into  
Three Parts: Freedom, Knowledge, and Authority, 16933 
 
Gabrielle Suchon, a seventeenth-century French philosopher and former nun, opted to 
live a contemplative life within the world rather than remaining cloistered as part of a formal 
religious community.4 Despite her own choices, Suchon concedes that the majority of pre-
modern women—“almost all persons of the female sex”—enter into marriage or religious orders 
as their primary commitment or “vocation.” While the same assumption could be made for men, 
 
1 Kempe, 1.11. All textual citations from Margery Kempe, The Book of Margery Kempe, 
Trans. and Ed. Lynn Staley, New York: Norton, 2001. 
2 Suchon, 88. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Stanton and Wilkin, 2. 
 90 
Suchon sees fewer restrictions for men within these vocations because she believes that men 
more readily negotiate for contemplative space within their commitments, what she terms the 
“mastery of a free and imperious way of acting.” In contrast, she argues that women are more 
often “excluded and deprived of” the opportunity to do so by the constraints placed upon them, 
whether within the marital union or by the church.5 Suchon’s viewpoint, writing at the end of the 
seventeenth-century, is based on more codified structures of female religious life and lay 
marriage in her time period that do not necessariliy represent the complexity of medieval gender 
relations. However, while her contention that marriage or religious orders “should display 
unequivocal and perfect freedom as their most natural character” may not reflect the reality of 
women in late seventeenth-century France, it is very much in line with the experience of the 
some medieval nuns, like Hildegard of Bingen, or semi-religious women, like the beguines of the 
thirteenth century.6 For Suchon, regardless of the vocation that they choose, women, like men, 
should be able to structure their lives in such a manner that they maintain the freedom to pursue a 
contemplative life free of commitments—even within marriage or as part of a religious sect. 
Similarly, Suchon argues that women’s free consent is crucial in selecting marriage, a cloister, or 
a celibate and contemplative life; but that women frequently lack the opportunity for such 
consent due to external familial and societal pressures. Often described as the first beguine, 
Marie d’Oignies (1177–1213) faced such familial pressure to marry, but was able to persue a 
celibate life because her husband granted her a chaste union and deferred to her spiritual pursuits. 
In Suchon’s terms, the celibate life freely chosen is one where women continue to live in 
the world—a regular community, as opposed to sequestration—but outside of the restrictions of 
 
5 Suchon, 88. 
6 Ibid. 
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the secular or religious states (i.e., marriage or religious orders). This option, according to 
Suchon, offers the greatest rewards, but also provides the greatest challenges. Unlike the set 
schedules of devotion and service demanded by a cloistered life or the stress and obligations of 
attending to a husband, children, and household, women who live chastely in the world, have 
“time, energy, and resources to provide instruction to the ignorant and shelter to the needy, as 
well as tend to the sick.”7 Medieval anchoresses, beguines, and other semi-religious women were 
able to carve out lives separate from traditional lines of patriarchal authority, within or outside of 
marriage, and fulfilled the call of public service suggested by Suchon. Women unfettered by 
religious or secular states benefit from the time for devotion, learning, and personal growth, and 
are able to focus on performing good works for their community. Chastity freely chosen—
beyond the confines of traditional structures that encourage the observation and control of 
women—should be viewed as more pure because it requires continual commitment: the chaste 
life must be repeatedly chosen and performed for it to be maintained. Further, it wants the 
societal support of more traditional secular and religious vocations. 
Cultural expectations that move women towards marital and spiritual commitments serve 
to place women under the control of male figures—husbands or religious leaders. For Suchon, 
“the universal custom of establishing oneself in a cloister or in a household under a husband’s 
control,” keeps women subservient and restricts their behavior.8 However, she argues that 
despite assumptions of feminine frailty and aptitude for sin, women’s self control and devotional 
practices are not predicated on their subservient relationships to a male authority. Rather, “a love 
 
7 Stanton and Wilkin, 234, and Suchon, 239. 
8 Suchon, 238. 
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of virtue and a zeal for honor—not bars—make women well behaved and restrained.”9 It is not 
the patriarchal control or surveillance within marriage or the church that moves women to 
chastity and devotion, but women’s own desire for virtue regardless of their marital or religious 
status. 
By her own admission, Suchon’s view of women’s ability to govern themselves and 
pursue a contemplative life is “unconventional.” Despite this, the state she argues for  “has 
always had many advocates but [it] still lacks generalized approval and remains subject to 
opposition and contrariness.”10 Just because a “neutral life” is viewed as “dangerous” by those 
who disagree with her assessment, Suchon claims that their “scorn” does not “compromise its 
merit in any way.”11 Her reminder is useful for thinking about the minority stories of feminine 
experience and marriage beyond the more “universal” ideals. Despite her her focus on women in 
late sixteenth-century France, the type of freedom that she imagines for women outside of “the 
two great” vocations is apt for discussions of the malleability of identities for medieval women 
within those same vocations, particularly wives whose identities were defined as much by their 
piety and religious devotion as their secular marital one. 
The women discussed in this chapter are wives, but their marital status, religious 
orthodoxy, and performance of piety underscore the precarious conditions faced by spiritual 
women who exist outside the traditional confines of the convent. Social privileging of the 
category of wife and the cultural assumption that wives remain appropriately under the control of 
their husbands should offset part of the vulnerability endured by semi-religious women. To some 
 
9 Ibid., 90. 
10 Ibid., 237. 
11 Ibid., 238, 239. 
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extent, this is true. Margery Kempe’s and Marie d’Oignies’ relationships with their husbands 
offer a measure of protection and freedom. After many years of marriage and fourteen children, 
Margery’s husband eventually accedes to her desire for a chaste marriage—in part because she 
agrees to pay his debts—and travels with her during her early pilgrimages (1.11). Unable to 
combat the familial pressures to marry, Marie weds at fourteen, but her husband quickly grants 
her desire for a chaste spiritual life and aids her in her work with leper colonies (1.3.80–81). In 
each instance, the husband’s support helps facilitate the transition from the woman’s secular 
union to a religious one. In the case of Margery, however, the transition is both messier and 
never truly complete: at first her husband refuses her request and even after he grants it, he 
demands that she continue to share his bed; and after years of separation Margery returns to care 
for him at the end of his life (1.9, 1.11, 1.76). Rather than simply replacing one bond or marker 
of identity with another, the marital and religious identities exist together exposing a variety of 
statuses that often overlap and are based on performance and public interpretation of that 
performance.12  
For semi-religious women, like Margery, who clothe themselves in the white garb 
customary for spiritual virgins (or virgin widows), the category of wife leaves them susceptible 
to public ridicule for performing an outward show of a specific pious identity that society views 
is at odds with their marital status. In dressing as a virgin despite the fact that she is a wife and 
mother, Margery’s performance is criticized as a lie. Similarly, wives who maintain close 
associations with their husbands expose themselves to greater scrutiny from those who question 
 
12 See Beattie, 328, and Karras, 4, for a discussion of ways that various relationships 
constituted unions that could be viewed as marriage or various identities that could be seen 
as coexisting. 
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the couples motives for making vows of chastity, as well those who doubt whether the couple 
can successfully uphold their vows while living in close proximity.13 
Medieval and early modern wives who wish to pursue more devout religious lives face a 
perilous navigation between the performance of their marital status and secular commitments 
while balancing their religious piety and devotional practice. Above all, they risk disruption of 
this balance through a negative public perception of their performance. Further, to borrow 
Kathryn Schwarz’s terms, women in spiritual marriages face heightened secular and religious 
surveillance, in part, because the “intentional virtue” of semi-religious women “unsettles the 
tenets of heterosocial hierarchy.”14 Many women, like Margery, fulfill their marital labors of 
patrilineal succession before requesting release from the conjugal debt; however, Marie and her 
husband John agree to a chaste marriage from the outset of their union. But beyond the issue of 
procreation, semi-religious women’s performance of piety—often more extreme and public than 
their husbands’—places them as the spiritually superior partner within the union.  
Women’s role in the spiritual labor within medieval and early modern households was 
significant. Religious orthodoxy, whether practiced within the marital union, the cloister, or as an 
individual practice, helped shaped a women’s identity as a good wife or nun. However, through 
the women’s orthodox performance of piety, these wives perform their intentional feminine 
virtue to excess, which renders them socially dangerous and open to accusations of heresy. 
Women whose devotion is public—and in many ways it needs to be public to be verified and 
counted—risk having their orthodox performance read as dangerous. As Ulricke Tancke and 
 
13 See Elliott, Spiritual Marriage, 138–141. Elliott notes that some issues surrounding chaste 
marriage derive from the practice in Cathar doctrine. As such, for the church, “lay chastity is 
uncomfortably like heretical chastity” (139). 
14 Schwarz, 1. 
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others have noted, “[t]he ubiquitous notion of the ideal female as ‘chaste, silent and obedient’ 
was pervasive” in pre-modern Europe.15 But while “[t]he opposite extreme, an outspoken and 
assertive woman, was portrayed as sexually incontinent, by way of associating women’s 
interaction with the outside world through speech with the metaphorical as well as literal 
openness of their bodies,”16 for semi-religious women, the voracity of their speech equated not 
necessarily with sexual excess, but spiritual incontinence. Though female speech “was 
sanctioned within the context of a woman’s religious and domestic duties,”17 prohibitions against 
women proselytizing created a specific challenge for the public devotional practices of semi-
religious women. As stated in 1 Corinthians 14:34: mulieres in ecclesiis taceant non enim 
permittitur eis loqui sed subditas esse sicut et lex dicit (women should keep silent in churches, 
for they are not allowed to speak, but to be subject, as the law says).18 Paul’s order goes on to 
situate a woman’s spiritual guidance in the hands of her husband, noting that women should 
remain silent in church and seek answers at home from their husbands.19 For both Margery’s and 
Marie’s husbands, the acknowledgement of their wives’ capacity for spiritual zeal and expertise 
locates the men as the obedient spouse, following the religious instruction and desires of their 
wives, and disrupts the gendered order that calls for masculine authority and feminine 
submission. 
Women’s religious devotion—an essential quality for medieval and early modern good 
wives—when performed with orthodox rigor simultaneously calls into question the stability of 
 
15 Tancke, 7. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 1 Corinthians 14:35, The Vulgate (c. 1300s). 
19 Ibid. 
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gender relations within marriage and, on a broader scale, disrupts marital identity when the 
language of spousal fidelity sifts from their husbands to God. As Ruth Mazo Karras notes, 
A great deal of the scholarship on medieval women over the last several decades 
has been on women who rejected marriage for spiritual reasons and focused their 
lives on a union with Christ or a relationship with a holy man. Either of these 
types of union could be, and was, discussed in marital language. These women 
underscore how important marriage was as a structuring image or metaphor for 
women’s lives, even women who chose not to enter it.20 
While Karras’ interest lies with women who forgo marriage for a religious life—whether 
cloistered or within the world—her discussion of the appropriation of marital language for 
spiritual women is still pertinent for the medieval women discussed in this chapter who, though 
married, still situate their religious commitments in terms of spiritual marriage. Neither a 
traditional secular wife, nor a wife of God located within the structures of a convent, these 
women underline the malleability of the category of wife, while simultaneously exposing the 
limits of the category to aptly encompass their multiple identities. 
In returning, then, to Gabrielle Suchon’s promotion of a life free from the main secular or 
spiritual vocations—marriage and religious orders—Suchon acknowledges the diversity of 
marital states and identities, and argues that a similar plurality is found in states of celibacy: 
[I]n the state of marriage, which represents a universal type, we find several 
species or different kinds. Some persons have always lived without commitments, 
such as young girls; others, after recovering their initial freedom through the 
 
20 Karras, 10. 
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death of their spouse, commit themselves anew to a second or third marital 
alliance. Moreover, we see a broad range of conjugal situations every day; some 
couples are united and peaceful, others in strife and divorce. The Neutral type I 
call voluntary celibacy also features a great deal of diversity: it is no less fertile in 
forming different species than the other vocations.21  
Rather than assuming that marital unions, religious unions, or lives free of commitment all look 
the same or conform to a standard ideal, Suchon, rightfully—and somewhat obviously—notes 
that identities shift, change, and exist in multiple formats. While she argues for the validity of 
celibate lives, regardless of their form or what it takes for women to maintain their desired 
lifestyle, her rationale is readily extended to secular marriage and the lives of semi-religious 
women who are wives, but also create identities and communities separate from their husbands. 
Some women live in close proximity to their spouses; some opt for semi-enclosed cells attached 
to a church similar to religious hermit or anchoress; while others live in female communities, or 
travel with other semi-religious pilgrims. The instability and variability of the marital union 
provides medieval semi-religious women the opportunity to reimagine a union more suited to 
their own pursuits. In each instance, the secular marital identities for these women become 




21 Suchon, 248. 
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II.  “[B]Y LOUE OF SPRITUEL SPOUSEHODE”22  
 
I have chosen you and taken you as my spouse, for it pleases me and likes me to 
do so, and for I wish to show you my privy secrets...I take you to me as my 
spouse to my own personal delight, as it is according and fitting that God have his 
delight with a chaste soul. —St. Bridget of Sweden, Liber Celestis, c.137023 
 
In the passage above, God not only declares a desire for a spiritual marriage with St. 
Bridget of Sweden, but also enacts the union with words of present consent: “I take you to me as 
my spouse.” In reporting the vision, Bridget—who becomes a member of the Third Order of St. 
Francis after her husband’s death and subsequently establishes her own order, the Brigittines—
aligns herself with other religious and semi-religious women who employ the terminology of 
marriage to describe their relationships with God. The language is intimate, “for it please me” 
and “personal delight,” and implies a lack of choice on the part of Bridget: God takes Bridget to 
wife without the necessary consent of a secular union. A more extreme case of spiritually 
coerced marriage is found in the example of Margery Kempe and God: “the Father said to this 
creature, ‘Daughter, I will have you wedded to my Godhead, for I shall show you my secrets and 
my counsels, for you shall dwell with me without end’” (1.35). While the sentiments between 
Bridget’s and Margery’s visions are similar including an intent to share in God’s “secrets” and 
 
22 Vitry, 1.3.91. All textual citations from Jacques of Vitry, “The Middle English Life of Marie 
d’Oignies by Jacques of Vitry, Book I and Book II,” Three Women of Liège: A Critical 
Edition of and Commentary on the Middle English Lives of Elizabeth of Spalbeek, Christina 
Mirabilis, and Marie d’Oignies, Ed. Jennifer N. Brown, Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2008, 
p. 85–120. 
23 Sweden, 138–139. 
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the expression of the words of present consent—“I take you Margery, for my wedded wife”—
Margery purposefully refuses to respond (1.35).24 Instead, she “kept silence in her soul” rather 
than explain to God that, “all her love and all her affection was set on the manhood of Christ” 
(1.35). Margery’s trepidation over the spousal is clear. Admittedly, when Bridget receives her 
vision of a spiritual marriage, her husband is dead; and she is a widow, free to make religious 
vows or remarry.25 However, Margery remains married to her husband, John, at the time when 
God takes her to wife. Though her husband and she have taken vows of chastity and live apart, 
the marriages exist simultaneously: Margery’s devotion grants her both secular and spiritual 
unions. In her subsequent pilgrimages, she draws on the power of both, using her heavenly 
spouse as a guide and her earthly one—even in his absence—as a cultural means of protection 
from those who would harm her.26 
Similarly, Marie d’Oignies’ marriage, though singular, is described as one that spans this 
life and the next and attests to a more malleable and evolving bond than implied by traditional 
secular unions. Marie receives a husband (also named John) because her parents are resentful of 
her religious fervor and refusal to dress or act as their family’s status and station deem 
appropriate. “And therefore they, hauynge envye at hir gracyous dedys, whanne she was fourtene 
yeere olde, maryed her to a yonge man” (1.2.56–57). Acknowledging that “she hadde not openly 
power of hir owne body,” because it belonged to her husband in marriage, Marie keeps the 
 
24 That there are similarities between Margery’s account of her marriage with the Godhead and 
St. Bridget’s spiritual union with God is unsurprising. St. Bridget is one of Margery’s main 
influences, along with Julian of Norwhich and Marie d’Oignies. See 1.39. 
25 Metaphorically, her religious vows make her a bride of Christ, regardless of her visions. 
26 See 1.51 for an example of Margery relying on both unions for protection. She argues that 
her husband “gave [her] leave with his own mouth” to go to York, but her spiritual 
knowledge that satisfies her accusers comes from God. 
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mortification of her flesh private (1.2.63–65).27 Compelled by her “meeknes” and “prayers,” the 
Lord “enspyred” John to suggest a chaste marriage so that Marie “myghte more frely seue oure 
Lorde” (1.3.80, 81, 84). Rather than merely grant his wife a chaste marriage so that she may have 
freedom to pursue her own spiritual work, John takes part “to folowe [Marie] in holy purpos and 
holy religyone” (1.3.89). While their marriage begins as a secular union, John’s willingness to 
free Marie from her physical obligation to him and embrace her spiritual calling as his own 
transforms their bond. Jacque of Vitry notes that as John “was departyd from hir by carnelle 
affeccyone, the nerre was hee knytte to hir by loue of spirituel spousehode” (1.3.90–91). The 
opposition between secular and spiritual unions suggests that secular marriage is limited by 
physical desire and earthly temporality; however, the union between Marie and John is deemed 
by God as a “reparelde matrymoyne” (restored marriage), one where God “wolde gyue agenyne 
to hir in heuene hir felowe” for withdrawing “from fleshely luste in erthe” (1.3.93–94). In this 
way, Marie’s union with John serves as both an earthly/secular marriage and a divine/spiritual 
one. They must release each other from their physical marriage so that they may more freely 
pursue the spiritual through Marie’s piety and good works—much like the recommendations 
made by Gabrielle Suchon at the outset of this chapter. The reward for their earthly piety is 
everlasting fame, “a blessed kynde of martirdome,” and their reunion in heaven (1.3.100–101). 
The central authority in the union shifts from John to Marie, but Vitry is clear in his narration 
that the real focal point of the union, and the impetus for John’s conversion to chastity, is God. 
 
27 Jacques of Vitry is careful to qualify his description of Marie’s piety: he is not “preisynge 
the exces, but tellyne the feruoure” (1.2.66). For Vitry, Marie’s ability to tolerate the 
physical pain is proof of her grace, not an example to follow. Gabrielle Suchon, rather than 
downplaying the physical excess of piety, notes the difficulties of maintaining “fasting, 
vigils, and other kinds of mortification to scourge the body” when women “are under a 
husband’s power and who are involved in caring for a family” (262). 
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Their “spirituel spousehode” implies devotion beyond a typical pair bond that destabilizes the 
traditional marital structure; the rupture in their earthy union is predicated on the promise of 
future/eternal stability.  
In her work, Spiritual Marriage: Sexual Abstinence in Medieval Wedlock, Dyan Elliott 
explains the distinctions between the terms “spiritual marriage,” “chaste marriage,” and “celibate 
marriage.”28 For Elliott, celibate implies the lifestyle choice of a single person, rather than a 
married couple, though she concedes that the term “celibate life” is sometimes used to denote “a 
married couple’s transition to chastity.”29 Chaste marriage frequently describes a union where 
both spouses are faithful to their marriage vows (as opposed to adultery);30 however, throughout 
this chapter, I have used Elliott’s definition of spiritual marriage as applicable for chaste 
marriage, as well. While spiritual marriage can refer to a number of “quasi-nuptial” or 
metaphorical unions— like those between Christ and the church or Margery and God—Elliott 
defines spiritual marriage as a marital relationship where a man and woman consent to release 
each other from their obligations of the conjugal debt.31 The conjugal debt granted spouses 
access to each others’ bodies based on the precepts of 1 Corinthians 7.4: mulier sui corporis 
potestatem non habet sed vir similiter autem et vir sui corporis potestatem non habet sed mulier 
(the wife hath not the power of her own body, but the husband; and, likewise, the husband hath 
not the power of his own body, but the wife).32 The mutual vow of chastity serves as an 
 
28 Elliott, Spiritual Marriage, 4–5. 
29 Ibid., 5. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 4. 
32 The Vulgate (c. 1300s). 
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agreement that the couple will maintain their marital vows, but abstain from their licit physical 
relationship.  
As Elliott notes, rarely did both parties enter into this agreement equally, despite the 
necessity of mutual consent.33 For example, when Margery first implores her husband to consent 
to such a union, he refuses her. Eventually, he concedes, but only under the conditions that they 
“lie still together in one bed as [they] have done,” that Margery “shall pay [his] debts” before she 
makes her pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and that she “shall eat and drink with [him] on Fridays” 
(1.11). Though Margery prefers to keep her fast on Fridays, she concedes to John’s demands and 
he grants her desire, stating, “As free may your body be to God as it has been to me” (1.11). As 
he releases Margery’s body from the conjugal debt, John implies that Margery is free to grant 
God the same access that John once enjoyed. In this way, John implies that their secular union 
has ended, which leaves her free to enter into a union with God. While Margery and John made 
their vows “under a cross,” the mutual consent and intent to maintain a spiritual marriage 
required the witness of a religious authority, and, as such, became a public acknowledgement of 
the couple’s piety as evidenced by their sexual abstinence. Public slander and doubt of their 
ability to maintain their vows while living together is what finally drove Margery and John to 
live apart to “avoid all perils” and any “suspicion…of their incontinence” (1.76).  
Beyond public perception, chaste marriage was not without its problems or challengers 
within later Medieval Europe. One of the greatest threats to couples that wished to make such 
vows was the Catholic Church. As the church attempted to establish its primacy within the social 
structure of the three estates—clergy, nobility, and commoners—they moved more firmly toward 
 
33 Elliott, Spiritual Marriage, 251–256. 
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privileging celibacy for the clergy. If lay married couples—particularly lay women within 
marriage—maintained chastity practiced by the clergy, they threatened to remove one of the 
tenets that set the clergy apart from the other estates. In essence, “lay chastity, whether heretical 
or orthodox, had the potential to challenge the structure of Christian society.” In order to remove 
the dangers of such a challenge, “[i]t was necessary to deflect the laity from too rigid an 
imitation of the theological model of marriage.”34 
The performative aspect of lay marriage—whether a secular union that followed a more 
traditional paradigm and resulted in the production of heirs, or a chaste bond thought to produce 
spiritual fruit through displays of piety and good works—means that there exists the continual 
potential for flux. In fact, some spouses granted vows of chastity, but later renounced them and 
reasserted their right to the conjugal debt. Further proof of the instability in marital performance 
can be seen in the union of Margery and John; for them, the vow of chastity served as a precursor 
to more formalized separate living arrangements and occurred after the couple had fulfilled their 
marital obligations of patrilineal succession. Some spouses continued to cohabitate after their 
vows, while others lived separate.35  
Based on the varied performance of marital unions and the importance of public 
perception of those performances, Cordelia Beattie’s claim that “marital status can be seen as a 
performance that had to be acted out in order to be visible,” seems accurate.36 It is the public 
view and judgment of marital identity that becomes particularly problematic for semi-religious 
women. Whether church accusations of heresy or societal assumptions that a man and woman 
 
34 Ibid., 141. 
35 Elliott, Spiritual Marriage, 251–256. 
36 Beattie, 327. 
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living together cannot possibly maintain their vows of chastity, wives like Margery and Marie 
remain vulnerable to external judgments of both their unions and their piety. It is unsurprising, 
then, that Margery and Marie maintain close associations with their husbands at the outset of 
their spiritual unions, thereby protecting their reputations and remaining safely under the 
authority of their husbands, at least according to public perception. But as their religious 
performances and reputations grow, it is also not surprising that both women establish lives 
separate from their spouses. Jacques of Vitry notes that despite Marie’s continued alliance with 
John and their work in Williambroc, she “couetyd to gif herselfe to God allone” (2.9.1137–
1138). Marie receives a vision of Oignies, “that she saw neuer byfore” and subsequently takes 
leave “of John hir husbonde and of his brothere Maister Guy, hir gostly fader” (2.9.1143, 1147–
1148).37 Her move to Oignies and her residence within a semi-enclosed cell connected to the 
church help transition Marie from the pious wife of John to more fully embody her identity as a 
semi-religious woman who becomes known as the first beguine.38  
In many ways, Marie’s identity as John’s wife—even as a chaste wife within a spiritual 
union—prevents her from forming her full identity as mulieres religiosae (religious woman). 
And despite the break in the performance of her marital union when she moves to Oignies, Marie 
does not separate entirely from male authority figures: her piety is observed, interpreted, and 
documented by Jacque of Vitry. Through Vitry’s observation of Marie’s devotion to and belief in 
God’s grace, her life becomes a religious performance to learn from and emulate. It is through 
 
37 John’s brother Guy serves as Marie’s long time confessor and spiritual advisor prior to her 
move to Oignies. 
38 As Jennifer N. Brown, notes, the term Jacques does not use the term beguine to describe 
Marie, in part, because it carried negative connotations during the time that he was writing 
(247). For further discussion of the beguine movement and Marie’s role within it, see 
Simons, 130–131. 
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her daily performance of piety that Marie instructs other women and members of her 
community.39  Her example constitutes an approach to religious life that varies from the 
preaching of male clergy. Marie’s ability to transverse her performance from maid to wife to 
semi-religious woman appears more smoothly in Vitry’s Vita of Marie’s life than in Margery’s 
struggles in The Book of Margery Kempe.40 While Marie maintains a constant network of 
religious and secular supporters, Margery cannot or chooses not to do so. Margery faces a 
constant threat of accusations of heresy, in part, because of her refusal to limit her gendered 
performance to a recognizable identity. For example, she maintains when questioned “I am no 
maiden; I am a wife” and yet she dresses in white, like a virgin or chaste widow (1.51). Her 
desire to emulate the religious lives of women like Marie d’Oignies and Julian of Norwich is 
seen in stark contrast to her inability to do so effectively. Margery’s struggles expose the 
precarious conditions faced by some semi-religious women who fall outside of the traditional 
structures of secular or religious commitments. Simultaneously, the instability of medieval 
marital structures create a space for the malleability of Marie’s marital identity that allows her to 
pursue her religious orthodoxy at the cost of her secular identity. In both instances, the women 
show the dangers and advantages for women who must balance social expectations of secular 
marriage with a desire for greater personal piety and spiritual autonomy. 
 
 
39 Her example and its instruction extends out to included the audience—both ecclesiastical 
and laity—that Vitry imagines for Marie’s Vita. 
40 Admittedly, Vitry points out that Marie’s family rejects her piety and she meets people who 
doubt her devotion and require proof of her piety, such as the priest who chastises her for 





“I MAYE LYVE IN QUYET AND BE FREE FROM HIS VYALENCE”: 
DIVORCE AND THE LIMITS OF FEMININE ENDURANCE 1 
 
I. “THE CANON LAWES OF THIS REALME DOE AT THIS DAY ADMIT A DEVORSE BETWENE A 
MAN AND HIS WIFE”2 
 
All [women] are understood either married or to bee married and 
their desires [are] subject to their husband, I know no remedy 
though some women can shift it well enough.  
—T. E., The Lawes Resolutions of Womens Rights, 16323  
 
 Published in 1632, though written near the end of the sixteenth century, The Lawes 
Resolutions of Womens Rights underlines the cultural assumption that early modern women were 
either wives, or soon to be wives. Within the orthodoxy of patriarchal order, husbands maintain 
the right to control their wives’ behavior. But, as T.E. notes, and Dympna Callaghan elucidates 
 
1  BL, Add. MS, 12507, fol. 204v. All transcriptions in this chapter are mine, with the 
exception of BL, Add. MS, 38170 and BL, Add. MS, 38170, fol. 176–178, which I 
transcribed with Cristina León Alfar. Transcriptions can be found at, 
http://opencuny.org/bourne/. Within this chapter, corrections to the manuscripts have been 
denoted with square brackets and contractions have been silently expanded. See the digital 
appendix for semi-diplomatic transcriptions. 
2  BL, Add. MS, 38170, fol. 178, no date. 
3  T.E., B3v. 
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in her introduction to The Impact of Feminism in English Renaissance Studies, there are 
“contradictions, gaps, and ‘wiggle-room’” in social practice not explicitly accounted for within 
the “patriarchal precept.”4 T. E.’s description of women who successfully navigate the social 
demands for obedience and deference to their husbands by “shift[ing] it well enough” carries 
undertones of duplicitous action often reiterated in literary representations of women, 
particularly those who avail themselves of legal redress in order to get their way. As Subha 
Mukherji notes, “[w]omen in legal situations are repeatedly associated in the drama with 
doublespeak, contradictions, law-tricks, stratagems and sexual intrigue.”5 Leonora’s attempt to 
disinherit her son in Webster’s The Devil’s Law Case and Vittoria’s boldness while on trial for 
her husband’s murder in Webster’s The White Devil offer two examples of former wives 
behaving badly at law. In Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, Portia dons male garb and 
goes to law in defense of Antonio. In Shakespeare’s All’s Well that Ends Well, Helena initiates a 
bed trick in order to fulfill the legal conditions of Betram’s letter. The acquiring of Betram’s ring 
and her subsequent pregnancy—the results of her stratagem—allow her to claim a legal right to 
her husband even though he has refused to accept their union throughout the play.  
Representations of women utilizing legal knowledge to their advantage within early 
modern drama vary in terms of social acceptability. Leonora’s self-slander—her false accusation 
of adultery against herself—is read as unnatural. Rather than acting “like a widow,” Vittoria’s 
“scorn and impudence” condemn her as much as her guilt (3.2.120–121).6 Her refusal to perform 
shows of deference and entreat the court for mercy suggests an expectation of the same for 
 
4  Callaghan, 10.  
5  Mukherji, Law, 208. 
6  See Mukherji’s discussion of Vittoria and the “spectacle of corruption” in Law, 155, 166. 
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women at law. Despite going against Betram’s desires, Helena’s questionable tactics seem 
justified because they re-inscribe patriarchal order: through her fulfillment of her feminine labor 
of producing an heir she simultaneously produces a spouse by forcing her prodigal husband to 
recognize their marriage. In contrast to Helena’s work to restore the family unit, Salome in 
Elizabeth Cary’s The Tragedy of Mariam insists, against the tenets of the Mosaic Law, on her 
right to a divorce. Salome’s blatant disregard for appropriate gender roles and structures of 
authority may best encapsulate the threat of women who use legal redress to counter the cultural 
belief that wives are subject to their husbands. As such, Salome’s attitude and reputation 
condemn her as much as her desire to leave her husband. 
Like representations of women at law in drama, early modern women similarly face 
heightened scruitiny of their personal character when seeking legal redress. Often social 
judgements of their actions are less bound by the legal validity of their arugment and more by the 
cultural rhetoric they employ to shape their argument. In a complaint dated 6 December 1582, 
Elizabeth Bourne crafts a narrative of a long-suffering wife who has patiently endured a variety 
of abuses from her prodigal husband, Anthony Bourne, over the course of their sixteen-year 
marriage. Rather than employing the law to recall her husband, Elizabeth seeks a legal 
separation. Her intent—the right to live separate from Anthony—leaves her vulnerable to slander 
because she seeks to free herself from the control of her primary male authority, her husband. 
However, the rhetoric she uses to describe her own suffering and Anthony’s behavior mimic the 
tropes of the prodigal husband and patient wife narratives as seen in early modern drama. 
Elizabeth situates her experience within a broader cultural narrative of vulnerable good wives 
and, in doing so, helps protect herself from accusations of inappropriate conduct. 
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In reading Elizabeth Bourne’s letters and petition for separation from her husband, 
Anthony, alongside representations of good wives married to similarly prodigal husbands in 
early modern plays The London Prodigal and The Yorkshire Tragedy, we can begin to 
understand the cultural rhetoric of wifely suffering that allowed Elizabeth to safeguard her 
reputation, while crafting legal and personal identities separate from her husband. While cultural 
narratives in letters and legal documents may seem incongruous with dramatic representations of 
women in early modern drama, I follow the example set by Subha Mukherji in her work Law and 
Representation in Early Modern Drama. In thinking about early modern law, Mukherji argues 
that “the historically produced compound of dramatic representations” is more likely to present 
“a cumulative and composite notion of women’s legal pursuits” compared to “the accidentally 
preserved products of legal documentation.”7 Early modern drama explores a range of legal 
experiences; in doing so, it provides the opportunity to glimpse cultural assumptions about 
“perceived legal or quasi-legal roles.” While Elizabeth Bourne’s petition for a divorce falls 
squarely within the legal purview to which Mukherji refers, I am more interested in how 
Elizabeth appropriates the cultural rhetoric of the long-suffering wife in order to obtain her 
separation, how the terminology of deference allows her to elicit empathy for her cause, and how 
her cultural understanding of tropes of acceptable female behavior—as exemplified in the 
prodigal Husband plays—affords her the opportunity to craft narratives that attest to her 
reputation while further damaging her husband’s. 
It is important to concede at the outset the challenges of reading letters and legal 
documents as evidence of truth—particularly before delving into the delicious accusations 
Elizabeth levies against Anthony. Many scholars have cautioned against assuming that archival 
 
7  Froide, 7.  
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documents present clear or accurate depictions of history.8 I would venture that in instances of 
divorce, this warning is even more paramount. Admittedly, it is tempting to be swept-up in the 
soap-operaesque tales of the Bournes’ troubled marriage. While I am fascinated by the 
outlandish stories, I am not interested in any moral judgment of Anthony’s alleged actions or 
Elizabeth’s presumably near-martyred suffering; I acknowledge that it is likely that neither party 
was innocent and that their relationship, like all relationships, was complicated. In fact, even if 
we could uncover some truth of lived experience—which we cannot—it would be irrelevant.  
What is essential is the account of marital instability that arises in the Bournes’ letters 
and legal documents. Elizabeth’s narratives and desire for divorce challenge literary 
representations of patient endurance where appropriate feminine behavior restores a husband’s 
devotion. Here I follow Natalie Zemon Davies’ model as presented in Fiction in the Archives and 
focus on the performative aspects of the writing, the rhetoric Elizabeth employs in soliciting help 
from her networks of support, the cultural frames with which she works and pushes against in the 
process of her correspondence, and “the crafting of a narrative.”9 Davies’ work on letters of 
remission and pardoner’s tales is particularly apt for thinking about how cultural ideals influence 
the crafting of a specific narrative when a woman turns to law. With letters of remission, Davies 
notes that the author needs a “supplication to persuade the king and courts, a historical account 
of one’s past actions, and a story.”10 Similarly, through her requests, Elizabeth Bourne needs to 
provoke empathy from those in power, provide a narrative of her history that portrays her as a 
long suffering wife, and a story. The story is crucial in that it helps construct a context for her 
 
8  For example, see: Amussen, Davies, and Stewart. 
9  Davies, 3. See Daybell, “Scripting a Female Voice,” for his discussion of the mechanics of 
women’s letters of request. 
10  Davies, 4. 
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assertions of appropriate feminine behavior—particularly in contrast with the narratives she 
constructs of Anthony’s inappropriate conduct—which, in turn, helps secure her desired 
protection from those above her. In analyzing the rhetoric and content of her claims, we cannot 
discover the truth of her experience, but we can begin to recognize what stories carried weight 
and how women might employ them in order to offset the precarity of their marital identity.  
As it stands, few scholars have worked on the life of Elizabeth Bourne or her contentious 
marriage. James Daybell’s important work on early modern letters has brought him in contact 
with the Bourne’s case and Elizabeth’s plethora of correspondence; he notes that over eighty of 
her letters survive.11 Charles Angell Bradford presents detailed family histories for Elizabeth 
Bourne, Anthony Bourne, and John Conway, and an overview of their disputes based on the 
British Library Add. MS. 23212 in an unpublished typescript Conway Papers held at the Folger 
Shakespeare Library. L. M. Hill discusses the Bournes’ dispute in his work on the career of 
Julius Caesar, and Cristina Alfar focuses on Elizabeth’s rhetoric surrounding her desire for a 
divorce in her complaint to Caesar.12 Even with increased interest in Elizabeth Bourne’s letters 
over the last ten years, there remains a great deal of work to do on the manuscripts and 
Elizabeth’s keen understanding of what Subha Mukherji calls “ritualistic self-representation.”13  
Ritualistic self-representation pertains to the “manipulation of appearances” that move 
beyond “physical or legal” in order to tap into “the power of public ritual.”14 Bourne continually 
 
11  James Daybell discusses Elizabeth Bourne’s writing in several works. See in particular: 
“Elizabeth Bourne (fl. 1570s-1580s): A New Elizabethan Woman Poet,” 176–178. Early 
Modern Women’s Letter Writing, 8, 61, 66. The Material Letter, 39, 166. Women Letter-
Writers in Tudor England, 53, 173, 240, 245–246. 
12  See Hill, 7–16 and Alfar, 61–103. 
13  Mukherji, Law, 220. 
14  Ibid. 
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presents herself as a wronged and helpless wife in need of relief; and she circulates accounts of 
her marital history that support her self-representation in documents to powerful allies, or would-
be allies. For example, in Elizabeth’s letter to Julius Caesar dated 18 August 1582, she writes 
“nowe I ame dryven to consele my lyfe and to absent my selfe from the cownseles letters 
through feare of Mr Bournes vyolence and leste he should take me in to his posessyon agaynst 
my wyll.”15 According to her letter, if her whereabouts are known Anthony may take her by 
force and insist that she live with him, thereby granting him access to her estate and her person; 
she fears such contact would result in economic and physical injury, respectively. The 
desperation of her concealment and refusal to appear before the Privy Council—essentially going 
against the demands of the highest governing body—underlines the extreme precarity of her 
position. She portrays herself as a vulnerable woman in need of protection from a husband who 
threatens “vyolence.” Through the application of cultural narratives of feminine weakness her 
letters demand a public ritual—saving the woman in distress—shared with Caesar and, by 
extension, the Council. That her pleas are successful suggests the power of the narrative within 
early modern England, and the cultural understanding that marriage, rather than offering 
stability, could endanger a woman and render her susceptible to coercion. 
In order to understand the cultural influences that allow Elizabeth Bourne to “shift it well 
enough,” my focus remains situated predominantly on the literary aspects of her writings: her 
appropriations of the good wife narrative of patient endurance and her depictions of Anthony as 
a prodigal husband. Notwithstanding the inclusion of a number of culturally loaded motifs of 
 
15  BL, Add. MS, 12507, fol. 204, 18 Aug 1582. For a full transcription, see 
http://opencuny.org/bourne/bl-add-12507-fol-204/. Anthony requests that the Council force 
Elizabeth to live with him, again. In response, she goes into hiding and subsequently 
petitions the same Council for the legal right to live separate from him. 
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feminine behavior that echo those found in conduct literature and early modern drama, 
Elizabeth’s correspondence and petition for separation remain minority narratives. As Susan 
Dwyer Amussen reminds us, frequently the evidence that remains in archives and court cases is 
“atypical.”16 If the Bournes had not been economically and politically connected, if they had not 
repeatedly caused trouble for high-ranking members of 
Elizabeth I’s court, and if their lives had been less 
scandalous, it is likely that their letters would not have 
survived.17 However, contrary to the designation by the 
nineteenth century archivist who processed the Conway 
Papers at the British Museum, the domestic nature of 
the dispute between Elizabeth and Anthony does not render it “Of no importance.”18 Rather, the 
case between the Bournes exposes the limitations of patient endurance exalted in conduct 
literature and represented on the early modern stage. 
 
16 Amussen, 6. 
17 Conway Papers, which house a majority of the correspondence in question, were kept as part 
of the estate of Edward Conway, a member of James I’s Privy Council and later his 
secretary of state. Edward Conway was originally betrothed to Elizabeth Bourne’s eldest 
daughter Amy Bourne, though Amy later married Fulke Conway, Edward’s younger 
brother. Both John Conway and his eldest son Edward were embroiled in the Bourne case. 
Elizabeth called on both for advice regarding her case, even asking for feedback on letters 
and petitions. Elizabeth requested that the council place her under Edward’s protection 
during the duration of the case. 
18 When Conway Papers were found and split up, two sections regarding Edward’s 
professional life at court went to the National Archives while the majority of correspondence 
concerning Elizabeth and Anthony Bourne were given to the British Museum and labeled of 
“Of no importance.” For more on the history of Conway Papers and the relationship between 
the two families, see Charles Angell Bradford, Conway Papers Original Typescript (S.I., 
1936). 
 
CONWAY PAPERS, BL, ADD. 23212 
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The prodigal husband plays provide a good literary and cultural counterpoint to the 
specificity of the marriage of Elizabeth and Anthony Bourne. Luce in The London Prodigal and 
the Wife in The Yorkshire Tragedy epitomize the long-suffering wife figure that is married to a 
morally corrupt man. In presenting the wives’ ability to act when their husbands cannot, their 
seeming devotion to their marriages in the face of verbal, physical, or economic abuse, and their 
ability to build networks of support for their cause based on their own reputations, the plays 
explore a variety of culturally sanctioned responses for women married to prodigals. Elizabeth’s 
own application of these responses at once aligns her with representations of the good wife in 
early modern drama while underlining the limits of these representations. For Luce and the Wife, 
their orthodox performance inspires their husbands’ amendments. The narrative of female 
endurance, then, intimates that through the feminine labors of chastity, devotion, and obedience, 
a wife will find relief from the precarious state produced by her husband’s behavior. 
Unfortunately, while the case of the Bournes replicates many of the arguments of the prodigal 
husband plays, it also calls into question the feasibility of a cultural ideal that assumes that 
appropriate female behavior leads to male repentance. When the ideal fails, and it does according 
to Elizabeth’s correspondence, early modern wives are left vulnerable and forced to negotiate a 
delicate system of safeguarding their reputations while actively seeking redress. 
The loss of status and fear of slander become central concerns for women who utilize the 
law for their own advantage; however, Salome, in Elizabeth Cary’s The Tragedy of Mariam, 
makes no attempt to assert her own virtuousness and displays no concern with safeguarding her 
reputation, as Elizabeth Bourne does throughout her writings. In fact, when Salome first 
contemplates the “wrong” she would do Constabarus in marrying Silleus, she quickly dismisses 
her “honourable” thoughts as “childish” (1.4.279, 282, 281). Instead, she acknowledges that her 
115 
“honour [is] wip’d away, / And Impudency on [her] forehead sits” (1.4.294–295). Men, like 
Herod, are able to dismiss their wives at will; however, Salome’s reflection on her own actions 
underlines one double-standard of Mosaic law: a man may leave his wife without adverse 
ramifications, but a woman must accept her husband and endure within her marriage or face the 
ruin of her reputation. By Salome’s own confession, if she were honorable she never would have 
framed her first husband Josephus—which resulted in his death—so that she could marry 
Constabarus, nor would she consider leaving Constabarus for Silleus (4.1.286–289). It is not just 
the law but also the fear of disgrace, according to Salome, that keeps women from pursuing their 
wills. Salome’s embrace of her tainted reputation leaves her unconstrained in her questioning of 
the bias of Mosaic law: “Why should such privilege to man be given? / Or given to them, why 
barr’d from women then?”(1.4.305–306). As Cristina Alfar notes, in “[l]ocating the inequity 
between men and women in Mosaic law that bars women from divorcing their husbands while 
allowing husbands to divorce their wives, Salome rejects the constraints placed upon her as a 
married woman.”19  
 In Of Domesticall Duties (1622), William Gouge discusses the basis for the double 
standard of Mosaic Law whereby a man could seek a divorce “in case he hated” his wife, but a 
woman could not. 20  Not unlike the rationale for coverture, Gouge argues that the “law 
questionlesse was made for relief of the wife, lest the hatred which her husband conceiued 
against her should worke her some mischeife, if he were forced to keepe her as his wife.”21 
Though no longer the contemporary law of the realm, Mosaic Law, as interpreted by Gouge, 
 
19  Ibid., 62. 
20  Gouge, 352. 
21  Ibid. For the suggestion that coverture was intended to protect women from arguments that 
might arise over property rights in marriage, see Stretton, Marital Litigation, 2. 
116 
underscores the early modern precepts that women are passive, subject to their husbands, and in 
need of protection. In Gouge’s reading, only the husband’s hate and desires are relevant. The 
husband’s capacity for “mischeife” caused by marital discord discounts and dismisses the 
possibility of the wife’s retribution when experiencing similar animosity toward her husband or 
her right to live separate from him in order to protect herself from his “mischeife.” Finally, the 
argument that it is for the wife’s safety that the husband readily be able to divorce her neglects to 
acknowledge the social and economic vulnerability of wives who are abandoned by their 
husbands.  
In The Tragedy of Mariam, Salome decries the inequity in the law when she notes that 
any man “Who hates his wife, though for no just abuse, / May with a bill divorce her from his 
bed. / But in this custom women are not free” (1.4.301–303).22 The law, which presumes to 
safeguard wives, leaves women susceptible to emotional and physical violence as represented in 
the three resolutely unhappy wives within the play. As discussed in Chapter One, Doris 
expresses anger over Herod’s ability to end their union despite her virtuous performance of her 
wifely duties, including providing him with two sons. Herod avails himself of the law in order to 
divorce Doris and marry Mariam. But while Herod’s wishes and the law allow him to put away 
Doris without cause—except his desire to take another wife—Mariam, lacking legal recourse, 
remains stuck in an unhappy marriage. Her dislike for Herod is so great that Alexandra 
speculates that Mariam will “joy” at his death and that her joy will not be “causeless joy” 
(1.218). Mariam’s merited pleasure in Herod’s imagined death goes against the concept that the 
desire of good wives should be subject to their husbands. Instead, the joy implies a gap between 
 
22  All textual citations from Elizabeth Cary, The Tragedy of Mariam the Fair Queen of Jewry, 
Eds. Barry Weller and Margaret W. Ferguson, Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1994. 
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outward shows of obedience and inner feelings: Mariam may perform her duties as a wife, but 
she yearns to be free from her union with Herod. The play, then, portrays two virtuous wives, 
unable to remedy their precarious positions because of their lack of legal standing. The 
“performance of wifely duty” is shown to be an “ideological construct” where stability “becomes 
impossible to guarantee.”23 Doris loses her status and the identity of wife; her children lose their 
inheritance. Unable to extricate herself from her marriage, Mariam suffers Herod’s mischief—
though not born out of hate—and, eventually, the loss of her life. Mariam and Doris embody the 
patient long suffering good wives who hazard their lives and living but maintain their good 
names.  
Salome’s willingness to “be the custom-breaker: and begin / To show my sex the way to 
freedom’s door” represents the broader cultural threat of women who are able to “shift it well 
enough”: they offer an example that other women will follow (1.4.309–310). The antagonism 
Salome expresses in refusing to be “led by precedent” and opting to give in to her “will” rather 
than abide by the “law” implies both a break from other representations of wives in the play and 
early modern ideals of wifely obedience. Refusing the cultural gendered ideals of male 
privilege/action and female obedience/endurance, Salome declares that women can “hate as well 
as men” and, therefore, should be “free” to employ the same “ancient use” in order to release 
themselves from an intolerable marriage (1.4.308, 1.5.137, 1.5.33). While Doris and Mariam 
exemplify women who are subject to their husbands, they are punished for their obedience 
within the world of the play. The social, economic, and physical vulnerability suffered by these 
precarious wives is seen in stark contrast to Salome. Admittedly, Salome’s pursuit of her own 
aspirations is portrayed as a stain on her reputation, a frequent danger faced by early modern 
 
23  Alfar, “Elizabeth Cary’s Female Trinity,” 61. 
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women who use the law to negotiate for space separate from their husbands, but she is the only 
woman in the play who is able to combat the presumed defenselessness of her gender and status 
as a wife. Salome recognizes the threat posed by her example when she surmises that “Though I 
be the first to this course do bend, / I shall not be the last, full well I know” (1.6.435–436). Her 
commentary and acknowledgment that she knows there will be others who follow her course—
who will question the limits of the law in order to craft their own identities—foreshadows the 
experience of the early modern readership for Mariam.24  
In contrast to the limits of Mosaic Law that is the basis for Salome’s status as the custom 
breaker, Herod’s abandonment of Doris, and Mariam’s confinement within her marriage in The 
Tragedy of Mariam, early modern wives were able to sue for separation. William Perkins, in 
Christian Economy: or, A Short Survey of the Right Manner of Erecting and Ordering a Family 
According to the Scriptures (1609), concedes that, “in requiring of a divorce, there is an equal 
right and power in both parties, so as the woman may require it as well as the man; and he as 
well as she.”25 Spouses could sue for separation or annulment, what Perkins calls divorce, but we 
must be careful to heed Tim Stretton’s reminder that, “[d]ivorce in the modern sense—a legal 
dissolution of marriage allowing either or both parties to remarry—was not an option for most 
individuals before 1857.”26  
 
24  As a closet drama, The Tragedy of Mariam (1613) was likely read rather than performed. 
The readership is not explicitly feminine; however, Elizabeth Cary’s authorship and her 
public personal struggles with her husband, Sir Henry Cary, do lend a particular 
contemporary cultural resonance to Salome’s prediction that other women will pursue their 
desires and leave their husbands. See Weller and Ferguson’s “Introduction”, specifically 4–
9, for a discussion of Carey’s battles with her husband. 
25  Perkins 171. 
26  Stretton, Marital Litigation, 3. It should be noted that a divorce by private act of parliament 
was possible, but not until 1670 and it was very expensive. What Elizabeth Bourne obtains, 
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There were two types of legal pronouncements regarding marital separation in early 
modern England: divorce a vinculo matrimonii, a release from the bond of marriage where the 
marriage is declared invalid and annulled; and divorce a mensa et thoro, a legal separation from 
bed and board where neither spouse is allowed remarry. Annulments were granted on the 
grounds of bigamy, pre-contract, non-consummation, enforced marriage, and when either party 
was underage. Separations were granted primarily on the basis of adultery and cruelty.27 As 
Susan Dwyer Amussen observes, “[b]oth women and men sued for separation, but more women 
did so than men.”28 Despite a theoretical equality in access to legal redress, “a sexual double 
standard usually applied so that husbands could separate on the grounds of adultery alone, while 
wives had to prove cruelty.”29 Julius Caesar notes in his response to Elizabeth Bourne’s 
complaint against her husband, Anthony Bourne, that legally a woman could petition for a 
divorce a mensa et thoro based on adultery. 
The canon lawes of this realme doe at this day admit a devorse betwene a man 
and his wife. And the case doth as well lie on the womans side to chalenge and 
have a separation from her husband being an open adulterer, as on the mans side 
to have a separation from his wife being an adulteresse.30 
 
discussed later in this chapter, is a declaration awarded by the Privy Council—similar to a 
private act of parliament—that she may legally live separate from her husband. 
27  Throughout this chapter, I use the term divorce primarily to mean a legal separation—in the 
modern sense—but have opted to maintain the word divorce because that is term used 
within the documents I address. 
28  Amussen, 127. 
29  Stretton, Marital Litigation, 4. 
30  BL, Add. MS, 38170, fol. 178, no date. For a full transcription, see 
http://opencuny.org/bourne/bl-add-38170-fol-176/. At the time of Elizabeth’s complaint in 
1582, Julius Caesar was not yet a Master of Requests, but was an up-and-coming lawyer in 
London with strong connections to court through Francis Walsingham (Hill 7–16). 
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While Caesar states that both men and women could seek divorce based on adultery alone, the 
word “open,” proceeding “adulterer” and missing before “adulteresse,” serves as a reminder of 
the discrepancy in this apparently equal law: a man could separate from his wife if he could 
prove she had committed adultery; a woman had to prove that her husband was a known 
adulterer.31 This difference appears slight, but while a man only needed to prove one instance, a 
woman needed to prove that her husband had frequently and openly sinned, which usually 
became part of a larger complaint against his moral, economic, and spiritual threat to her and 
their household.32 Because of this double standard, in practice men sued for separation in 
instances of adultery while women based their petitions on accusation of cruelty.33 Regardless of 
the reasons for such petitions, ecclesiastical courts favored a “come to charity” model for 
disputes; they emphasized living in harmony over granting separations. Consequently, as Laura 
Gowing has shown, a divorce a mensa et thoro was granted on a limited basis with men suing 
successfully based on adultery 42% of the time, while women’s claims of cruelty were 
successful in 26% of the surviving cases. Most divorce cases never made it to judgment; those 
that did took approximately 2–3 years to process.34 Despite the difficulties, there was one benefit 
to ecclesiastical law: church courts regularly ignored the doctrine of coverture.35  
 
Walsingham is also the likely tie between Elizabeth and Caesar as both Elizabeth and her 
mother, Lady Amy Mervin, wrote to Walsingham requesting his help with the separation 
(NA, SP12/158, fol. 85, 3 July 1582). 
31  Butler, S., Divorce, 14. 
32  Gowing, “Language,” 34–35, and Gowing, Domestic Dangers, 188–189. 
33  That women sue for separation based on cruelty makes sense considering the prevalence of 
female petitioners employing the terminology of female weakness and vulnerability as 
discussed later in this chapter. 
34  Gowing, Domestic Dangers, 181. 
35 Stretton, Women Waging Law, 29–30. For instances of other courts open to married women 
acting as femme sole, see Subha Mukherhi, “Women, Law, and Dramatic Realism,” 251. 
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Though ecclesiastical courts granted women the right to bring actions to court without the 
permission of their husbands, women faced added scrutiny in going to law. Women seeking 
separations risked slander and accusations of adultery from their husbands in retaliation, while 
those who sued on the basis of cruelty were obligated to publicly detail the humiliations they 
suffered at the hands of their husbands.36 In each instance the possibility of public infamy placed 
women in jeopardy and exposed them to social and economic vulnerability. The potential 
monetary losses of dissolving a marriage could prompt a husband to slander his wife. If a woman 
was found guilty of adultery, she forfeited her portion rights, any inheritance that had been under 
her husband’s control during their marriage, and her husband’s obligation to pay for her 
maintenance. Consequently, allegations of cruelty were often met with countersuits of adultery 
for financial reasons.37  Salome’s understanding of the ill repute she will suffer through seeking a 
divorce is confirmed by Constabarus who entreats her to “eschew deservèd shame, / And seek to 
be both chaste and chastely deem’d” (1.6.393–394). In warning his wife against the shame that 
will come in demanding her freedom and rejecting the limits of Mosaic Law and Constabarus’ 
own wishes, Constabarus underlines the importance of public opinion: Salome should not only 
strive to be virtuous, but she should endeavor to seem so, as well.  
Chastity without community confidence in and recognition of that virtue limits the power 
of the good wife performance. In fact, it suggests that a woman’s actions are less significant in 
constructing her reputation than the collective interpretation of her actions. In this way, a wife 
might use cultural knowledge in order to produce what Kathryn Schwarz calls “authentic 
 
36  See Stretton, Women Waging Law, 222–225; Dolan, Dangerous Familiars, 80–88 for a 
discussion of the Earl of Castlehaven and his wife.  
37 For more on the accusations of cruelty see Gowing, Domestic Dangers, chapter six, 
especially 206–229. 
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impersonation.” In Schwarz’s terms, “the performance of feminine roles answers the need for 
social stability, and privileges the issue of how virtue signifies over the question of whether it 
refers.”38 Based on this concept, it is the public representation of chastity and feminine obedience 
that is crucial, particularly when a woman takes action that would otherwise be read as disrupting 
patriarchal projects. Early modern wives, like Francis Howard in her divorce from the Earl of 
Essex and Elizabeth Bourne in her separation from Anthony Bourne, risked public shaming 
when seeking relief from the law to rectify what was often viewed as a private and family 
matter—even though the forming of a marriage and the policing of socially acceptable marital 
behavior was seldom private.39 Consequently, a wife’s need to maintain a narrative of patient 
endurance, even in the face of seeking a separation from her husband, was paramount. 
In defense of their reputations, many early modern women strove to craft narratives—
both in letters garnering support from friends and family and in their legal complaints—that 
demonstrated their status as long suffering good wives forced to go to law for protection of 
themselves and their kin. The descriptions of their suffering employ a number of cultural 
expectations of feminine performance exemplified in conduct literature and early modern drama. 
In some ways the narratives crafted by early modern wives, such as Elizabeth Bourne, reiterate 
elements of the patient Griselda figures discussed in Chapter Two or the exemplary behavior of 
wives in the prodigal husband plays, such as the Wife in The Yorkshire Tragedy (1608) and Luce 
in The London Prodigal (1605). These texts intimate that long suffering and patient wives 
 
38  Schwarz, 11. 
39  Lindley, The Trials of Frances Howard, 89–93. Mukherji, Law, 215. See Panek, 61–92, 
regarding the public pressures and scrutiny faced by men in marraige; and in one example of 
public regulating of the relations between spouses, see Pamela Allen Brown’s discussion of 
community condemnation of domestic violence, 118–149. 
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married to tyrannical or prodigal husbands are rewarded with the return of their penitent 
husband, and that the goodness and forgiveness of the wife can restore the husband to proper 
behavior. However, representations of similarly suffering good wives presented in letters and 
legal documents suggest a boundary of endurance and the implausibility of cultural ideals that 
advise that marital accord may be obtained predominantly through the performance of feminine 
obedience and endurance. These depictions expose the vulnerability of the category of wife for 
women who are unable to recall their husbands to them through idealized behavior. They also 
reveal the possibility of women employing the same narratives in order safeguard their 
reputations while simultaneously negotiating for a space and identity separate from their 
husbands. As Mukherji argues in Law and Representation in Early Modern Drama, “We can 
now begin to see how the notion of acceptable models of female behavior at court itself made 
space for strategy.”40 Through their appropriation of the good wife trope, some women are able 
to exploit the precariousness of their marital union to remove themselves from the same. 
Wives who are able to employ such strategy and obtain the legal right to live separate 
from their husbands may not be able to remarry, but they also trouble the category of wife and 
T.E.’s assertion that all women are wives, or wives in training, and should be viewed as such. 
Amy Froide in her important work on lifelong single women in the early modern period correctly 
questions, “If a woman was likely to be unmarried for two-thirds of her lifespan, then why do 
those of us who work on the early modern period continue to view marriage as the normative 
state?”41 Froide’s push back on the centrality of marriage is furthered by Ruth Mazo Karras’ 
 
40  Mukherji, Law, 212. 
41  Froide, 3.  
124 
work on the variety of relationships that did not constitute marriage in Medieval Europe.42 
Cordelia Beattie adds “the separated and the divorced to the never married and the widowed as 
those who might be considered as single” in her discussion of the “margins of marriage” or to 
shift the emphasis, the “margins of singleness.”43 The work of these scholars explicitly calls into 
question the tendency of early modern narratives to privilege marital status as the primary 
identifier for women. While Karras concedes that for Medieval Europe “whatever pair 
relationship is most privileged in a given society is ipso facto what that society considers 
marriage,” she also notes that “the line between what was marriage and what was not was not 
sharply drawn.”44 Karras’ work, then, most closely aligns with Beattie’s in terms of thinking 
through other unions and a broader definition of singleness. Both scholars recognize the fluidity 
of identities beyond the marital union that women and men embodied. They also tease out the 
margins of marriage where unions differ greatly from the ideals repeated in conduct literature 
and sermons. Drawing on the work of Froide, Karras, and Beattie—and in contrast to T. E.’s 
assertion that women are or will be married and consequently that their will is subject to their 
husbands—it may be useful to think of marital identity and autonomy on a broader spectrum of 
experience. 
Central for Froide in this respect, as well as for my own work on precarious wives, are 
the wider networks of kinship within which women participated. Froide points out that “[w]hen a 
woman was single or widowed she might well have activated ties of kinship, friendship, or 
 
42  Karras.  
43  Beattie, 237.  
44  Karras, 3, 2.  
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neighbourhood that she did not need to rely on during her married years.”45 Although I agree 
with Froide’s assessment, I will show that kinship and networks were essential to the success of 
women whose marriages placed them in socially, politically, and economically precarious 
positions. For these women, it was often the relationships they fostered beyond their marriages 
that allowed them to negotiate for a livable space, protect themselves and their reputations from 
the abuses of their husbands, and seek redress for the wrongs that they endured. In contrast to 
Froide’s argument that early modern women activated ties of kinship when single, I argue that 




II. “[O]NE LIFE, ONE LOVE, AND ONE LIKING”46 
 
In a letter written from Elizabeth Bourne to Anthony Bourne, she attempts to explain to 
him the reasons that she refuses to live with him. The detailed history of their union that she 
presents in the letter as evidence of her resolve to deny his “whyseth reconsyliacion” seems 
unnecessary because she is writing to her husband, who presumably knows the history. But as 
the note at the beginning of the letter reveals, Elizabeth sent a draft of the letter to Edward 
Conway for his review and asks that once he has “perused [her] letter” that he share it with 
Caesar before returning it her. In sharing the letter with Conway and Caesar and asking them to 
sign the letter—and in doing so provide public witness to its contents—she hopes to control their 
 
45  Froide, 7.  
46  BL, Add. MS 23212, fol. 12, 20 Feb Unknown Year, 16r. 
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interpretation of the events chronicled in the letter and also prevent any attempt Anthony may 
make after to “mysconster [her] meaning.”47 The public dissemination of her letter complicates 
the notion of private correspondence.48 Considering the intended wider audience, Elizabeth takes 
great pains to detail the many problems they faced in their union in contrast to the ideals of 
marriage purported in religious writings and cultural expectations of marital accord. Adamant in 
her doubt of his ability to “unfained retired from sin to virtue,” she claims that without his 
genuine reformation it would be a “dainngerous life for us to live in soe near [a fel]lowshippe as 
man and wife.”49 Her letter explicitly draws on narratives of marital harmony and cultural fears 
of the chasm between seeming virtuous and being virtuous, though this anxiety is usually applied 
to women’s chastity, not men’s. In calling out his lack of ability to leave his adulterous life 
behind him, Elizabeth suggests that a man’s reputation and the community’s judgment of his 
fitness as a spouse may be tainted by the public knowledge of or belief in his sexual 
transgressions. Regardless, she concedes that if she could trust his repentance—which she might 
if he returned to a faith in God and cast off his long-time mistress—she would happily acquiesce 
to live with him.50 If not, residing together as husband and wife would place them both in 
precarious conditions.  
In contrast to the longstanding animosity between the Bournes, Elizabeth draws on 
religious teachings of marriage in her claim that the ideal for a married couple is, “one life, one 
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love, and one liking.”51 For Elizabeth, when a couple works together they do so in “one 
continewing care in both our hearte to [the] increase of our good.”52 In reiterating the model, she 
highlights faults in her own marriage and infers that the model is idyllic and likely unattainable. 
She closes the letter by claiming that “If I may live to enioy this happiness,” Anthony’s true 
reform and their reconciliation, she will disregard “the sufferance of all my sorrowes well satisfie 
[me] which I have indured.”53 Through adopting the terminology of idealized spousal behavior—
the unity of person and the mutual desire to increase the family and estate—she shows a 
willingness to return to that model, while simultaneously pointing out why that standard is 
impossible for their relationship. In ending with an appropriation of the narrative of feminine 
endurance, Bourne characterizes herself as a long suffering good wife waiting in hope of the 
correction and return of her prodigal husband, but she also reiterates that within a functioning 
marriage the couple should work together to care for each other and further their estate. In her 
refusal of her husband’s demand for spousal cohabitation, her desire to offer a corrective for his 
behavior, and her emphasis on the mutuality of masculine and feminine care for the stability and 
reputation of the early modern household, Elizabeth challenges early modern assumptions of 
wifely passivity. Though her case and marriage may be a minority story for early modern 
women, it is not without precedent in contemporary literature and cultural documents. 
Garthine Waler’s work on female violence astutely calls into question the assumption that 
early modern wives were “characterised by passivity and weakness.”54 In Crime, Gender and 
Social Order in Early Modern England, Walker observes that while women’s violence was in 
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the minority compared to men, the assumption that this discrepancy was a result of “biology, of 
prescriptive social roles” or of “the internalization (by either or both sexes) of patriarchal 
ideology” is insufficient for understanding women’s violence. 55  While female defendants 
comprised a small percentage of assault cases, over half of women prosecuted were wives: a 
significant number when we consider that approximately only one third of all early modern 
women were married.56 Walker notes that in many cases, the focus revolved around the 
household or household goods, implying that women were explicitly not passive in regards to 
their obligations to protect and help run their estates. Of the cases that involved protecting the 
household, be it people or property, seventy percent of the women implicated were wives, not an 
insignificant number and one that supports Walker’s claim that early modern wives were 
expected to protect their homes. “Both household ideology and practical circumstances required 
wives to maintain the integrity of their households with and without their husbands’ 
participation…Contextualising women’s non-lethal violence in terms of household authority and 
obligations challenges the historiographical insistence upon women’s negligible participation.”57 
Scholars have long asserted the claim that despite narratives of obedience and passivity, 
women were central in the running of the household and protecting the family’s interests. As 
Margaret Ezell illustrates in her work on the early modern patriarchal family, “although the 
character of the Good Wife in seventeenth-century representations stresses her duty to her 
husband and her devotion to furthering his fortunes, it does not represent her as feeble, incapable 
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or servile.”58 Rather, she is “husband’s partner, she is expected to be able to take over his work 
when the occasion arises.”59 Linda Pollock’s work on the education of early modern upper class 
women supports this assumption as she shows that while women were raised to show deference 
to patriarchal figures—fathers or husbands—they were simultaneously expected to be capable of 
independent action.60 Walker’s, Ezell’s, and Pollock’s assertions are furthered by Graham 
Holderness’ observation that “Scholars have exhaustively mined public and private records…and 
successfully demonstrated that women wielded and exercised power and authority in many areas 
of social life: control over medicine, food production and other peoples’ bodies; or power over 
moveable property and assets within the home.”61  
Contemporary literature offers further support of the claims that women played an active 
role in household affairs and did not always concede their ideas and intents in favor of their 
husbands’. John Shirley, in The Illustrious History of Women (1686), focuses a chapter on what 
he calls “The Character of a Virtuous Wife.”62 Following the structure and tone of earlier 
conduct literature publications, Shirley claims that women should endeavor to console their 
husbands and not cross them when they are angry; however, he notes that rather than renounce 
their point of view, women should wait until their husbands are calm and then “she mildly argues 
the Matter with him.”63 Shirley balances the expectation of obedience with the acknowledgement 
that women may successfully employ tactics in order to gain their desire, even when it is in 
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contradiction to their husbands’ own wishes. In this paradigm, the performance of passivity is 
required before action may be taken. A similar dichotomy is found with female supplicants who 
must present shows of deference and submission, even as they actively petition for their cause, a 
paradoxical device to which I will return to later in this chapter. While Shirley explains that 
under the correct conditions virtuous wives have the ability to influence and refute their 
husbands’ decisions—in opposition to the patriarchal ideal—he takes his argument for female 
action further with a discussion of a wife’s duty to act in her husband’s absence. He claims that a 
good wife “[o]fficiates his place, in regarding and taking care of his Affairs.” Though he admits 
that when the husband is present, “she [i]ntermedles in his concerns no further than she is 
required,” he still leaves a space for her participation in matters of the estate even when problems 
necessitate that she leave the home, particularly when “urgent occasions require.”64 Shirley’s 
discussion of the roles of good wives, then, supports the conclusions drawn by scholars, such as 
Walker, Ezell, Holderness, Wells, and Korda, who explore the dynamic contributions women 
make in furthering and protecting the economic health of their family, particularly when their 
husbands are unable to do so. 
Considerations of a wife’s active position within the marital union may seem 
counterintuitive to a discussion of the precarious conditions faced by wives in early modern 
England. However, it is exactly the struggle between the persistent cultural expectations of 
feminine passivity and obedience and a wife’s need to play an effective role that can amplify the 
conditions of precarity when those two elements are at odds. A wife must seem chaste, silent, 
and obedient, but simultaneously be capable of practical enterprise. This duality forces women to 
perform shows of deference even when, and especially when, they execute their own judgment in 
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fulfilling their desires. Without successfully maintaining this balance, wives risk being deemed 
rebellious, immoral, or masculine. As Cristina Alfar discusses in Fantasies of Female Evil, 
“when women fail to perform their femininity through appropriate behaviors such as submission 
and obedience, they are accused of monstrosity and manliness, attributes that are posed as 
betrayals of fathers, husbands, and lovers.”65 For early modern women, there is a fine line 
between authorized action and transgression, and the distinction is often one of public 
perception. Moreover, when a wife procures help for her husband in order to protect the 
household economy and reputation, her supporters may read her intervention as warranted but 
that does not guarantee approval by her husband. 
In early modern drama, the tension between a wife’s publicly sanctioned acts for the 
betterment of her family and a husband’s repudiation of her behavior is seen repeatedly in the 
prodigal husband plays. Like the Griselda figure discussed in Chapter Two, the prodigal husband 
is another early modern character type, one often paired with a long suffering good wife. The 
prodigal spends his inheritance on revels and women, and generally besmirches the reputation of 
himself and his family through bad behavior and economic ruin. Frequently, he desires to remain 
single, or he loves one woman while his family forces him to accept another as his wife.66 The 
husband’s conduct varies, but it may include riotous behavior, gambling, adultery or bigamy, 
pandering, and threatened or actualized murder. The prodigal is in some ways the male opposite 
of the female Griselda, and within these texts it takes an extreme performance of patience on the 
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part of the wife to return the husband to right rule and sway. But the patience of the wife is rarely 
depicted as passive.  
The London Prodigal (1605) and Middleton’s The Yorkshire Tragedy (1608) both portray 
good wives who actively seek remedies for the precarious conditions they find themselves in due 
to their husbands’ reckless behavior. The spouses at the center of The Yorkshire Tragedy are 
named Husband and Wife. The Husband’s gambling and rioting ruins both his reputation and his 
estate; his lands are mortgaged and his friends are in bonds for his debts. In an attempt to rectify 
the dissolute fortunes of their home, the Wife leaves Yorkshire for London and petitions her own 
kin, her uncle, for support. Her absence from the domestic sphere suggests the extreme 
circumstances she finds herself in; as Shirley reminds us, women should only travel when 
“urgent occasions require.”67 Rather than continue to suffer her husband’s abuses—he calls her 
harlot, his children bastards, and threatens her with physical violence—she procures a position 
for him at court that he might work to restore both his credit and their lands. In contrast to 
Froide’s claim that single women and widows activated ties of kinship not necessary for married 
women and Vives’ edict that wives “shall reckon to find all” in their husbands, the precarious 
position of the Wife forces her to rely on the help of her kin.68  
The Wife’s confidence in the appropriateness of her stratagem is seen in her imagining 
that the news of her arrangements for him will “make new league between us, and redeem / His 
virtues” (3.22–23).69 She assumes that her plan will call back his affections and curb his 
debauched behavior, although she has gone against her husband’s original request that she sell 
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her dowry lands for his use (2.91–92). The Wife hopes that through her own labor of securing 
him a position she has fulfilled their mutual goal: removing the threat of economic ruin. In this 
vein, the Wife’s actions fulfill Margaret Ezell’s decree that a good wife must maintain a 
“willingness to labor on behalf of her family” and a “complete identification of her interests with 
those of her husband.”70 However, the husband has no desire to reform and the Wife’s interests 
extend beyond those of her prodigal spouse. She affirms, “By this good means I shall preserve 
my lands / And free my husband out of usurer’s hands” (3.29–30). In securing a job for her 
husband, she stands to free him from his debts, thereby saving herself and her children from 
poverty. Also, she reveals a personal stake in maintaining her lands that intimates a desire to 
protect her family’s wealth and her children’s inheritance, in direct opposition to her husband’s 
desires. Her trip, then, provides a remedy for her husband’s economic desperation while allowing 
her a means to maintain her property, property that is under her husband’s control, but which he 
cannot sell without her family’s permission. 
By the laws of coverture, a wife’s property and inheritance became the husband’s in 
marriage; however, early modern property law required the wife’s or her family’s permission for 
land to be sold or placed in trust. In attempting to gain access to ready money to satisfy his 
pleasures, the Husband demands that the Wife consent to sell the property that comprises her 
dowry. Until she does, he threatens to “forever hold thee in contempt, / And never touch the 
sheets that cover thee, / But be divorced in bed” (2.87–89). Beyond the promised scorn, the 
separation from bed becomes a prime factor in the Husband’s intimidation technique. If the Wife 
refuses his request, he posits that she is to blame for the failure of their marriage. The implication 
is that if she concedes, he will continue to live with her, which would maintain the outward show 
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of functional accord. In an attempt to preserve her marriage, the Wife yields, “Sir, do but turn a 
gentle eye on me, / And what the law shall give me leave to do / You shall command” (2.93–95). 
Even though she does not go through with the sale, but finds another remedy for their economic 
straits, her stated willingness to amend the fissure in their union at all costs—even that of her 
dowry—highlights the social importance of cohabitation for the preservation of reputation and 
marital status, particularly for women. The Husband’s threat, then, points to the hazard of 
coercion within marriage and the vulnerability of wives who must give in to their husband’s 
commands in order to maintain a livable space. 
Elizabeth Bourne narrates a similar example of a woman selling her property in order to 
satisfy her husband and keep him in her company, a tactic that ultimately fails for Bourne. In her 
complaint to Julius Caesar, she establishes that Anthony is prone to feigning reconciliation in 
order to gain access to her inheritance. She claims that shortly after they were married, “hee left 
my compainie, and lived in the liberty of his rainging affections with divers women.”71 
According to Elizabeth, when she confronts him he pacifies her: he asserts that financial 
disagreements with his father keep him from home. Elizabeth suggests that they travel with her 
family; he concedes and “continued for a time in good vsage of mee, to my greate comfort.”72 
The implication of Elizabeth’s narration—as it is in the The Yorkshire Tragedy when the 
Husband threatens divorce and the wife begs for a gentle look—is that a wife merely desires the 
presence of her husband and his kindness to requite her labors. In a reverse of the moment when 
the Husband threatens desertion if the Wife does not sell her lands, Elizabeth reports that 
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Anthony assures her that sale is necessary “for the reliefe of vs both, during his fathers life,” and 
that when Anthony receives his inheritance upon his father’s death, “hee would recompence” his 
wife.73 In Elizabeth’s retelling, she notes that Anthony “winne[s her] consent” to the sale and 
that he provides assurances to her mother and friends. The inclusion of outside witnesses 
suggests that the economic well being of the family is a public matter, that others can attest to 
Elizabeth’s claims, and that when Anthony is foresworn he breaks his oath to his wife and the 
witnesses. Directly after he receives payment “hee left [Elizabeth] alone as before; and continued 
in London by the space of halfe a yere, and spent 500 pounds in vaine loue with a 
gentlewoman.”74 In naming her husband an open adulterer since the outset of their marriage and 
crafting a narrative that exposes a pattern of behavior whereby her husband only returns home to 
gain access to her inheritance, Elizabeth establishes herself as a long suffering wife who has 
done all she is able to remedy the division between herself and her husband, much like the Wife 
in The Yorkshire Tragedy who assumes that her efforts will “make new league between” her and 
her husband. Conversely, the historical example of the Bournes and the dramatic representation 
of the Wife and Husband in The Yorkshire Tragey present instances where the wife’s labor in 
attaining monetary gain for the husband fails to secure marital accord and stability for the wife.75  
Elizabeth and the Wife are seemingly are left without recourse when their labors fail to 
recall their husbands; however, their suffering does not go unnoticed and as such is affective if 
not effective. Elizabeth’s mother demands that Anthony explain how he intends to use the money 
for her daughter’s relief and when he does not respond, “shee charg[es] him with his loose life 
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and the wronge that hee did” to Elizabeth.76 Similarly, the Husband’s irate response to the Wife’s 
initiative in The Yorkshire Tragedy is seen in stark contrast to the Servingman and Gentleman 
who praise her actions as virtuous, and, as such, offer public support for her performance. The 
Gentleman reiterates the Wife’s goodness to the Husband, insisting that of all of the husband’s 
faults his greatest lies in not prizing her: “of all the worst, / Thy virtuous wife right honorouably 
allied, / Thou has proclaimed a strumpet” (2.152–154). He further names her “Kind and 
obedient” (2.177). Upon hearing about the position at Court, the Servingman echoes the Wife’s 
own hopes when he states, “If [the Husband] should not now be kind to you and love you, and 
cherish you up, I should think the devil himself kept open house in him” (3.24–26). The 
servant’s implication is clear: if her solution does not restore marital accord, there must be 
something aberrant in him. Their presence within the play attests to the Wife’s virtue and helps 
to offer community support and sanction for her action. In praising her orthodox commitment to 
her marriage, they deride the Husband’s conduct as unnatural. 
The Wife’s ability to act when her husband cannot, or will not, fulfills the demands for 
feminine labor in marriage, but it also exposes the limits of marital obedience and the precarious 
conditions suffered by wives of prodigal husbands. At what cost must a wife maintain her 
obedience to a husband who seeks their social and economic destruction? Where is the limit of 
appropriate female deference when acquiescence would lead to ruin? The Wife’s lack of 
obedience in refusing to sell her dowry is met with further derision and violence from the 
Husband. He calls her a “politic whore” (3.49), blames her for ruining his reputation by 
“set[ting] down the history of me, of my state and fortunes” to those in London (3.50–51), 
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threatens her with violence (5.69–70), and eventually stabs his sons and the Wife (4.1, 24, 26). 
The extreme precarity of her position, where she must chose between losing any hope of 
maintaining a livable life or losing her husband and children, indicates a fault in the system that 
requires her devotion and labor without affording her access to economic, physical, or personal 
stability. 
The Wife in The Yorkshire Tragedy and Luce in The London Prodigal rely on their own 
reputations and networks of support when their marriages fail to provide them with adequate 
maintenance to sustain a livable life. While the Wife procures a position for her husband, Luce 
volunteers to work in order to make amends for her husband’s economic recklessness. When 
Matthew is arrested for debt on their wedding day, Luce supplicates to the Sheriff and Matthew’s 
Uncle in hope of securing Matthew’s release.77 She asks, “what good or gayne can you receiue, / 
To imprison him that nothing hath to pay?” (E2r).78 Luce points out the irrationality of debtors’ 
prisons where men without means are confined, unable to work to repay their debts. In contrast 
to her husband’s prodigal ways, Luce publicly affirms her own reputation and worth in her 
petition for Matthew’s Uncle’s support: 
Alas, I nere ought nothing but I paid it, 
And I can worke, alas he can doe nothing: 
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I haue some friends perhaps will pittie me, 
His chiefest friends doe seeke his miserie.  
All that I can, or beg, get, or receiue, 
Shall be for you. (E2r) 
Luce’s declaration of her virtue solidifies her status as a good wife, while unsettling her 
husband’s position as the head of the household. She provides an apt example of Schwarz’s 
claim that “intentional virtue unsettles the tenets of heterosocial hierarchy.”79 In contrast to 
Matthew’s prodigal ways that land him in prison, Luce points to her own fiscal restraint. His 
accumulation of debts and inability to remedy their economic distress diverges from her 
willingness to humble herself and labor to aid him.80 Finally, her own good reputation as seen in 
her network of friends disposed to help her is the converse of her husband’s standing, which has 
left him friendless due to his poor credit. In securing her husband’s release, Luce portrays herself 
as restrained, humble, and of good credit. Her petition effectively acts as a verbal bond presented 
to Matthew’s Uncle. The Uncle pays for Matthew’s release “not in regard of him,” but because 
of Luce (E2r). Further, the Uncle gives Luce “100 angels,” money that should go to her husband 
as the head of the household, but the Uncle explicitly forbids it (E2r). Luce’s performance reads 
as an example of feminine orthodoxy—while enduring hostility from her husband, she prostates 
herself in his defense. As a result, the Uncle treats her as someone to be pitied, aided, trusted, 
and respected, unlike her husband. As Jennifer Panek discusses in her work on the pressures of 
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public scrutiny and credit in the prodigal husband plays, “the public nature of [the wife’s] 
submission paradoxically undermines her husband’s authority even as she elaborately defers to 
it.”81 For Panek, even when the wife is acting in the husband’s best interest, “the fact that it is 
public means it is felt by the husband as a kind of defiance, insofar as it works to discredit 
him.”82 It is the larger audience—one that sees the wife as worthy and the husband as deficient—
that generates both the anxiety for the husband and the precarious condition for the wife because 
in seeking needed support for her family, she discredits her husband’s ability to do so. Through 
providing evidence of her acceptable behavior in an attempt to help her husband, Luce 
inadvertently publicly names Matthew as unfit. 
The economic acumen and understanding of the power of reputation and its ability to 
foster or destroy networked support shown in the portrayals of the Wife and Luce resonates 
beyond early modern drama in the correspondence of Elizabeth Bourne, similarly bound to a 
prodigal husband. Anthony leaves the realm in late spring 1577 with his long-time mistress 
without the Queen’s consent. Subsequently, he is captured and placed in the Tower of London.83 
According to the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, Ca3, “any native departing the kingdom without the 
Queen’s license forfeited to her Majesty the profits of all his lands and also his goods and 
chattels.”84 Though restitution is granted upon the offender’s submission, the Bournes incur a 
one thousand pound fine that places them in an economically precarious state. Similarly, 
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Anthony’s actions—breaking the laws of the realm while publicly absconding with another 
man’s wife—causes further damage to the family’s reputation, which makes it more challenging 
for Elizabeth to seek aid because his credit—like Matthew’s in The London Prodigal—is found 
lacking. Like her counterparts in early modern drama discussed previously, due to the failings of 
her husband, Elizabeth petitions for assistance in negotiating an economic settlement to protect 
her estate.  
Good Mistress Morgan with my harty thankes for your great Curtesy, showed me, 
I commend my self to you most hartelie praying you amongst the rest of 
your Freindshippe towards me that you will wyttsafe85 to delyver me a letter to 
good Mistress Blanchaparry and that you will entreat her most ernestlie to move 
her Majestie for me in a Reasonable sute. 86  
Elizabeth solicits Mistress Morgan’s help in entreating Blanche Perry to convince the Queen to 
approve a payment plan for the Bournes’ fine.87 At the time the letter is written, Anthony Bourne 
is not a prisoner in the Tower as evidenced by Elizabeth’s declaration that if a settlement cannot 
be reached, Anthony “shalbe imprisoned and I vndone.”88 Presumably, then, he is capable of 
negotiating the terms himself, but it is Elizabeth’s reputation and connections that facilitate the 
opportunity. Rather than simply “managing their [husbands] affairs in their absence,” as Tim 
Stretton suggests, women might act when their husbands’ behaviors threaten their estate, as seen 
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in Luce’s and the Wife’s interventions.89 Elizabeth’s intervention occurs by her employment of a 
rather standard early modern form of appeal. 
In Lynne Magnusson’s work on the rhetoric of letters of request, she identifies linguistic 
strategies or “social scripts” that appear repeatedly in such letters.90 The first is “humility and 
entreaty” and the second is “supposal and assurance.”91 Elizabeth begins her letter with humility 
by acknowledging her debt for the kindness Mistress Morgan has shown her. The entreaty comes 
as Elizabeth beseeches further aid in having Mistress Morgan act as a conduit for another 
request, this one to Blanche Parry. Elizabeth ends her letter with a supposal, she assumes that 
Mistress Morgan will be successful in her suit, and provides an assurance—“I will requite any 
good you shall doe me to the vttermost of my power”—by offering different cash payments to 
Mistress Morgan depending on what outcome she negotiates.92 The understanding of these 
rhetorical strategies is useful because they similarly appear in verbal appeals on the early modern 
stage as seen in Luce’s petition to Matthew’s Uncle. The conventional structure, whether in 
literary or cultural documents, implies a broad social acceptance of the form. As such, the 
request becomes a culturally sanctioned mode of correspondence—verbal or written—for 
women to be heard, otherwise, as Luce notes, “womens words are faint” (E1v).93  
A similar structure of humility, entreaty, supposal, and assurance combines with the 
rhetoric of feminine need in the speeches of Luce and the Wife within the prodigal husband 
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plays. Luce begs the favor of her husband’s Uncle and the Wife seeks relief from her own Uncle. 
Within the worlds of the plays, when a woman lacks support from her husband, she turns to 
another male familial authority figure.94 This idealized version of kinship works to maintain 
patriarchal authority and guarantees that a wife’s labor for her family remains bound to and 
supervised by an appropriate male figure. However, the example of Elizabeth’s letter of request 
to Mistress Morgan intimates that this ideal was not always possible or the most fruitful course 
for early modern wives.95 Elizabeth draws on a network of highly influential women capable of 
effecting change and negotiating financial settlements without relying on the input of their 
husbands. In doing so, Elizabeth’s letter depicts the aptitude for independent action and thought 
by early modern women, at least when corresponding with other women.  
While Magnusson’s rhetorical scripts apply to various forms of early modern petitions by 
both genders, James Daybell argues that women employ what he terms as “negative female 
gender assumptions” including “female ‘weakness,’ ‘frailty,’ ‘vulnerability’ and women’s 
intellectual and physical ‘inferiority’ to men.”96 Elizabeth’s application of these tropes appears 
throughout her correspondence, particularly in her letters to Julius Caesar, John Conway, and 
Edward Conway; however, her letter to Mistress Morgan omits any suggestion of feminine 
intellectual inferiority. In fact, Elizabeth’s economic shrewdness and understanding of the 
financial obligations of their estate—particularly in contrast to her husband’s amassed debts—
 
94  Luce loses her father’s support because she refuses to forget her vows to Matthew and God 
and take another husband. In lacking access to relief from her father, she turns to her 
husband’s family. 
95  Admittedly, Elizabeth repeatedly calls on her step-father James Mervin, particularly when 
dealing with legal matters and the Lords of the Privy Counsel, but she seeks help from men 
and women outside of her family, as well. 
96  Daybell, “Scripting a Female Voice,” 15. 
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along with her assumption that Mistress Morgan and Blanche Perry will both comprehend the 
benefits and necessity of the solution Elizabeth proposes, suggests that all of these women 
possess a certain fiscal intellect. The Wife in The Yorkshire Tragedy and Luce in The London 
Prodigal both display similar financial wisdom. The Wife secures a post for her husband rather 
than risk the permanent loss of monetary gain from selling property, and Luce acknowledges the 
dangers of buying on credit and declares her willingness to work to secure her husband’s 
freedom. The rhetorical strategy and fiscal shrewdness apparent in Bourne’s letter reiterates 
Luce’s own claim of financial restraint in her verbal plea. Further, Luce and Elizabeth imply that 
if their requests are met, they will compensate those who aid them—Luce offers to labor, beg, or 
steal to compensate Matthew’s uncle for his assistance, while Bourne promises a cash 
settlement—revealing an acute sense of the workings of the culture of credit and exchange.  
Admittedly, Elizabeth’s intended audience in this particular petition is comprised of well-
educated and connected women, rather than men who may expect shows of gendered deference. 
While avoiding some negative female gender assumptions, Elizabeth stresses her vulnerability. 
In writing to Mistress Morgan, Elizabeth refers to herself as a “poore unfortunate friend” and 
despairs “yf I can not obteyne this favour I and all myne shall presentlie beg and be vndone.”97 
She extends her suffering to those around her and, as such, implies that she seeks relief for the 
good of her family, not just herself. In Daybell’s terms, the repeated use of the narrative of 
feminine vulnerability shows that women had a keen understanding of cultural gender roles and 
would consequently employ a specifically feminine “rhetorical skill in wringing out the 
maximum amount of empathy for their situation.”98 The gendered discourse of deference and 
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helplessness that Daybell points to in women’s letters to men whereby they depict “themselves 
and other women as objects of pity, as victims of poverty and suffering,” becomes a 
performative tactic to obtain a desired outcome.99 The view that “[g]reat effort was made by 
women to emphasize the level of distress experienced, their unfortunate, miserable condition, 
and often their desperation, lack of comfort or help elsewhere,” supports my argument that wives 
were often viewed and represented as inhabiting a precarious position within early modern 
culture.100 If the stability and companionate marriage championed in conduct literature was 
assured within their society, the terminology of vulnerability would lack sway. Although I agree 
with Daybell’s assessment of the practice of eliciting pity through an appropriation of feminine 
weakness, the custom also serves to couch a woman’s overt attempt at action—which may be 
deemed inappropriate or beyond the purview of a good wife—by underlining the precariousness 
of her situation and need for protection. In this way, women may appropriate the social script to 
their own advantage. In contrast to her letter to Mistress Morgan, the appropriation of gendered 
rhetorical scripts appears repeatedly in Elizabeth’s correspondence seeking aid to sequester 




III. “I CAN NOT WITHOUT EXTREME FOLLY REFUSE THIS LAWEFULL MEANES”101  
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 Husbands and wives could not sue each other, except in “ecclesiastical courts, which 
allowed married women to bring actions in their own right,” in instances of defamation and 
“separation proceedings.”102 Elizabeth took advantage of her right to sue at court, admitting in 
her initial letter to Caesar that “A bowt fower yeres passed I dyd retayne cownsell and dyd serve 
[Anthony] wyth process and he wold not appere and answer hit.”103 Within this statement, 
Elizabeth reveals a problem with the ecclesiastical process for divorce: Anthony is able to stall 
Elizabeth’s first attempt at a legal separation by refusing to appear in court. According to 
ecclesiastical law, a wife is able to sue in her own person, but if the other party delays or refuses 
to comply, the church courts are limited in their recourse. The church could excommunicate a 
person or demand penance, but arresting or fining a delinquent litigant was only an option for 
common law courts. Considering the difficulty of proving cruelty, the time to judgment (often 2 
or 3 years), and the limited success of separation lawsuits, Elizabeth’s impulse to circumvent the 
church court appears sound.104 In some ways, her decision to utilize her economic and personal 
resources—here, her mother—in order to gain the favor of Sir Francis Walsingham and the Privy 
Council, which in turn facilitate her access to the legal assistance of Julius Caesar, fulfills 
Salome’s own circumvention of the law. Salome asserts that her high status allows her to claim 
the divorce she desires, “And with an off’ring will I purge my sin; / The law was made for none 
but who are poor” (1.4.311–312). While early modern law was not necessarily accessible for the 
 
102 Stretton, Marital Litigation, 3. 
103  BL, Add. MS, 12507, fol. 204, 18 Aug 1582. 
104  Within the surviving documents, it is unclear if Elizabeth has Caesar process her suit 
through the Church court. In his response to her complaint, he answers her questions based 
on the laws of the Ecclesiastical courts; however, there are no records of the Bournes’ case 
within the surviving court records and the Indenture that grants her a portion and recognizes 
her “sole lyfe” is demanded by and submitted to the Privy Council (NA, SP13/c, fol. 028, 
[18 Jan] 1385.). 
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poor—legal disputes tended to require a great deal of money to process—Salome’s point about 
the ability of those in power to bypass the normal legal means is apt for Elizabeth’s case.105 But 
while her powerful networks of support and her financial means opened up channels that she 
would have otherwise lacked, Elizabeth still had to assume the posture of deference and 
desperation in order to obtain the legal status of femme sole. 
 Lady Amy Mervin, Elizabeth’s mother, shows similar feminine deference and employs 
the rhetoric of desperation on behalf of her daughter when writing to Sir Francis Walsingham to 
follow up Elizabeth’s own “Sypplycation to mye lordes of the councell.”106 As one of Queen 
Elizabeth’s ladies in waiting and wife to one of the Queen’s legal advisors, Lady Mervin wielded 
some influence at court, as is evidenced by her correspondence with Walsingham. Mervin begins 
her letter with seeming disdain for her daughter’s “unwylling mynde to be reconsyled to her 
husband.” She suggests that if motherly affection did not force her to “tender [Elizabeth’s] well 
[b]eing as [her] awne,” she would be furious that Elizabeth refuses to follow the advice of her 
betters who wish her to reconcile with her husband. By chastising her daughter’s behavior—in 
her refusal to live with Anthony, her disregard of advice, and her “lyving a fugytive in continuall 
feare” rather than submit to the Council—Mervin acknowledges the proper behavior and 
obedience required by Elizabeth’s status as a wife and a woman subject to patriarchal authorities 
(her husband and the Council). However, Mervin also acknowledges her position as a mother 
 
105  The exception to this was the Court of Requests, which was an equity court that became 
known for receiving claims from widows, orphans, and the poor. See Stretton, Women 
Waging Law, 180–187. Caesar, Elizabeth’s lawyer, became Master of Requests at the end of 
the 1500s. 
106  NA, SP 12/154, fol. 85r. The “lordes of the councell” to whom Lady Mervin refers are the 
members of the Queen’s Privy Council. The following quotations from Lady Mervin’s letter 
are all from this manuscript; for a full transcription, see http://opencuny.org/bourne/na-sp-
12-154-85/. 
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who is obligated to defend her daughter; if she did not, she claims she would make a “shipwrack 
of Nature conscience and creddyte.” In claiming her status as a mother, Mervin provides a sort of 
rhetorical apology for her subsequent defense of Elizabeth and her plea for aid for her daughter. 
In echoing Elizabeth’s own descriptions in her correspondence, Mervin prays, “Naye woulde god 
she showlde lyve but in feare and not rather in assurance” of Anthony’s violence. Further, she 
points out that as a femme covert, Elizabeth lacks legal redress if Anthony forces himself upon 
her property, person, or goods: “What lawe can she have agaynst him yf he shall eyther enter 
upon her landes, or can combyn eyther her parson or anye of her goodes[?]” She offers witness 
to Anthony’s supposed habit of disregarding his legal agreements: “what will he care for the 
breache of his band,” when he has done so before. She closes her plea by asking the Council’s 
assistance in protecting her daughter from Anthony’s assured abuses, “I besceche you consyder 
what better dealinge, then after this rate can be expected for mye daughter, unlesse your 
honorable compassions and authorytye prevente him.” In locating the Council as Elizabeth’s last 
hope of defense against a man Lady Mervin claims is prone to violence and breaking his oaths, 
she argues for their intervention, stresses the necessity of community support for wives in 
vulnerable positions,107 and points out the heightened precarity for women who must balance the 
often conflicting requirements of patriarchal deference and self preservation. Lady Mervin’s 
acknowledgement of her daughter’s unorthodox actions and her defense of the same affords one 
example of early modern women’s need to preface their appeals, particularly those addressed to 
 
107  Elizabeth drew much support for her separation from her own family members who were 
powerfully connected at court. Her mother, Lady Amy Mervin, notes that she will “make 
suche frendes as I can for the fauor of your cause” and that Elizabeth’s step-father, James 
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174, 28 Aug 1584.). 
148 
men, with a stated understanding of appropriate models of female behavior. Similarly, in asking 
for assistance that if granted would go against the patriarchal projects of marriage and patrilineal 
succession, Mervin situates the request as unconventional, but necessary when men fail to 
provide suitable conditions for marital accord. In attesting to Anthony’s poor credit—as seen in 
his disregard for his bond—and tendency toward violence and economic ruin, Mervin affirms 
cultural expectations of appropriate male conduct while simultaneously maintaining that her son-
in-law’s conduct fails to meet such expectations. 
Elizabeth Bourne’s complaint dated 6 December 1582, in which she catalogues charges 
against Anthony as evidence of her need to obtain a divorce a mensa et thoro, combines many of 
the gendered rhetorical strategies discussed throughout this chapter: she names Anthony a 
prodigal husband; acknowledges the cultural stigma of speaking publicly against him; portrays 
herself as a vulnerable wife in need of protection from his violence (emotional, economic, 
physical, and spiritual); and includes a litany of honorable witnesses who may attest to both 
Anthony’s malicious behavior and her suffering, thereby referring the judgment of their 
reputations to a larger community. Over the course of eight double-sided folio manuscript pages, 
she represents herself as long-suffering wife while crafting a narrative for Anthony that renders 
him an unfit husband who embodies the bad spouse trifecta of cruelty, adultery, and 
abandonment. 
In opening the complaint by stating that Anthony began his adulteries “immediately after 
[they] were married,” Elizabeth infers that for sixteen years her husband has never fulfilled his 
marital obligation of “chaste loue.”108 She acknowledges that at the outset of her marriage, she 
 
108  BL, Add. MS, 38170, fol. 151r. For a full transcription, see http://opencuny.org/bourne/bl-
add-38170-fol-151/.  
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maintained “hope of his amendment,” assuming that “time should teach him the difference 
betwene vice and vertue (considering then his young yeres).”109 Her description of both his 
adultery, his youth, and her willingness to endure, to “bury my secret sorrowes a long time in 
silence,” situate Anthony as a prodigal husband enjoying the vices of youth and her as the long 
suffering wife, awaiting his amendment. Her appropriation of this narrative aligns her with 
literary figures of the patient wife and places Anthony’s actions within a broader cultural frame 
of the riotous youth. In many ways, the rhetoric of Elizabeth’s words echo those of the wives in 
the prodigal husband plays. Luce, in The London Prodigal, tries to make excuses for her 
husband’s behavior when she urges, “Impute his wildnesse syr, vnto his youth, / And thinke that 
now is the time he doth repent” (E2r). Though Matthew, her husband, is not so soon reconciled 
to her, just as Anthony is not to Elizabeth, Luce assumes, as Elizabeth did, that the cause is his 
youth. While Luce and Elizabeth perform the expected feminine behavior of patience in response 
to actions of their husbands, the Wife in The Yorkshire Tragedy in her initial monologue 
expresses the underlying anxiety and vulnerability that women face when married to prodigal 
husbands: 
What will become of us? 
… 
Are these the virtues that his youth did promise— 
Dice, and voluptuous meetings, midnight revels, 
Taking his bed with surfeits ill beseeming  
The ancient honour of his house and name? (2.1, 6–9) 
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While her critique of her husband is private in that it occurs as a monologue, it is made public by 
the audience who witnesses her distress. The Wife’s stated fear for her family suggests that their 
access to a livable life is bound up in her husband’s actions, which currently leaves them 
susceptible to economic and social ruin due to his gambling and adultery. In impoverishing his 
estate and his reputation, the Husband’s behavior extends beyond his own destruction to the 
detriment of his wife, children, and his family’s name.  
As Jennifer Panek has shown, the prodigal husband plays “hint at a kind of male marital 
discontent” that derives from anxieties of “the social role of husband in its liminal stages.”110 
Panek argues that because of the gendered nature of the early modern credit system, men were 
subjected to increased public scrutiny upon marriage.111 The frequency with which the rebellious 
husband figure appears in literary and cultural documents implies a cultural unease with spouses 
who refuse the tenets of patriarchal strictures, while exposing the social pressures that may drive 
men to rebel from the domestic sphere. The problem with Panek’s observations that men must 
work through the transition from “bachelor to husband” and the literary representations that 
imply the success of that transition—particularly when husbands are married to patient wives—is 
that neither accounts for occasions when men refuse repentance and reconciliation. Though 
Elizabeth initially bears the burden of her husband’s behavior and assumes that he will repent, 
she concedes that “time wrought contrary to my hope: in steade of my wished good and his 
amendment, I haue found nothing but the continuall increase of his ill, to a due confirmation of 
my despaire of better.”112 In this light, the prodigal husband plays become idealized narratives 
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whereby a woman’s orthodox performance of feminine obedience and endurance inspires her 
husband’s repentance; her patience is rewarded with marital accord. In contrast, Elizabeth’s case 
exposes the limits of female endurance when reconciliation fails to occur. In noting the 
“continuall incease of his ill,” Elizabeth challenges the notion that feminine labor will secure 
marital accord. In appropriating the cultural rhetoric of the prodigal husband and insisting that 
her husband has remained one for sixteen years, Elizabeth underlines the precarious position of 
wives who are expected to maintain obedience and devotion to husbands who refuse to repent. 
The further challenge of Elizabeth’s case derives, in part, from the fact that despite her 
husband’s long abandonment where he “refused to liue with mee, theise sixe yeres, in breach of 
his holy vowe of chast matrimonie,” Anthony now desires to return home.113 Her petition, then, 
becomes a protective strategy—a countersuit to Anthony’s request to the Council that they 
require that she accept him—and an example of Susan Dwyer Amussen’s claim that legal 
separations “formalized living arrangements most couples had long since made.”114 Though 
Elizabeth had previously sought a separation from the Ecclesiastical courts during their time 
apart, Anthony’s return acts as a catalyst prompting her to pursue the divorce with a heightened 
sense of urgency. In defense of her refusal to appear before the Council at Anthony’s behest—for 
fear of her lack of legal recourse should he take her into his possession against her will—she 
claims that beyond “satisfieng of [her] betters and the worlde,” she narrates her history to 
safeguard against slander and the ruin of her reputation, “to avoide the imputation of an 
vnreasonable creature in my selfe.”115 In couching her complaint against Anthony as a show of 
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deference to satisfy the Council, she thwarts accusations of willful disobedience—in refusing to 
appear before the Council—and the stigma of shrewish women who complain about and chide 
their husbands. 
For Elizabeth, the expectation of feminine silence within the good wife trope comes into 
conflict with the equal expectation of obedience to authority. She exploits this conflict to her 
advantage as she positions herself as a reluctant petitioner. She bemoans: 
So heavy bee theise griefes, and so vnfit a thing it is for a wife publickely to 
complaine against her husband, that is vnwillinglie, by his owne want of gods 
grace and good consideration, I were not compelled, I would rather commit his 
sinnes, with my sorrowes, to the scilence of my grave, then to the vewe and 
iudgement of anie living creature.116  
Her keen understanding of the dangers, the “discursive risk,”117 of speaking out against her 
husband in a public sphere primarily inhabited by men suggests a political and legal savvy that is 
in some ways incongruent to the image of private patience and suffering—her willingness to take 
his “sinnes” and her “sorrows” to the grave—she portrays through her words. Elizabeth’s 
narrative teems with evidence of her knowledge of “acceptable models of female behavior at 
court,” that she appropriates as a performative tactic to achieve her desired goal: a separation 
from her husband.118 Throughout the complaint she uses rhetoric of endurance to describe her 
torment, which allows her to maintain a balance between idealized female passivity while 
fulfilling her need for legal action. Her account of Anthony’s continued adultery, as well as her 
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economic, emotional, and physical duress, underlines her vulnerability and her need of the 
Council’s help. 
As discussed previously, while adultery and cruelty are the primary grounds for a legal 
separation in the early modern period, there existed a gendered division in cases whereby men 
claimed adultery and women cruelty. The split reflects cultural fears of gendered disorder. The 
unchaste female threatens to disrupt patrilineal succession, marital and social order.119 For men, 
the line between appropriate levels of violence for correction and inappropriate tyranny is often 
more blurred. Drawing on the work of Martin Ingram, Frances Dolan claims that despite 
acceptable forms of physical correction, in Ecclesiastical cases where men were accused of 
cruelty, “the community judged such men’s domestic violence as a symptom of uncontrol and 
abnormality,” even to the extent of assuming that such inability to restrain oneself implies 
“mental disturbance or instability.”120 For men and women, then, the gendered accusations of 
adultery and cruelty both result in broader implications of social instability that requires 
community enforcement and containment.121 
The violence that the Husband threatens and subsequently inflicts on the Wife and their 
children in The Yorkshire Tragedy reflects this fear of immoderate behavior pushed to instability. 
When the Husband discovers that the Wife has not consented to sell her land as he demanded, 
the Husband draws a dagger on her and threatens, almost distractedly, “Money, whore, money, 
or I’ll—” (3.69–70). The quick entrance of a servant interrupts the Husband’s attack and seems 
to call him back to his senses. The Wife decries, “Was ever wife so wretchedly beset? / Had not 
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the news stepped in between, the point / Had offered violence to my breast” (3.80–82). Further 
evidence of the distraction that accompanies violence occurs when the husband “Tears his hair” 
before stabbing his son (4.82 SD). And, finally, when the servant tries to subdue his master, the 
Husband admits his own lack of restraint in exercising his authority; “Com’s thou between my 
fury to question me?” (5.30). The representation of excessive force and unnatural cruelty 
exhibited in this scene of filicide is an extreme case; however, the threatened violence, lack of 
control, and the need for an intermediary to protect the wife from further abuse are all elements 
that appear in Elizabeth’s accusations against Anthony. 
In a similar situation to the Husband demanding the Wife sell her property for his own 
use, Elizabeth claims Anthony ordered her to return to him half of the portion allotted for the 
maintenance of her and her daughters. In response she offered him “the whole, so hee woulde 
refuse” Mistress Pagnam (his long-time companion). According to Elizabeth: 
Hee fell so passionate at this my annswere, that he reviled mee with all the ill 
wordes hee could devise: hee offred mee the terrour of his dagger, (which my 
father Sir James Marvin saved mee from) with solemne othes vowed, hee would 
teare the skinne of my backe; if hee might not, hee would blowe vp mee and my 
howse with gownepowder, but hee would bee revenged and rid of mee.122 
In offering him her entire portion if he would leave his mistress, Elizabeth begins the narrative 
by situating herself as the morally superior one in their relationship. She does not deny him his 
claim to her finances, but she asks that in return for her acquiescence he agree to live a chaste 
life. Her deference to her husband simultaneously acts as a corrective. Rather than accept her 
offer, he verbally abuses her, threatens her with a dagger, and when her step-father refrains 
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Anthony from harming her, he vows bodily harm and revenge. The specificity and severity of the 
crimes he threatens—skinning her and blowing up her house—function to shock the reader and 
suggest that Anthony, like the Husband in The Yorkshire Tragedy, is unstable. Her use of 
“passionate” as her descriptor for his behavior implies his volatility and excess of emotions. In 
this one example, among many, Elizabeth represents herself as the wronged spouse attempting to 
help her husband reform. She points out Anthony’s readiness to foresake his bond in demanding 
part of her portion. She shows his refusal to leave his incontinent life with Mistress Pagnam. She 
names him emotionally unstable. And she verifies the immediate and future threat of cruelty 
beyond the physical: he is capable of verbal, emotional, physical, and economic violence. 
Finally, in noting that she would have been harmed without the intervention of her step-father, 
she situates herself as a defenseless woman in need of protection while providing a credible 
witness to the entire event. 
Elizabeth’s broadening of her definition of cruelty to include various types of 
intimidation follows standard conventions for female litigants. As Laura Gowing has observed, 
“Although canon law restricted the definition of cruelty to physical violence, plaintiffs and their 
witnesses, especially women, attended with as much care to the economic, mental, and verbal 
cruelty that gave violence its context, revealing the broader popular conception of marital 
breakdown.”123 As both Bourne and Gowing’s work on domestic violence show, early modern 
culture defined a range of abuses as violence and considered them all as evidence of instability in 
a marital union. 
Though cruelty is the only offense that Elizabeth needs to prove in order to secure a 
separation, she spends a substantial amount of time detailing Anthony’s alleged adultery. 
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Elizabeth mentions ten specific instances of adultery in the complaint. Many of the women she 
mentions by name, including several wives of gentlemen. In providing names and reiterating 
stories told of Anthony’s exploits, she satisfies the demands for divorce set forth by Caesar: 
Anthony is an “open adulterer.” The descriptions include charges of illegitimate children, 
excessive spending, and instances of disease. Even when describing “his loose life”—a phrase 
she uses repeatedly—she takes pains to demonstrate how his excess with women spills over into 
a lack of restraint in other areas of his life, or as she states, “ill doings breede ill thinkings, and of 
corrupted manners spring pervertted iudgements.”124 She situates his adulteries as a symptom of 
a broader pattern of corruption. In this pattern she includes spiritual depravity, claiming that his 
“licenstious and wanton life doth make me feare least hee bee growen into a kind of atheiste a 
thing most dangerous to them that shall live with him.”125 The Wife in The Yorkshire Tragedy 
observes a similar sign of moral degradation in her husband when she observes that he, 
“Forgetting heaven, looks downward” (2.16). The suggestion in both the play and within 
Elizabeth’s complaint is that if someone is capable of the depraved behavior exhibited by the 
Husband and Anthony, they must have lost faith in God. In naming Anthony an atheist, Elizabeth 
moves beyond the claim of him as an unfit husband who may physically cause her injury, to a 
larger argument that his soul is damaged and therefore he is untrustworthy and likely to bring 
about the ruin of others. She reiterates an early modern cultural link between adultery, religion, 
and the threat of contamination when she notes that, “[t]he punnishment of adultery by the lawes, 
nowe in vse with vs, is excommunication” and “since hee or shee worthely incurreth 
excommuncation, who keapeth companie with an excommunicate person… I holde it damnable 
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for mee to live with him.”126 Elizabeth employs rhetoric of religious devotion to justify her desire 
to live separate from her husband. While she positions her argument as one of declaring her own 
virtue and commitment to God—in contrast to her husband—she intimates that if the Council 
forces her to live with him, they will not only place her body in jeopardy but her soul, as well. 
In detailing Anthony’s moral and spiritual corruption, Elizabeth narrates a history of his 
life that contends he is incapable of change or remorse; specifically, he is incapable of living 
with her in “chast matrimonie.”127 She attests that there are, “manie others [women] I could 
particularly name; but theise are to manie, for mee to hope, that ever hee will bee reformed; hee 
beganne so young, and hath continued so manie yeres.”128 Initially, she describes him as a 
rebellious youth and herself as a patient wife holding out hope for his amendment, like the Wife 
and Luce; however, Elizabeth shifts the narrative to one of continued depravity on his part and 
her loss of faith after his many false attempts at reconciliation. Unlike Matthew and the Husband 
in the prodigal husband plays, Anthony will not repent.129 For Elizabeth, the main factor in his 
refusal to mend his ways is Mistress Pagnam.  
Master Bourne hath, not vppon anie heate or sudden motion of his minde, but 
vppon a long and deliberate purpose (yea since his fained shewe of desire to liue 
with mee), so dispossed, mee of his loue (if ever hee loued mee), and so fixedly 
hath placed it on Mistres Pagnam, that it is impossible to remove it.130 
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In contrast, Anthony’s “passionate” outbursts or the heated affairs of his youth, Anthony is 
steadfast when it comes to his devotion to Mistress Pagnam. Despite gestures Anthony makes 
toward reconciliation, Elizabeth argues that marital accord between the Bournes is impossible 
because he will never leave his mistress. Through her acknowledgement of Anthony’s love for 
Mistress Pangman, Elizabeth presents herself as precarious wife, not unlike Doris and Katherine 
discussed in the Chapter One, who is left with little recourse when her husband’s affections 
cause him to seek another wife.131 Elizabeth names Anthony’s love for Mistress Pagnam 
permanent and as proof of their bond she reiterates Anthony’s abandonment, his “wilfull refusall 
to dwell with” her for “6 yeres.”132 
The strategy of naming in order to suggest identity, describe character, and solidify or 
decline relationships occurs in a specific material and performative context within Elizabeth’s 
complaint to Caesar. As with her correspondence, repetition and naming are important for 
Elizabeth within the complaint. The stories told in her letters to family, friends, Anthony, and 
Caesar, all appear here, as well. The language is rehearsed, the details more explicit, the list of 
grievances longer, the witnesses above reproach, and the spiritual attack on Anthony more direct. 
For Elizabeth, this complaint becomes the final dramatization of their marriage and her 
revocation of her status as Anthony’s wife. Anthony may reclaim her as his wife through his 
stated intent to reconcile and live together, but Elizabeth firmly argues for an end to their 
marriage. Nowhere is her refusal to accept Anthony as her spouse seen more clearly than in the 
two instances within the sixteen-page account where she mistakenly writes “my husband.” The 
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word husband appears frequently throughout the document; however, these are the only two 
places where the possessive “my” occurs. In the other instances Elizabeth uses “a husband” or 
“her husband” as a general term when suggesting how a person should or should not act within 
marriage. She also uses “her husband” as a reference to the men Anthony has cuckolded.133 But 
in the two places where she writes “my husband” the text is crossed out. Admittedly, this 
linguistic amendment was likely scribal rather than authorial, but what remains is a physical 
denial of Anthony’s place within Elizabeth’s life. The act of consciously renaming “my 
husband” within the document attests to an end of that relationship within her mind and within 
the legal construct of her complaint. The physical crossing out of Anthony as Elizabeth’s  
husband suggests the broader break with him that 
she seeks through her complaint. As Gowing 
notes, in early modern England “A formal decree 
of separation was, technically, the only way in 
which a couple could live apart” 134  It is this 
formal decree that Elizabeth requires, but not 
because she and Anthony need the court order to 
live apart. As Elizabeth repeatedly proclaims: “hee hath refused to liue with mee, theise sixe 
yeres.”135 It is not Anthony’s absence that drives her to seek protection from the law, but his 
sudden intent to make amends and live with her, again. Her mistrust of his motives are clear: “I 
am most assured hit is not any remorse of conscience, repentance of your sinne, or love of mee 
 
133 Ibid., fol. 152v, 156v, 157r. 
134 Gowing, 181. 
135 BL, Add. MS, 38170, fol. 151r. 
 
“throwgh my husbands his threatenings” 
BL, ADD. MS, 38170, FOL. 154. 
 
“and my husbands both Master Bournes like” 
BL, ADD. MS, 38170, FOL. 154. 
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that moves you nowe to live with mee hit is bare neede.”136 She argues that Anthony is driven by 
monetary need to seek her company, and fears for her own physical and financial ruin if he is 
allowed access to her property and her person. 
Throughout her letters and the complaint, it is clear that physical proximity and control 
over access to her person, her property, and her kin, are paramount to Elizabeth’s notion of 
herself and her relationships. Those with whom she chooses to interact are given titles of 
endearment and knowledge of where she “consele[s] [her] lyfe.”137 In contrast, she sequesters 
herself from others, particularly those who encourage her reconciliation with Anthony. Her 
control over her physical space mirrors her attempts to control her legal status. In an undated 
letter to Anthony, she defines their relationship based on times of absence and presence: “when 
you had me, I was your wife.” 138 Her statement infers that for Elizabeth, a crucial signifier of 
identity and martial status lies in whether or not the couple inhabits the same space. By placing 
the comment in the past tense, Elizabeth denies the name of wife, but she also inadvertently sets 
up a conditional by which if Anthony has her—if he is able to gain access to her—she will be his 
wife, again. Her fear of him taking her “in to his posessyon agaynst [her] wyll” makes sense 
 
136  BL, Add. MS. 23212, fol. 14, 20 Feb Unknown Year. 
137  See Elizabeth’s naming of Edward Conway as “sonne Conway” (BL, Add. MS. 23212, fol. 
12) or her confiding in her sister that she stays at Sarsden (NA, SP12/ 175, fol. 21, Nov 
1584). Elizabeth’s awareness of the danger she faces if others have control over her 
physically continues after she is granted her separation from Anthony (NA, SP 12/198, fol. 
36, 6 Feb 1587). For a transcription of the latter two examples, see 
http://opencuny.org/bourne/. 
138  BL, Add. MS. 23212, fol. 12–16, 20 Feb Unknown Year. Though the year of the letter is 
unclear, it is likely 1583 or 1584. Within the letter Elizabeth references the involvement of 
the Privy Council. In a note to Edward Conway she references Caesar to whom she first 
wrote in July 1582. 
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within this definition of marriage,139 as does the urgency with which Elizabeth Bourne seeks a 
legal separation from Anthony Bourne, a separation that is repeatedly discouraged by the Lords 
of the Council but ultimately granted.140 
Elizabeth’s ritualistic self-representation as a precarious wife becomes a way to protect 
herself from the slander she may incur as a woman seeking legal redress against her husband. 
The repetition of this narrative also fosters public identities for Elizabeth and Anthony that are 
open to equally public censure. Her writing, in effect, propagates the stories told about him.141 
 
139  BL, Add. MS, 12507, fol. 204, 18 Aug 1582. 
140 NA, SP13/c, fol. 028, [18 Jan] 1385. For a full transcription of the “Arbitrators Report, 
Indenture of Award,” see http://opencuny.org/bourne/na-sp-13c-fol-028/. Though the 
Arbitrators reiterate their hope that the Bournes will reconcile—“That if hit happen any 
reconciliacion to be had between the saide Anthony Bourne and Elizabeth his wife (as the 
said arbitrators hope and wysh and the saide Anthony Bourne himself doeth pretende and 
faithefully promiseth to endevore and seeke)”—they make provisions for Elizabeth to live 
separate from her husband. John Conway is charged with overseeing Elizabeth’s “porcion of 
lan[d]s or other substaunce whatsoever due, lynntted, or appointed for themaineteynaunce of 
the saide Elizabeth Bourne during her sole lyfe or sepparacion from the saide Anthony her 
husband” (emphasis mine). The Indenture explicitly gives Elizabeth a designated 
maintenance and legally acknowledges her “sole lyfe.” It also guarantees that if the couple 
reunites, Elizabeth will have a say in the bonds concerning her property, “the saide Anthony 
Bourne wyll geve and performe goode and sufficient assurannce aswell for the security and 
goode vsage of the person of the saide Elizabeth his wyfe to her lykinge, as of her goodes 
and landes” (emphasis mine). In granting Elizabeth femme sole status, but also outlining 
conditions for the couple’s reunion, the Arbitrators inadvertently expose the malleability in 
marital status for early modern couples. Elizabeth was a femme covert, but now may live a 
sole lyfe. If she and Anthony reconcile, she would become femme covert, again, but 
according to the Arbitrators, she would maintain some control over her property, essentially 
straddling the two identities. 
141 The infamy of Anthony’s affairs is documented by others, as well. John Conway, after 
hearing of Anthony’s plans to flee to France with Mistress Pagnam, writes a lengthy plea 
advising Anthony to “leave her and your unlawful passions if it be possible” (As qtd. in 
Bradford, 58–62.). Further, one of Anthony’s affairs is the topic of a joke by Francis Bacon 
in a section on “Apophthegms” in his Works: “Secretary Bourn’s son kept a gentleman’s 
wife in Shropshire, who lived from her husband with him. When he was weary of her, he 
caused her husband to be dealt with to take her home, and offered him five hundred pounds 
for reparation. The gentleman went to Sir Henry Sidney, to take his advice upon this offer; 
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Throughout her correspondence, her stories of Anthony’s neglect, scheming, and “incontinent 
life” function as both offensive and defensive maneuvers.142 She defines Anthony as a prime 
example of a corrupt man who is physically and spiritually diseased through reaffirming his 
infamous reputation as an adulterer, history of legal trouble, explosive temper, economic waste, 
and his “dissolute and loose life.”143 Through Elizabeth’s telling, Anthony’s identity becomes 
synonymous with that of a bad husband and perhaps more importantly a bad subject. In contrast 
to her wayward husband, Elizabeth’s heroic patience and endurance serve as an example of 
model female behavior. In reiterating Anthony’s personal failures, Elizabeth simultaneously 
shows herself to be exemplary. By naming Anthony an unfit husband who has abandoned her for 
six years, Elizabeth argues that in essence she has lived as a femme sole and now deserves the 
legal right to remain so. 
The example of Elizabeth and Anthony Bourne serves as a case study of cultural 
narratives surrounding acceptable behavior for pre-modern husbands and wives as it 
simultaneously catalogs the social, economic, emotional, spiritual, and physical dangers that 
early modern wives may face. As Elizabeth works through the litany of accusations against 
Anthony and his failings as a husband, she implicitly draws on and reaffirms cultural 
assumptions about how a husband should behave. Similarly, her self-representation aligns her 
with appropriate feminine behaviors, while, somewhat counterintuitively, allowing her to craft an 
identity separate from her husband.  
 
telling him; That his wife promised now a new life; and, to tell him truth, five hundred 
pounds would come well with him; and besides, that sometimes he wanted a woman in his 
bed. By my troth, (said Sir Henry Sidney) take her home, and take the money; and then 
whereas other cuckholds wear their horns plain, you may wear yours gilt” (Bacon, 131) 
142  BL, Add. MS, 38170, fol. 156r. 
143 Ibid. 
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In arguing that she is a good wife who upheld her end of the marital social contract, 
Elizabeth maneuvers into a space where she is not a wife, but neither is she “nothing.” Unlike 
Mariana in Measure for Measure who is not a maid but not yet recognized publicly as a wife, 
Elizabeth and the other women discussed throughout this project are wives and are not wives. 
The disconnect between these women and their socially sanctioned male authority, their 
husbands, exposes an instability in the category of wife that is often overlooked by modern 
scholars who reiterate a normative trajectory for pre-modern women—daughter, wife, widow—
based on their relationship to a series of male authorities.  
While some women are forced into these new identities against their will, others exploit 
the malleability of the category of wife by employing various tactics in order to foster alternate 
identities. Based on the selection of case studies considered here, the effectiveness of the 
strategies, whether to maintain the status of wife or move away from it, depends heavily on the 
woman’s success in garnering support with her cause, usually from networks outside of her 
marriage. For women in unions with men who occupy multiple lines of authority—those who are 
husbands, rules, and even spiritual heads—their precarity is heightened because their husbands 
have greater control over their access to aid. The importance of kinship and alternate networks of 
support is, in some ways, unsurprising because as social beings identity is always contingent on 
the public recognition and acceptance of that identity. Further, while the primary focus of this 
project has been on how marital instability impacts pre-modern wives, there are broader 
questions to be asked about how seemingly personal shifts in marital identities impact 
households, families, friends, communities, and political networks; the ramifications extend far 
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